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ABSTRACT
As an important stage in the economic development of Turkey, the post-WW II import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) started in the early 1950s and lasted until 1980. The aim
of this dissertation was to analyze the major characteristics of growth and structural change
during ISI. Industrial growth during this period passed through three similar cycles each
spanning about a decade. Each cycle started with high growth and high expectations, but
ended with a balance of payments crisis accompanied with a drastic slowdown in growth.
Each crisis led to a standard stabilization program followed by a military coup. One
principal finding was the coincidence of the cycles in industrial growth with the stages of
ISI. This stemmed from the nature of the structural change that took place during ISI. The
process of ISI was increasingly dependent on external resources, especially on imports of
intermediates and raw materials, in addition to capital goods. As a result, industrial growth
became dependent on import availability; the economy could grow only when there was
sufficient foreign exchange, otherwise it would stagnate. Without continuous expansion of
capacity to produce necessary intermediate and capital goods and creation of new
technologies, effective accumulation and expansion of industrial capital was not possible.
In short, as a result of increasing external dependency, the resulting economic structure
was not capable of achieving self-sustaining growth. The second principal finding was that
industrialization initiated through ISI not only failed to acquire a built-in impetus, but also
created an ever increasing external debt. As ISI progressed, each stage became more
import dependent, and thus, each crisis was progressively deeper. Each stabilization
program that followed, in turn, led to increased external debt, thus exacerbating the balance
of payments crisis. This vicious circle of debt made ISI untenable and finally, there was a
switch to export-promotion industrialization (EPI) in 1980.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with general patterns of development and
industrialization in developing countries. The primary focus, however, is on the
development of Turkey as a part of the world capitalistic system. Development of
capitalism as an international system can be characterized by the stages that international
division of labor has passed through and the forms that it has taken throughout history.
The domestic politico-economic structures of the countries involved define an international
division of labor. According to the requirements of this division of labor, certain patterns
of specialization emerge. Therefore, the stages of capitalism can be analyzed depending on
the particular international division of labor and the accompanying domestic structural
changes observed in both the developed and the developing countries. For the purpose of
this thesis what is important is the pattern of changes in the domestic structure of the
developing countries.
Turkish development history followed a pattern similar to both Latin American and
Asian countries (see, for example, Sonmez, 1982 for Turkey; Hirschman, 1968, and Hein
and Stenzel, 1979 for Latin America). It can be roughly divided into three stages, each
with a distinct capital accumulation process:
1. Export economy period - primarily based on the accumulation of commercial and
agricultural capital.
2. Import-substitution period - primarily based on the accumulation of domestic
market-oriented industrial capital.
3. Post-Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) period - opening of domestic market
to international competition at varying degrees, and generally based on the
accumulation of export-oriented industrial capital.
The incorporation of various parts of the world into a Western European centered
capitalist world economic system, which had originated in the 16th century, proceeded
throughout the 18th and the 19th centuries. It was after the industrial revolution, however,
that it was effectively accomplished. The necessity of expanding the markets of this system
on a global scale led to a systematic international division of labor. According to the newly
emerging international division of labor, the non-European world, where the industrial
revolution was not realized, was transformed into the producer and exporter of primary
goods (foodstuffs and raw materials) to industrial Europe, and has also provided the
markets for European manufactures. This was the export economy stage for many
developing countries of Asia and Latin America.
The beginning of underdevelopment can be directly traced to this international
division of labor. The export economy stage, which is defined on the basis of the
productive structures and traded goods, also brought about a differentiation with respect to
socio-political structures of the countries involved. The mode of incorporation into the
world economic system varied from region to region depending on the existing socio-
economic structures and the specific ways they interacted with the world economy.
However, as a result of this incorporation, the existing self-contained societies lost their
internal articulation and were transformed into countries largely dependent on the world
economy. In the cases of Ottoman Turkey and Latin America, external borrowing greatly
stimulated the process of integration into the world economy. (For a detailed analysis, see
Kiray, 1988 on the Ottoman debt; and Cardoso and Faletto, 1979 on the Latin American
case). While in Europe the dominant industrial capital led to the accumulation and
investment of productive capital, in the non-European world landed interests and
commercial capital dominated. As a result, the newly emerging productive structures could
not sustain the domestic accumulation and investment necessary for continued growth.
Thus, the export economy stage brought about certain social, political and economic
structural changes that produced underdevelopment.
The export economy stage, as an international division of labor capable of
reproducing itself lasted until the beginning of the 20th century. However, a period of
crisis extending from the beginning of WW I to the Great Depression of 1929 interrupted
it. This made it possible for the primary exporting countries to initiate their own
industrialization process. Generally, it was an import-substitution industrialization (ISI)
process that was largely based on domestic resources. In this respect, however, the first
stage of ISI in basic consumer goods was in sharp contrast to the period of ISI that would
take place in the post-WW II era. Following a brief period of return to the export economy
stage after WW II, capitalism reorganized itself at the international level. This meant a new
international division of labor and, accordingly, a new round of politico-economic
restructuring in both the developed and the developing countries.
The most salient characteristic of the post-war era was the internationalization of
productive capital. Industrial capital from the developed countries began direct investment
in the newly created national markets of the developing countries. This led to a totally
different period of ISI from the earlier one both in its structure and in its results. It
depended on increasing amounts of foreign investment which also meant transferring the
technology and the consumption norms of the developed industrial countries. Accordingly,
the process of ISI shifted to its second stage, the stage of consumer durables. Later,
however, the third stage of ISI, the intermediate and the capital goods stage, in general
failed to be completed. The resulting crises of ISI led to opening of the domestic
economies to international competition at varying degrees and shifting to export promotion,
i.e., the post-ISI stage.
This thesis is concerned with the ISI stage of development. Specifically, the
process of ISI in the post-WW II period as a stage in the economic development of Turkey
will be analyzed. The focus is on the major characteristics of growth and structural change
during ISI. Given the cyclical character of growth during ISI, the empirical and theoretical
underpinnings of these industrial cycles will be examined.
Since the early 1950s Turkish industrial growth has gone through three rather
similar cycles each spanning about a decade. Figure 1, which shows the percentage
growth rate of the industrial sector during 1950-78, clearly reveals these cycles (Dervis and
Robinson, 1978). Here, the industrial sector is defined to include all non-agricultural
sectors including services. The overall growth rate (the agricultural plus the non-
agricultural growth rates), however, does not closely follow this cyclical pattern. This is
because of the highly volatile nature of agricultural growth due to variations in climatic
conditions. Nevertheless, overall growth is punctuated by periodic downswings (Figure
2). Each cycle starts with a relatively rapid growth and high expectations, but ends with a
major balance of payments crisis accompanied by a drastic slowdown in growth. What
follows, typically, is an IMF-imposed stabilization package, implementation of which is
generally made possible by a military coup. It is this cyclical pattern of industrial growth
in Turkey that provides the foundation for the model to be developed later.
Although the theory presented here is based mainly on the Turkish experience of
industrialization in the post-WW II period, the cyclical pattern of industrial growth during
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ISI is not restricted to Turkey. There are many other examples of it, especially from Latin
America, e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia (see, for example, Malan and
Bonelli, 1977 on Brazil; Cavallo and Mundlak, 1982 on Argentina; Aspra, 1977 on
Mexico; and Berry and Thoumi, 1977 on Colombia). Accordingly, a comparison of the
Turkish experience of ISI with the experiences of other countries helps to shed light on this
strategy of industrialization. This is especially true for the larger Latin American countries
(Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and to some extent Venezuela) which are thought of
sharing common politico-economic developments (Cardoso and Faletto,1979). These
countries are comparable to Turkey in that they all have a similar socio-economic structure
and a process of integration into the international economy, although Turkey follows them
with a considerable time lag. Parallels will help to analyze the Turkish development
history better, not only via direct lessons learned from the Latin American experience, but
also via the application of Latin American approaches to the Turkish case. Although the
Turkish case is often thought of being unique, this comparison points to quite similar
cross-country patterns. Only by discovering the similarities and differences that global
generalizations can be reached.
It is generally agreed that the traditional strategy of development in Turkey is ISI.
The genesis of Turkish ISI dates back to the early 1930s. It is commonly believed that the
Great Depression of 1929 disrupted international trade to a great extent, and thus created an
opportunity for "nationalistic and independent" development in Turkey. It was through the
state capitalistic system (etatism) that this opportunity was seized. In general, domestic
resource-based industries and agricultural processing were favored (Cavdar, et al., 1973;
Rosaliev, 1978, Malkoc, et al., 1973). This led to a period of rapid industrialization which
successfully substituted for the "basic needs" imports (food, textiles, and clothing)
throughout the 1930s. However, with the outbreak of WW II this momentum of
industrialization came to an end. In the post-war period ISI continued to be the basic
philosophy of development. Indeed, it was officially accepted as the only way to
development. ISI was expected to "free the country from the vagaries of the world
economy", to close the structural foreign exchange gap, and to transfer the predominantly
agricultural labor force into an industrial work force. Accordingly, the post-war
industrialization effort shifted its emphasis away from basic goods and moved towards
durable consumer goods which had heavy requirements of imported intermediates and raw
materials. However, the character of the post-war industrialization was quite different
compared to the pre-war industrialization, especially in that it increasingly relied on external
borrowing to finance the necessary imports.
Many competing arguments have been put forward to capture the character and the
consequences of the Turkish ISI. These arguments flourished in the late 1970s in an effort
to provide alternative explanations for the most serious crisis of ISI, that of the capital
goods stage. The crisis of the late 1970s and the "solution" brought to it stimulated more
creative analysis of development in Turkey. In addition to increasingly serious bottlenecks
of energy, communications, and transportation since the early 1950s, the progressively
worsening economic situation included high unemployment, stagflation, a staggering
external debt, and a falling rate of profit in the industrial sector, especially in
manufacturing. Both the interpretations of this crisis and the proposed solutions vary a
great deal. However, it is generally agreed that the January 25, 1980 Structural Adjustment
Program marked the end of ISI, which had been followed for nearly two and half decades.
The following section will summarize the main hypotheses about Turkish ISI.
The standard Neoclassical approach is based on the idea that within the world
capitalist system, specialization in a complemantary way would lead to welfare
maximization not only for the industrializing countries themselves, but for the world
economy on the whole. The conditions for specialization are determined by the static
comparative advantage priciples and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Against this basic
premise, ISI based on progressively increasing protectionism that was followed in Turkey,
from the mid- 1950s on until 1980, is harshly criticized. The resulting problems of high
inflation, low capacity utilization, and worsening balance of payments are stressed. These
adverse developments are attributed to the fact that the generous industrial incentives
provided very high and indiscriminate import protection, and thus encouraged production
for domestic market only while leading to the stagnation of exports and employment. A
detailed quantitative analysis of the consequences of Turkish ISI is provided by Krueger,
1978. Moreover, the role of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), especially their
economic, financial and operating inefficiencies are highly criticized (Walsted, 1980).
Some others argue that ISI in general was the right development strategy for
Turkey, but its implementation was faulty. First of all, it started from the "wrong end",
i.e., from the consumer non-durables, and more importantly, proceeded without a
comprehensive program. Thus, the resulting pattern of resource allocation was not
rational, sizes of most establishments were too small to take advantage of economies of
scale, and also there were wide-spread management inefficiencies. In short, if the Turkish
ISI had followed a more moderate and a better planned path, the crisis of ISI could have
been avoided (Boratav, 1979; Korum, 1976; Tuzun, 1979; Yalin, 1980; Erdem, 1980;
Kandiller, 1976; Kucuk, 1980).
The opposing arguments are mainly based on the structuralist/dependency school of
thought. Although among them exists quite a variety, most of the these views stem from
various considerations of nationalism, of equity in the distribution of income, of export
pessimism, and of a revolutionary strategy for development. Of course, these
considerations are not mutually exclusive; some arguments are based on different
combinations of them. However, basic disagreements about "Statism" (or State
capitalism) and the possible ways of achieveing economic "independence" underlie much of
these alternative arguments. Some see Statism as a traditional remnant of the pre-
capitalistic era; and thus argue that it should be replaced by a private capitalistic system to
achieve "real", independent economic development. This argument is sometimes also
forwarded in support of export-oriented industrialization, as an alternative to ISI.
In contrast, the "nationalistic" approach views Statism as the ideal way of
development. It asserts that given the historical experiences of many LDCs which prove
the existence of a negative relationship between growth and international trade, self-reliance
is the only way to national economic development. The ISI strategy would provide a way
out of the role imposed on Turkey by the international division of labor, and therefore,
would lead to "independent" development. Furthermore, "Statism" is the only
"progressive" and "anti-imperialistic" means of achiving it. Clearly, this viewpoint
idealizes the developments of the "Statist" period in the 1930s as the achievement of "real"
industrialization in Turkey.
The "export pessimistic" viewpoint also favors ISI. Because, as the argument
goes, export-orientation generally leads to increased "dependence", and thus, obstructs
"real industrialization". Export pessimism is based on the empirical reality of low income
elasticity of demand for light consumer goods in the developed countries (DCs), for which
Turkey could develop an export potential. This observation coupled with a new era of
protectionism in the DCs against the imports from the LDCs, points to the difficulty of
exporting manufactures under stiff competition from the more established newly
industrializing countries (NICs).
The "revolutionary" viewpoint also sees ISI as the only way to break ties with
monopoly capitalism. Moreover, it supports ISI based on the public sector, which later is
supposed to be taken over by a revolution, once the foundations of industrialization are
firmly established. This viewpoint is obviously very similar to the "nationalistic"
viewpoint, but with a very different result: revolution by the intellectuals working together
with the industrial proleratiat. This is in sharp contrast to a "voluntarist" solution implied
by the "nationalistic" approach, in which only under the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie
that Turkey can follow a "nationalistic" development path. Such a leadership will be
independent from all the social class interests in the society, i.e., an above-class coalition,
and thus will provide a possibility for nationalistic revolutionary development.
As mentioned earlier, most of the criticism of the Turkish ISI is based on the
capitalist "dependence" argument. Depending on the different concerns and/or certain
combinations of them, the criticism takes many forms. However, in general the problems
of the ISI (balance of payments deficit, low employment generation, and hyperinflation) are
seen as a direct outcome of the relations with the world capitalism (Altintas, 1978;
Bortucene, 1979; Kafaoglu, 1979; Galip, 1979; Ozkol, 1969; Sonmez, 1980, Erdogdu,
1978). Some others also add the "international conspiracy" argument to the "dependence"
argument. According to this, the IMF and the IBRD try to obstruct the growth and
development efforts in Turkey in order to serve the interests of the industrialized Western
countries which these international organizations represent in reality. Therefore, within the
world capitalist system, Turkey cannot be expected to achieve sustained development
(Boratav, 1979; Dogan, 1980; Kafaoglu, 1979, Ozgur, 1976).
Another argument within this framework asserts that the problems experienced with
ISI had resulted from the process being pushed backwards. Although, given the politico-
economic conditions of Turkey, ISI had started at the "right end", i.e., from the consumer
goods industries, but the policy to push ISI "backwards", i.e., to the intermediate and the
capital goods industries, actually ended up deepening the crisis. In other words, the
attempted "deepening" of ISI had led to the "deepening " of the structural ISI crisis. This
happened mainly because of the lack of a comprehensive approach based on the combined
efforts of both the public and the private sectors. Given the fact that this effort had to be
based on a high degree of protection, and thus on many distortions created in the goods and
factor markets, sustaining the industrialization efforts became impossible.
Since the late 1960s, structuralist/dependency theories provided an alternative to the
free trade theories for studying the existing uneven levels of development in the world.
Formalization of these theories also has shown great progress during recent years (e.g.,
Taylor, 1983). The structuralist/dependency theories are based on the fundamental
distinction between the original transition to capitalism by the countries in the "centre" and
the incomplete (or restricted) transition to capitalism by those in the "periphery". These
typically different paths of development are dependent on each other in that the
accumulation of capital in the centre depends on the extraction of value from the periphery
in various forms. Therefore, underdevelopment is an active process of exploitation
through which the Third World has become locked into an international system of "unequal
exchange". Development is not a matter of painfully slow progress up the evolutionary
scale, as conceived by the conservative theories based on the modernization approach.
However, although the dependency school, through critical analysis of colonial and
imperial history, successfully exposed the integration of the periphery into the world
capitalist system in a hierarchically disadvantaged way, it has itself come under criticism.
One major criticism is that it underestimated the diversity of possible paths of development
which could result from the differences in the pre-capitalist production systems and the
different ways in which the peripheral countries can be integrated into the world capitalist
system. In sum, the unduly heavy emphasis on the "typical" features of peripheral
capitalism ultimately had the potential to create an abstract, ahistorical theory
(Ramazanoglu, 1988).
Another criticism of the structuralist/dependency shool involves the definition of
capitalism as a system of exchange, rather than interrelated systems of international
production, circulation, distribution and exchange. Parallel to this assumption, most
analyses of class struggles concentrate on the opposing interests of the international
bourgeoisie, together with their allies in the developing countries, and of the workers and
peasants who constitute the majority of the world population (e.g., Wallerstein, 1980,
1982). In addition to the power struggles among the international bourgeoisie, intense
struggles that go on among the competing sections of the national bourgeoisie (e.g., as in
Turkey in the 1970s) in the peripheral countries need to be addressed. Finally, since
dependency/structuralist theory is basically rooted in a Marxist social theory, the only
prescription for the peripheral countries is to disengage from the world system and to
pursue an independent development path. However, the form that this independent
development may take is not satisfactorily explained. Given the culturally, politically and
economically increasingly interdependent world conditions, the possibility of such a
development seems rather remote.
It can be argued that a deep theoretical understanding of the uneven development of
capitalism needs to recognize the relationships between the general processes (i.e., the logic
and the consequences of capitalism in general) and the specific historical forms.
Throughout history many different forms of development have emerged, which are specific
to a given social formation during a particular period. Also, each historically determined
social formation develops unique forms of class struggle in a unique capitalist state, and
under a unique set of relationships with the rest of the international system. It would not be
possible to understand these forms as typical or atypical cases; rather, they need to be
understood as unique parts of the whole capitalist sytem.
Therefore, for an in-depth analysis of development, it becomes necessary to
examine both the domestic class structure and the patterns of relations with international
capital together shaping the way in which integration into the world capitalist system
actually takes place. It is based on the form of this integration that the necessary capital
accumulation strategy (i.e., model of growth) to be followed can be determined, and then
the resulting policies to carry it out can be formulated and implemented. In short, only by
critically analyzing these politico-economic changes in a dynamic way and in a historical
context that can we determine different forms and phases of capitalistic development. In
the next section, a methodological framework based on these guidelines will follow.
Most earlier studies of ISI emphasized the "dependent" nature of industrial growth
during ISI, rather than the "cyclical" nature of it (Structuralists, and especially
Dependentistas, have extensively analyzed the nature of industrial growth during ISI. See
for example: Prebisch,1950, 62; Furtado, 1961, 65, 66, 70, 74; Sunkel and Paz, 1970;
Pinto, 1974; Serra and Tavares, 1974; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Dos Santos, 1973;
Frank, 1967). When the cycles are mentioned, however, they are not linked to the stages
of ISI. The crisis of the second stage, that of ISI in durable consumer goods, is stressed as
"the crisis of ISI", rather than only one of the successive crises that occur at the end of each
stage. What is missing from the earlier arguments is the recognition that industrial growth
during ISI is cyclical and crises-ridden. The first cycle corresponds to the non-durable
consumer goods stage, the second to the durable consumer goods stage, and the third to the
intermediate and capital goods stage of ISI. Given the initial logic of saving foreign
exchange, the crisis at the end of each stage necessitates a transition to a higher stage
("deepening of ISI") with the purpose of saving even more foreign exchange. Only when
the final crisis, which is generally characterized by stagflation, high unemployment and
external debt, makes it impossible to continue ISI, is there a shift to a different strategy of
industrialization, usually to export-promotion. In short, ISI brings about a politico-
economic structure that fails to generate self-sustaining growth.
Organization of the thesis:
The first chapter is an introduction and the second chapter is the general framework
for the thesis. Following these chapters, there are three main parts in the thesis. Part A is
Development History: Stages of ISI (chapters III, IV, and V), Part B is The Characteristics
of Turkish ISI (chapter VI), and Part C is A Theory of ISI (chapter VII). The periodization
of development history provides a description of the major politico-economic developments
during the stages of ISI. The analysis of the relationship between manufacturing growth
and structural change helps to uncover the major characteristics of ISI in Turkey. Then, a
theoretical model captures the cyclical nature of growth during ISI. Finally, the
conclusions are presented in chapter VIII.
Following the introduction, the second chapter begins with a historical background
to the study of ISI in Turkey in the post-WW II period. It covers the Statist period of the
1930s, during which rapid industrialization took place through ISI in basic consumer
goods. However, with the outbreak of WW II, this momentum of industrialization came to
a halt. It was in the early 1950s that industrialization gained importance again. The
methodological framework used to study ISI in the post-WW II period follows the
historical background. The general framework ends with a general review of Turkish
development ideologies as they relate to industrialization.
The following three chapters in Part A analyze the stages of ISI in Turkey. The aim
of these chapters is to determine the general characteristics of these three stages that took
place during the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s. The third chapter describes the non-
durable consumer goods stage, the fourth chapter the durable consumer goods stage, and
the fifth chapter the intermediate and capital goods stage. The politico-economic
developments during each stage are shaped by the interaction of domestic and international
factors. Given insufficient internal sources of capital accumulation, external sources of
capital and international trade patterns play a central role in ISI. Together with sectoral
developments, an analysis of social aspects of industrialization completes the historical
overview of the stages of ISI. Finally, Part A ends with an overall summary of the stages
of ISI and a discussion of the major results from the experience of industrialization during
the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s. It also briefly touches upon the implications of these
results for the 1980s.
The sixth chapter, Part B, presents a detailed analysis of Turkish ISI at the
subsectoral level. It helps to determine the major characteristics of growth and structural
change in manufacturing during ISI. The contribution of ISI to cyclical manufacturing
growth was significant during the first and the second stages only. As the emphasis of this
highly import-dependent ISI was on consumer goods, ISI in intermediate and capital goods
lagged far behind. The high degree of protection and overvaluation of the exchange rate led
to increasing import dependency in industrial production as well as continuing anti-export
bias. The continuous current account deficits were financed through external borrowing.
At the end of each stage of ISI a serious balance of payments crisis resulted, which led to a
stabilization program and further borrowing. Thus, industrialization through ISI not only
failed to acquire a built-in impetus, but also created an ever increasing external debt. A
summary of the main characteristics of Turkish ISI concludes Part B.
The seventh chapter, Part C, is the theory chapter. After pointing out the most
salient characteristics of the countries with industrial cycles during ISI, especially through a
comparison of the Turkish and Latin American experiences, it introduces a theoretical
model of ISI. This formalization captures the cyclical pattern of growth during ISI. ISI
does not lead to sustained economic growth. Because of its highly import-dependent
character, manufacturing growth is often interrupted by a balance of payments crisis. One
principal finding is the coincidence of the stages of ISI with the cycles in industrial growth.
The final chapter discusses the relationships and the principles of the ISI
experience. A global pattern of industrialization of LDCs emerges. Where ISI has failed to
create a strong industrial base, the post-ISI period of increased openness also fails to
generate sustained industrialization and growth.
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The period of ISI in the post-WW II period represents one of the stages in the long
history of development in Turkey. A thorough understanding of this important stage,
therefore, requires a careful identification of its place in the history of development.
Section one places Turkish ISI in its historical context. The second section provides the
methodological background for the thesis, while the final section reviews the dominant
Turkish development ideologies as they relate to the industrialization process.
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the Ottoman Empire, obstacles to industrialization during the 19th century stem
from many sources. In rural areas, the landlord-clergy coalition, or esraf, had
monopolized economic as well as political power. The working class and the Anatolian
petty bourgeoisie, being highly fragmented and unorganized, were also dominated by the
local esraf. Raw materials production by small-holding peasants, who constituted the
majority of the rural population, was kept under strict control by the esraf. In major urban
areas, minority commercial interests had ties on the one hand with the esraf for the export
of raw materials and on the other hand with European commercial capital for the marketing
of imports from Europe. The Palace's foreign trade was no longer under the control of the
Ottoman State. Foreign capital, through links with the Palace and the minority
compradors, had deeply penetrated into the Ottoman economy, concentrating in the raw
materials sector and also in the construction of railways. Given the dependent structure of
the Ottoman economy during the 19th century, neither large scale local industry nor an
established class of industrialists existed. A few state-owned textiles establishments aside,
existing industries were limited to small-scale manufacturing and processing industries
which were largely owned and controlled by the minority compradors.
In the begining of the 20th century, various developments had taken place which
were to have a large impact on the economy later in the 1930s. These developments made
the first ISI period possible by leading to the creation of an important domestic market.
Among them were the accelerated construction of railways, the abolition of asar (the rural
production tax), and various improvements in the banking system. After the completion of
a railway system which connected the export-goods-producing regions in Turkey to the
main ports and from there to the metropolitan countries, the construction of railways by
foreign capital slowed down considerably. This led the government to take over and to
accelerate the construction of a large network of railways starting in 1924. By 1932 the
railway network inherited from the Ottoman Empire was expanded by almost 30%. In
addition, because of their strategic locations, many ports, shipyards, and railway
establishments were nationalized. Thus, through an improved transportation network,
distant corners of the domestic market were connected; circulation of goods and services
became easier and faster.
The abolition of asar provided the opportunity for more agricultural surplus to be
marketed. This greatly encouraged agricultural production for the domestic market by
initiating a gradual transformation of the existing export-oriented agricultural structure.
Also, as banking proved to be a profitable sector in the 1920s, many local and national
banks and various state banks were established. Although most of these local banks went
bankrupt due to the Great Depression, the state protected the national banks and established
new ones that would finance public investments in the industrial sector, such as the
Industrial and Mineral Bank. More importantly, the preparations for the creation of a
central bank began as a result of the rapid monetarization of the economy.
GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE STATIST PERIOD
The Great Depression of 1929 not only hindered international trade, as did World
War II, but also interrupted the integration of the less developed countries into the world
capitalistic system. In Latin America, given large domestic markets, the difficulty of
obtaining traditional imports encouraged domestic industrial production of these goods
(Hirschman, 1968). Also, because of the depression, declining foreign demand for
traditional exports caused sharp decreases in the export prices of these commodities. This
required state intervention in order to protect the producers and exporters of these goods,
e.g., in Brazil the state had to buy coffee stocks that could not be exported (Furtado,
1965). State intervention, by keeping the domestic income levels high, also furthered the
expansion of the domestic market. Consequently, production for the domestic market
became more profitable than production for export purposes. Many enterprising
industrialists, with the help of the state (indirectly through improved infrastructure, credit
and price policies, and directly through the establishment of state economic enterprises),
started the production of basic consumer goods (Frank, 1967). As a result, Latin America
achieved a high level of import substitution industrialization during the Depression years
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). In Turkey, however, there did not yet exist a fully developed
industrial class that could shoulder the burden of domestic industrial production
necessitated by the Depression.
By the end of 1929, Turkey had a very large trade deficit, as a result of which the
Turkish Lira had lost considerable value (Sonmez, 1982). Moreover, the question of the
Ottoman debt, with the yearly payments amounting to 13-18% of the state's budget, was a
pressing problem. Fortunately, in 1929 with the expiration of the Treaty of Lausanne, the
state was abie to gain control over its customs. Under this treaty, Turkey had continued to
recognize the economic concessions granted to foreign firms by the Ottoman Empire. In
anticipation of the imposition of import controls following the expiration of the treaty,
skyrocketing speculative imports during the last few months of 1929 made the balance of
payments deficit much worse. This, coupled with major economic problems due to the
Depression, such as the difficulty of obtaining manufactured imports and declining demand
for traditional exports, necessitated a protectionist customs policy that could offset the large
trade deficit (Hershlag, 1968). With strict tariff schedules, quotas, and foreign exchange
controls Turkish foreign trade was brought under the control of the state (Ozgur, 1976).
Although these policies narrowed profit margins for the commercial capital
interests, state protection created new profit making possibilities. The state had not yet
directly intervened through state enterprises either in industry or in commerce; these areas
were left to private capital for the time being. In contrast to the commercial interests (the
group that had benefitted the most during the earlier export period), industrialists now had
two important advantages. First, due to the declining agricultural exports, the domestic
price of agricultural goods fell considerably, especially that of wheat, which was the basic
wage good (Boratav, 1976). This was automatically translated into lower wages paid by
the industrialists. Secondly, lower agricultural prices also meant cheaper inputs for agro-
based industries like textiles and food processing. In addition, industrialists took
advantage of the incentives provided by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry
(1927), and by the new high tariff protection. Consequently, between 1930 and 1932 an
average annual industrial growth rate of 13.6% was achieved. Furthermore, the trade
deficit was eliminated due to import restrictions, and the share of imports in GNP dropped
considerably from 1930 onwards (Boratav, 1977).
Despite these successful developments, various income distributional results of this
import substitution industrialization alarmed the military/civilian bureaucrats who had
successfully maintained state power. On the one hand, in the rural areas big landlords
gained even more power because of expanding agricultural production; on the other hand, a
newly-developed organic relationship between the new capitalists and a group of
bureaucrats caused growing resentment in the society. Given the concern about these
distributional matters, and the fact that the national industrial class was still small and weak,
the state decided to take over this function itself. Thus, starting in 1932 Turkey entered a
unique period of capitalist development called "Etatism" or "Statism." The main objective
of the Kemalist leadership was to establish various state-owned industrial enterprises that
would form the foundations of a strong industrial economy while private sector activities in
commerce, services and agriculture continued. Accordingly, the relationship between the
state and the private sector was complementary, not competitive during this period. As in
the liberal period during the first years of the Republic, developing the private sector was
given top priority. State intervention in the economy was solely due to the disruption
caused by the Depression (Avcioglu, 1969; Boratav, 1974; Aydemir, 1976; Hershlag,
1968; Keyder, 1979). In the early 1930s, the state entered into various branches of local
industry primarily to develop the infrastructure, to establish banks, and to regulate
commerce. In addition to the establishment of several major industrial, agricultural and
commercial banks, the establishment of many state-owned and controlled enterprises in
glass, sugar, leather, cotton yarn, woolen textiles, and the highly successful cement
industry were among the most notable activities.
Statist economic policies can be classified into two main groups. The first group
was intended to increase protectionism in foreign trade and to direct rents resulting from
protection to the state. This would not only help finance industrialization, but also end the
exploitation of craftsmen, small farmers and businessmen by big merchants and usurers
(Boratav, 1974). These objectives were accomplished through various laws and
regulations, passed between 1932 and 1936, concerning the state monopoly rights in tea,
coffee, and also sugar imports; lending money; cost and price controls for industrial goods;
and the responsibility of the state to prevent sharp decreases in wheat prices (Sonmez,
1982). Thus, in addition to protectionism, state intervention in internal trade and price and
interest rate determination was firmly established.
The second group of policies constituted the First Five Year Industrial Development
Plan (1933-37), which basically determined the public sector import-substitution
industrialization investment program. The plan diagnosed that, within the existing
international division of labor, Turkey was a dependent and "underdeveloped" country, and
that since the Great Depression presented a historical opportunity for the LDCs to develop
and industrialize independently, Turkey should take full advantage of this situation.
Accordingly, the First Five Year Industrial Development Plan aimed at developing
industries that would utilize local raw materials and produce basic consumption goods for
the domestic market (Boratav, 1974). Industrial centers were planned to be geographically
dispersed so that the industrialization could be extended to the rural hinterland as well.
Various state enterprises would be established in those industries where the private sector
initiative was lacking. Indeed, an extensive textile industry was established in order to
meet the domestic demand and eventually to generate exports. Parallel to the
industrialization efforts, the state also launched an all-out campaign of nationalization of
foreign firms throughout the 1930s and the early 1940s, including railways, utilities,
transportation and port facilities, mines and factories (Avcioglu, 1969). This helped to
improve the country's balance of payments by virtually ending the outflow of capital, and
also contributed to the increasing size of the public sector.
By the end of the five years encompassing the First Five Year Industrial Plan, most
of the objectives of the plan were realized. Almost all of the proposed twenty factories
including a steel mill, a paper and cellulose factory, a cement and seven textile factories,
and six chemical plants had been completed and started production (Hershlag, 1968). Up
to 1936, given the relatively long gestation period of the investments, industrial production
grew slowly. However, after 1936 the rate of the industrial growth increased rapidly,
bringing the average annual growth rate to 11.6% between 1930 and 1939. The share of
manufacturing in GNP also rose to 14.7% in 1939 from 13.5% in 1933 (in current prices).
At the same time the share of imports in GNP declined noticeably, from 14.5% during
1923-29 to 6.6% during 1933-39, due to successful import substitution. The foreign trade
balance also continued registering surpluses throughout this period. As a result of the
Statist policies, an active domestic market was created and the commercialists had
increasingly turned to industrial production to meet the booming demand. Yet, throughout
the 1930s the major characteristic of private industry was its small scale (Karpat, 1959).
Despite a highly successful state-led industrialization period, a well-developed industrial
class had not yet emerged.
Throughout the 1930s, the central emphasis of development was placed on the
industrial sector while agriculture was given less attention. Agricultural investment was
only one-third of public industrial investment. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector did
make a substantial contribution to the national economy (Avcioglu,1969). This was
achieved as a result of mechanization in the countryside and consequent improvements in
productivity. Extensive state aid led to increased agricultural production. The state also
expanded its activities in agriculture by setting up model farms and state-operated
agricultural schools and stations to encourage peasants to adopt modem and more efficient
production techniques. Imported farm machinery was sold to peasants through the loans
provided by the Agricultural Bank.
State efforts in developing agriculture were intensified during the second half of the
1930s. In 1937 a Four Year Plan for the development of agriculture was formulated. In
addition to a broad-based land reform policy, this plan included technical improvements,
aforestation, raising agricultural exports, and implementation of irrigation and other water
schemes (Hershlag, 1968). But, given the strong resistance of the esraf and the local
landlords in the countryside, most of these programs were never implemented. In short,
only a limited transformation took place in the agricultural sector. This was mainly in
agricultural production because the predominantly feudal relations in the countryside were
kept intact (Avcioglu, 1969).
Although Turkey received several external loans during the 1930s, mainly from the
USSR, most of the capital allocated to industrial development was raised through the
mobilization of local resources. Among them were the agricultural sector and the newly
imposed taxes, especially on working people. Forced savings did play an important role in
industrialization during the Statist period.
On the whole, the Statist policies ended up benefiting the commercial interests.
They were in control of marketing a significant proportion of the goods produced by
farmers. The exploitation of the peasant masses by the traditional ruling classes (or esraf)
continued, and even intensified during the war years. The surplus transferred out of
agriculture thus provided a major source of finance for industrialization (Boratav, 1974).
With the Great Depression, the internal terms of trade, which had turned against
agriculture, provided the channel for the transfer of surplus out of agriculture throughout
the period. If the state had not intervened, this surplus would have been shared among the
commercial and industrial interests involved in agriculture-related activities. Only with state
intervention did agriculture become an important financial source of industrialization in
Turkey. This was accomplished through selective price controls on agricultural products:
by keeping the price of wheat (the main consumption good) low so as to keep wages low,
the price of cotton (the main input into textiles) high, and the price of tobacco high enough
to encourage exports.
In urban areas, the accumulation of capital under statism was mainly achieved
through the intensified exploitation of wage labor in the industrial sector. Throughout the
1930s and 1940s, one of the major aims of the state was to maintain a docile labor force in
order to increase production. Longer work hours through speed-ups and the eleven-hour
work day and unsafe working conditions were imposed on workers while unions were
outlawed and strikes banned (Rosaliev, 1974; Ozgur, 1972). Given the limited degree of
industrialization, the size of the industrial labor force was not very large; in 1915 it was a
mere 14,000 and by 1927 it had reached only 60,000. But the rapidly growing industrial
labor force totalled 427,000 by the late 1940s. According to available statistics, wages
continued to stagnate throughout the decade and actually fell during the war years
(Berberoglu, 1982). Prices, in contrast, rose continuously, causing sharp increases in the
cost of living index over these years (CLI, Istanbul, 1938 = 100, 1942 = 233, 1946 = 343,
1950 = 361).
Yet another important source of funds for industrialization came through increased
taxation. While the corporate, inheritance, excise and other taxes paid by the well-to-do
people were lowered, various indirect taxes paid by the laboring masses were increased
more than fivefold between 1929 and 1939 (Ozgur, 1972). In addition to the burden of
taxation, given declining wages and rising prices, the working class shouldered the burden
of industrialization under the state capitalist regime.
As the Depression slowly came to an end, the statist industrialization policies
became less vigorous, especially after 1936 (Boratav, 1974). As international trade started
picking up, the import quota system lost its importance and was finally lifted in 1937
(Tezel, 1977). Although, industrialization efforts continued, and an average industrial
growth rate of 14.2% was achieved during 1937-39. Furthermore, the passage of the State
Economic Enterprises Law made the transfer of the State Economic Enterprises to the
private sector possible. In fact, the Second Five Year Industrial Plan (1939-43) signalled
this transition by stressing the need for the concentration of public investment in the
production of intermediate and capital goods, in addition to the continuing state support for
the private sector. According to this plan, minerals and raw materials would not be
exported unfinished, but as processed/manufactured goods, which required the
development of heavy industry, improved infrastructure, and low cost energy sources.
Thus, as ISI proceeded, a new division of labor between the state and the private sector
seemed to be initiated. However, the Second Five Year Industrial Plan was never fully
implemented due to the outbreak of World War II in 1939 (Hershlag, 1969).
WORLD WAR I PERIOD
With the outbreak of World War II, Turkey was subjected to increasing outside
pressures. These pressures not only threatened its independence, but by imposing the
adoption of a war economy put a halt to its industrialization program. As the
implementation of the Second Five Year Industrial Plan was interrupted, the state aimed its
basic economic policy toward at least maintaining existing industries. In contrast, the Latin
American countries were successful in maintaining their course of industrialization; they
were not engaged in the war. The conditions favorable to import-substitution had
continued to prevail because the developed countries had now shifted their emphasis to war
production. Moreover, increasing demand for Latin American exports also had led to
increasing export revenues. This unprecedented accumulation of gold and foreign
exchange reserves in Latin America constituted a strong base for the import-substitution
programs to be followed in the post-war period.
Because of the possibility of entering the war at any time, Turkey underwent a
period of semi-mobilization. Economic policies were solely determined by the National
Emergency Act, passed in the beginning of 1940. This law gave the state almost unlimited
power to intervene in the economy. With the increasing demand for Turkey's exports and
resulting higher export prices, agricultural incomes went up considerably (Hershlag,
1968). Moreover, agricultural production actually dropped because of a labor shortage
created by the military service of the majority of the peasants. Over the 1940-45 period, the
growth rate of agricultural production was -7.2%. In addition to the difficulties of
obtaining traditional imports, under the National Emergency Act, imports were further
restricted. Declining production and imports, widespread shortages of even basic food
items, together with the state's practice of printing money to finance defense expenditures,
resulted in a serious inflationary situation. Skyrocketing speculation and black market
activities fostered a rapid accumulation of commercial capital. Toward the end of 1942, the
Kemalists introduced the Capital Tax, which was designed to tax the exorbitant wartime
profits pocketed by the commercial interests. However, this was never accomplished, as
the tax was used instead against the minority, non-Muslim compradors. The Capital Tax
successfully served the purpose of ensuring the dominance of the Turkish compradors
(Boratav, 1974).
Under the conditions of semi-mobilization, the state had to direct most of its
resources to the war-related expenditures. This of course slowed the momentum of
industrialization. The industrial growth rate dropped to -6.6% during 1940-45. The share
of industry in GNP (in 1968 prices) was 13.5% in 1940 and it showed only a marginal
increase during the war years, climbing to 14.8% by 1945. The share of agriculture, on
the other hand, dropped from 44.5% in 1940 to 38.7% in 1945 (Sonmez, 1982).
Throughout the WW II period, however, the industrial growth rate declined less than the
agricultural growth rate. And GNP growth averaged -6.3% during the war period, in
sharp contrast to 2.1% during the statist period.
However, since the increase in export prices was greater than the increase in import
prices, the external terms-of-trade turned in favor of Turkey. (External terms-of-trade was
100 in 1938 and rose to 114 in 1944, Sonmez, 1982.) As a result, during the war years,
export revenues always exceeded import expenditures. Thus an accumulation of gold and
foreign exchange reserves was achieved, as in the case of Latin America. But, unlike the
continuing Latin American industrialization, the state-led accumulation of industrial capital
in Turkey during the pre-war period was now replaced by the accumulation of commercial
capital by market-oriented landlords and compradors (Karpat, 1959; Boratav, 1974). As a
result, no meanful productive investment in industry took place. Most efforts to restructure
the agricultural sector also failed. Following the war, the passage of the Law for Peasants
to Acquire Land and the Formation of Peasant Co-operatives in 1945 was an important step
toward an effective land reform policy. This, in fact, was the source of the major conflict
between the state and the powerful landowners. After a bitter power struggle, the landlords
finally succeeded in blocking the implentation of this law. Soon afterwards, the landed
interests left their ruling coalition with the bureaucrats to form the Democratic Party.
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
A complete description of the history of development in Turkey requires a
periodization based on distinct stages of development. Each stage of development
corresponds to a specific pattern of capital accumulation (or growth/development model).
This specific pattern of capital accumulation is simultaneously determined by the changing
politico-economic conditions of the international context, which define both constraints and
opportunities for various protagonists, and by the domestic political regime, which is based
on certain class conflicts and alliances. In determining the form of integration into the
world division of labor, the relative importance attached to these external and internal
variables differ widely among the competing theories of development. The reasons for
these differences derive not only from varying analytical perceptions of how a given social
system functions, but also from differences in concrete cases used, if any, as the basis for
judgment. However, each development strategy, in turn, reflects the requirements of a
given pattern of capital accumulation. Once the development strategy is determined, the
major development policies can then be identified, formulated, and later implemented by the
state, with the purpose of creating and sustaining the necessary conditions for this mode of
capital accumulation. This in turn requires the establishment of a correspondence among
the economic, political, ideological, social, and geographical spheres of a social formation.
A full application of such an interdisciplinary mode of analysis is beyond the scope
this thesis. However, it will be applied here to the extent possible to draw the main
contours of the observed development patterns . The main emphasis will be on the
economic dimension of development, although the corresponding political, ideological,
geographic, and social spheres will be dealt with, in so far as they influence the
establishment of these development patterns. I will review the corresponding international
context and the ideological and social developments in general, while emphasizing the
politico-economic developments in each stage of development. It will be argued that for
both the competing ideologies of statism and liberalism (i.e., anti-statism), the underlying
idea has been an effort to reach "modernization", to catch up with the highly industrialized
countries of the Western world. This effort has been progressively intensified during the
planned period in the 1960s, and later crystallized in the form of aiming, and in 1987
actually applying for EEC membership.
As mentioned earlier, the emphasis of this analysis will be on the politico-economic
dimension of development through ISI. Nevertheless, parallel developments in the
agricultural sector will also be stressed. The important role of role agricultural sector in the
ISI process in Turkey stems from two sources. One is the capacity of agriculture to
provide traditional exports, thus yielding needed foreign exchange resources for the
industry. The other is the capacity to supply the industrial sector with necessary
agricultural inputs. This role of agriculture as a supplier of industrial inputs , directly
through the SEEs and indirectly through agricultural exports, is conditioned by government
agricultural support prices, input subsidies, relatively low agricutural taxes and provisions
of cheap credit and infrastructure. Moreover, since most subsidies, especially agricultural
support prices, are backed through deficit financing, one significant side effect of this
policy is increased inflation.
However, the process of production in the agricultural and industrial sectors can be
viewed as the receiving media on which the requirements of markets (foreign and domestic)
are transmitted and implemented through trade and credit systems. This central role of
international trade will be examined through its share in national income, specific trade
regimes, composition of exports and imports, balance of payments in general, and
exchange rate policies. The complementary role of credit can be seen in the functioning of
financial institutions. The internal sources of capital accumulation (public finance, money ,
banking, informal money markets including usury) together with the external sources
(direct private investment, grants, debt) determine the use of capital resources. Finally, the
sectoral distribution of capital and the pattern of industrial investment will be explored.
The size and distribution of the labor force, real wages, unionization, and income
distribution related issues will also be analyzed. With respect to the social dimension of
development, Turkey's rapid industrialization has clearly had the consequence of
reinforcing and/or widening gaps and inequalities between different economic sectors,
geographic regions, and social classes. This uneven development, in turn, has produced
heightened conflict among groups competing for a larger share of the benefits from growth.
The growing degree of structural differentiation and the development of a more complex
form of social and economic organization is reflected in the increasing diversification of
Turkey's occupational structure, and within this structure in the increasing importance of
specialized occupational categories. Also, the accelerating process of urbanization and a
massive displacement of the majority of the agricultural population, and its redistribution
among a variety of occupations have taken place through conduous internal migration. The
inability of the industrial sector to absorb the increase in labor force resulted in high levels
of unemployment and the rapid growth of marginal jobs in the tertiary sector. Despite the
"solution" of exporting workers to Europe on a massive scale starting in the 1960s, the
urban unemployment problem remains monumental.
In addition to the increasing diversification of the occupational structure,
urbanization, and migration (internal and external), increasing perceptions of conflict of
interest led to the rapid proliferation of associational organizations throughout the country.
Especially with the promotion of the "New Strategy" aiming at rapid growth in order to
gain EEC membership, a new trend has begun towards a form of associational capitalism
based on the most important professional associations. This policy of corporatization
clearly has aimed at structuring and controlling mass politico-economic demands more
effectively, especially since without generous help from the military forces it would not
have been possible.
Following the major historical developments along the stages of ISI, the
manufacturing sector, given its emphasis as the "engine of growth" will be examined in
detail in chapter VI. After a review of manufacturing growth at the subsectoral level, the
scale of manufacturing firms, public and private manufacturing, and foreign capital in
manufacturing, the structure of industrial production and the distribution of value added
will be analyzed. Finally, the relationship between structural change and growth via ISI
will be explored.
Using the above methodology, I will attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis
of ISI in the post-war period in Turkey, complete with its structural underpinnings and the
nature of the mechanisms through which it was conditioned and shaped. After the
establishment of the nature of growth during ISI and the resulting structural changes, I will
turn to theoretical modeling of this process with the aim of capturing its cyclical behavior.
This makes it possible to illustrate some controversial propositions about development in
the Third World while describing the Turkish case. An evaluation of the development of
Turkish capitalism in the general context of competing theories of development and the
world capitalistic system will conclude the thesis.
3. DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGIES
This section provides a review of Turkish development ideologies as they relate to
the analysis of industrialization. Having reviewed various other approaches to the analysis
of Turkish development history in the Introduction, in this section I turn to the traditional
approach, the "progressive bureaucracy" approach. It underlies most of the other
approaches. According to this dominant viewpoint, Statism, under the control of the
"nationalist and progressive" bureaucrats, is the only way to achieve independent economic
development. First, a discussion of the main points of this approach will be presented.
Secondly, the origin of the "progressive bureaucracy" will be analyzed. Later, the Kadro
theory which provides the theoretical basis of this viewpoint is discussed. A brief look at
the contemporary Kadro theory will conclude this section.
Traditionally, at least up to the early 1980s, the Turkish development history has
been interpreted within the Liberalism versus Statism framework: 1923-30 is the "Liberal
period", development based on the private sector; 1930-50 is the "Statist period",
development based on the public sector; 1950-60 is another "Liberal" (i.e., anti-statist)
period; and post-1960 is the Planned period, development based on a mixed economy
where there is a certain division of labor between the private and the public sectors.
Therefore, this approach implies that the changes in political power led to a different
economic policy during each phase of the development process in Turkey.
Despite significant political changes that took place since 1950, the main thrust of
the development policies stayed the same. While the 1960, 1971, and the 1978
Stabilization Programs attempted to continue the process of ISI, the 1980 Structural
Adjustment Program aimed at export-promotion following stabilization in the short-run.
Each stage of development is separated by a crisis period; in fact, the political crises have
followed the economic crises, not the other way around. Moreover, in each period of crisis
and transition a military intervention took place. But the resulting change in terms of the
political regime clearly reflected a restructuring of the dominant class conflicts and alliances
based on a particular transition to a new capital accumulation process, i.e., a distinct stage
of development. Also, interestingly, each economic transition was put forward by the
political regime preceeding the military interventions, but the actual implementation of each
economic transition was successfully achieved only after the coup.
The above traditional interpretation, based on the dominant role of the public vs.
private sector, obscures a meaningful analysis of capitalist development in Turkey.
Development of capitalism under the public or private sector does not determine the
economic policies to be followed. The organizational feature of development follows from
the chosen development strategy. After the economic, social, political, and ideological
requirements of a certain strategy are somehow reconciled, implementation then can be
carried out within a certain organizational framework. The idea of the state as a force above
all classes in the society, with only nationalist and developmentalist aspirations, is difficult
to maintain in the face of the historical experience. For example, although the bureaucrats
were in power from the beginning of the Republic, a significant level of industrialization
took place in the 1930s, and not in the 1920s.
According to this traditional viewpoint, following the establishment of the Turkish
Republic, the "nationalist and progressive" bureaucrats aimed at achieving independent
economic development. Despite opposition from the dominant groups (merchants and
landowners), they were able to implement the Statist policies more successfully beginning
in the 1930s. However, in 1950 the merchant-landowner alliance wrestled political power
from the bureaucrats, and thus, there was a transition to a "liberal", i.e. "anti-statist",
period. Finally with the 1960 military coup, the progressive bureaucrats were able to
return to Statist policies; economic planning was reinstituted and the State Planning
Organization (SPO) was established.
In fact, the Statist policies of the 1930s had come to an end by the end of the 1930s.
The post-WW II period witnessed a total restructuring of the politico-economic relations
with the capitalist world. The momentum of industrialization was lost. Accordingly,
within the Marshall Plan Turkey resumed the role of an agricultural exporter to Europe.
However, because of the developing balance of payments problems in the mid-1950s, once
again ISI was resorted to. Moreover, the establishment of the SPO in 1960 brought only
official ratification of ISI, not a return to the Statist policies. Consequently, the ISI process
that started in the mid-50s proved to be totally different from ISI under the Statism of the
1930s.
The weakness of the traditional interpretation of Turkish development history
becomes clearer when one also considers the complementary role of the state sector during
ISI. The public and private sectors did not simply co-exist or compete; they were
complementary. The division of labor between these two sectors changed and evolved
according to the requirements of different stages of ISI. The public sector shouldered the
responsibility of providing the consumer goods industries in the private sector with
necessary inputs. In addition to cheap credit and trained technical personnel, through the
State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) the public sector concentrated in the production of
agricultural and industrial inputs necessary for private industries. Moreover, the practice of
financing the SEE deficits from the Central Bank credits continuously fueled inflation.
The origin of the Progressive Bureaucracy
According to the Progressive Bureaucracy viewpoint, there is a strong relationship
between the War of National Liberation and Turkish Statism. Statism is seen as a natural
result of nationalism since it seeks economic independence in addition to political
independence (Avcioglu, 1969). Nationalism was promoted by the military-esraf (big
landowners, merchants, and the clergy) coalition that had made the War of National
Liberation possible. Therefore, the military-bureaucrat group came to represent the
"nationalist and progressive" elements while the esraf-merchant group was seen as the
conservative and thus the limiting element to this progressiveness. Since the bureaucracy
was not based on a national class, various individual characteristics of the bureaucrats
(e.g., education, reputation) became the focus of attention (Cem, 1970). It is difficult to
explain the bureaucrats being "nationalist" without having a national political program that
is based on a social class or an alliance. The major aim of the bureaucrats, who were the
founders of the Turkish Republic, was achieving independent economic development via
industrialization (Hershlag, 1968; Keyder, 1979; Tayanc, 1973).
However, this "independent" development took almost another decade to start after
the liberation. The standard explanation for this delay from the traditional viewpoint is that
due to misjudgement of capitalism and imperialism during the 1920s, the bureaucrats had
made mistakes in trying to create a national capitalist class. The bureaucrats had thought
that this newly created capitalist class would lead to independent economic development,
but they were wrong. However, the bureaucrats were able to "correct" this mistake later by
taking charge and successfully implementing the Statist policies in the early 1930s.
Indeed, the 1930s witnessed unprecedented industrialization, averaging 10% during
1932-39. This was largely independent from the world capitalist system due to the Great
Depression, and was in sharp contrast to the "liberal" period of the 1920s when not much
development had taken place. This seemed to verify the Progressive Bureaucracy theory.
During the 1920s, since it was a period of national reconstruction on the ruins of the
Ottoman Empire, the state was not in full control of the country. Economic power was still
held by the Christian minority, who had always acted as agents of the major Western
powers. It was only in the 1930s that the bureaucratic state could combine and control
political and the economic power for the first time. Thus, the bureaucratic state and statism
are viewed as identical: not only "progressive", but also "anti-imperialistic".
During WW II, given the conditions of semi-mobilization in Turkey, the
bureaucratic state had to take several steps towards restricting the power of the esraf, e.g.,
the capital tax which was designed to tax the exorbitant wartime profits of the compradors
and big landowners, and some import-export restrictions. Later as a result of these various
restrictions, however, a bitter power struggle started within the coalition of the bureaucrats
and the esraf. Finally, it culminated in the breakdown of the coalition, and in 1950 the
Democratic Party, which represented the esraf, overwhelmingly won the national elections.
Thus, as the national capitalist class had become powerful enough to wrestle the state
power from the bureaucrats, a return to the "liberal" (anti-statist) policies was finally
possible. According to the Progressive Bureaucracy view, Statism is the only "correct"
economic policy towards independent development and anything else represents an
undesirable deviation from it.
The development of a national capitalist class was the fulfillment of the major
objective of the bureaucratic state (Tuzun, 1976). Ironically, however, when the
Democratic Party assumed political power in 1950, the bureaucrats viewed this situation as
a failure of the revolution. In their opinion statism was the only way to develop capitalism.
As a matter of fact, throughout the history of the Republic capitalistic development has been
the major goal of every government. In 1950 there was simply a change in government,
but not a change in basic economic policies.
The military intervention of May 27, 1960 was also seen as an event with
progressive consequences from this viewpoint Although following the coup the Justice
Party, self-claimed successor to the Democratic Party, came to power, the military and the
bureaucracy were now in a position to share the state power through various institutional
changes, e.g., the establishment of the SPO (Cem, 1970). The populist class coalition
base of the political regime that followed the coup strengthened the image of the military
and the bureaucracy as being "progressive and above all classes", and therefore, as
"nationalistic". However, the question of why the bureaucrats had to share or influence
state power in the face of the existing national industrial bourgeoise remains unanswered in
the Progressive Bureaucracy framework.
The Theoretical basis of the Progressive Bureaucracy
The Progressive Bureaucracy view follows from the Kadro theory of the 1930s.
The Kadro movement was developed around the publication of a political journal called
Kadro (Cadre) from 1932 to 1934. Kadro tried to justify and defend the role of the
bureaucratic state in "fighting" capitalism (Aydemir, 1968). According to the Kadro
theory, the state was justified in taking over the key areas of production given the fact that
the capitalists had not contributed to Turkey's development. Kadro played an important
role in the legitimization of the Kemalist regime. It opened its pages to commited
exponents of the Statist policies of the 1930s which were seen as the best way of
developing Turkey's industrial potential. The main argument was that Statism was based
on the principles of private ownership; only where private capital failed, would the state
step in to support private capital.
These views can be placed within two theoretical frameworks: Revolution from
"above" and Center-Periphery. In the framework of the Revolution from above theory
(Trimberger, 1978), the Progressive Bureaucracy view would maintain that in the absence
of a well developed national industrial class, the bureacracy, by taking over this function
and using state capital, can lead to "independent" development. Thus, the bureaucratic state
is "progressive". According to the Kadro theory, the Turkish revolution was anti-
imperialistic without being a class-based movement, and thus the bureaucrats who led it
were independent from all the social classes in the society (Boratav, 1974). In this context,
the "center-periphery" theory seems to complement the "revolution from above" theory; the
leadership of the bureaucracy follows not from the national class conflicts, but from the
international conflicts leading to national liberation movements in the LDCs. Thus, the
Kadro theory concludes that the bureaucratic state is also anti-imperialistic.
Kadro theory also maintains that Marxism no longer has any historical validity.
Instead of contradictions among social classes emphasized in the Marxist theory, in the
20th century there is a capitalistic world system and the conflicts between the developed
and the underdeveloped countries represent the heart of the problem. This capitalistic
world system is based on the metropol-colony system, which prevents the class conflicts
imbedded in capitalism from spreading worldwide. In short, Kadro theory substitutes
international conflicts for class conflicts in the developed capitalist countries. Moreover,
the economic dependence of non-industrialized countries on the developed countries needs
to be eliminated to be able to resolve this international conflict
National liberation movements are viewed as the only way to put an end to this
colonial system and to change the existing international division of labor. These
independence movements in the LDCs are expected to be nationalistic and free of class
conflicts, because there is no class conflict in the LDCs due to the unifying effect of
colonization. They will lead neither to capitalism nor to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
On the contrary, these liberation movements will pave the way to independent development
and industrialization under the control of the state. Since it was not only nationalistic but
also anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic, the Turkish independence movement is seen as
an example to other liberation movements to come; . Through Statism, Turkey would
follow a "special" way to independent development, and thus would set an example of a
society without class conflicts.
This analysis of the world capitalistic system by the Kadro theory emerged
following the Great Depression period, and it was clearly based on the idealization of the
Statist period in Turkey. Kadro theory correctly predicted that the Great Depression was
different from the regular cycles of capitalism and that it would lead to a new international
division of labor. Moreover, it also predicted that the economic dependence of the LDCs
on the developed countries would come to an end, and the production of wage goods
would be left to the newly industrializing countries while the metropolitan countries
specialize in the production of capital goods. Statism in Turkey was seen as a part of a
trend of becoming increasingly self-sufficient as the Depression provided the LDCs with an
opportunity to try to reach economic independence without interference from the developed
countries. Although Kadro theory could forsee the changes in the international division of
labor reasonably accurately, being "inward-looking" and "independent" from the world
capitalistic system were thought of as being identical. The historical experiences of the
LDCs, however, have not led either to "independence" or to "self-sufficiency".
Contemporary Kadro Theory
Kadro theory continues to dominate the traditional way of interpreting Turkish
development history. Statism is still considered by many to be the solution to the economic
and social crises of the 1980s. The revival of the Kadro theory began with the Yon
(direction, course) movement in the 1960s. The Yon movement gained momentum around
1962 during the Republican Peoples Party (RPP)'s steady move away from its Kemalist
principles. A certain section of the radical nationalist intelligentsia connected with the left-
wing of the RPP began to move toward an independent mode of ideological expression and
political action founded on these principles. They converged around the weekly publication
Yon, established in December 1961. The intellectuals associated with the Yon group
viewed themselves as "the true representatives of the Kemalist cause", meaning anti-
imperialism, nationalism, and state-directed social and economic development (Avcioglu,
1969). According to this movement, there are basically three distinct paths to development
for the LDCs to follow. The "Communist" development path is simply not realistic in the
case of Turkey. And since the "American"-type, foreign capital dependent path has not led
to any serious development and industrialization, it cannot be seen as an alternative either.
This leaves "Statism" as the only viable solution for Turkey to follow. It is the only
nationalistic-revolutionary development path that can continue the Kemalist reforms under
the leadership of the petty-bourgeoise. This theory maintains that the reason for the deep
crisis of the late 1970s was the extreme dependence of the Turkish economy on the world
capitalistic system, and the only way out of this crisis situation would, therefore, be a
return to Statism.
This viewpoint can be criticized on two points. First, Statism is seen as the only
way to development for LDCs, especially when a world crisis situation exists. However,
following the Great Depression, in Latin America "inward-looking" development and
industrialization took place without Statism. This was because industrial classes were
already developed enough to undertake industrialization, whereas this condition did not
exist in Turkey. Second, the view that a world depression gives a chance for economic
independence reflects a conception of the world capitalistic system as being composed of
DCs against LDCs; therefore, individual countries, not class conflicts, are taken as unit of
analysis. However, the effects of depression on the LDCs can only be identified through
an analysis of the existing politico-economic structure, and in a world crisis situation
whether the country will in fact take advantage of the opportunity for independent
development or not would depend on the conditions of this structure. Moreover, the extent
and the character of this development will be shaped by its relationship to the world
economy. Since the contemporary Kadro theory asserts that development is only possible
through independence, it fails to explain the economic development achieved during the
post-WW II era in Turkey.
It is interesting to note that during the crisis of the 1960s in Latin America, which
was similar to the recent crisis in Turkey, the Dependency school seems to support the
same views as the Kadro theory. Although developed much later and in a different context,
the Dependency school and Kadro school come to similar conclusions. Basically,
development within the world capitalistic system, which is based on a metropol-colony
system, is not possible for the LDCs; independent national development can only take place
outside capitalism. Interestingly, these theories seem to be the outcomes of common
experiences. However, this mode of analysis fails to recognize the crucial importance of
class distinctions in the LDCs, and the capitalistic class alliances between the DCs and the
LDCs as will be discussed later.
PART A. DEVELOPMENT HISTORY: STAGES OF ISI
HI. ISI IN NON-DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS: THE 1950s
In Turkey, during the 1930s a significant level of import-substitution was achieved
in consumer non-durables (cotton and woolen textiles, sugar, cement, paper, and glass
products) under Statism. After the unprecedented successs of the First Plan, the Second
Industrialization Plan (1938-1942) aimed at moving to the production of capital goods.
However, WW II brought this industialization momentum to a halt. From then until 1960
we observe two distinct periods: 1946-53, the pre-ISI and 1954-60, the return to ISI.
From the end of the war to 1950 a transition period to new politico-economic policies
occured. Under the Marshall Plan, a new role in the international division of labor, that of
an exporter of agricultural goods to Europe and an importer of their manufactures, was
embraced. Despite this, ISI in consumer goods continued in the background. The basic
characteristics of the new economic policies were: free market conditions in trade and
commerce, encouragement of the private sector, limiting Statism except in building
infrastructure, commercialization of agriculture through price supports, mechanization and
road-building, and the encouragement of foreign capital. As a result, more rural areas
opened to the market and domestic market creation was intensified. In industry, the private
sector also joined the production of consumer goods. The rather large foreign exchange
reserves accumulated during the war period encouraged imports of consumer goods. This
introduced new consumption patterns that were reinforced both by expansionary monetary
and fiscal policies and an unprecedented level of urbanization that took place as a result of
the rapid commercialization of agriculture. After 1950, the role of the state in economic
development had also changed; the SEEs were increasingly used to aid private capital
accumulation. Industrial development in the 1950s had three important characteristics:
increasing privatization of the industrial sector, increasing external dependence (foreign
capital), and increasing capital monopolization. In short, a long period of externally
financed industrialization began in the 1950s. However, after 1953, as a result of the
growing BP difficulties, ISI proper gained importance; various import control measures
were introduced as early as 1954. The official ratification of ISI started with the
establishment of the State Planning Organization in 1960.
1. 1946-1953
As the Second World War interrupted the implementation of the Second Five Year
Industrial Plan (1938-42) in Turkey, economic emphasis necessarily shifted to war
production. Top priority was given to those subsectors that produced the bare necessities
(clothing, sugar, glass, etc.), various strategic raw materials (mainly, chrome and lignite),
and weapons. Meanwhile, development of the public industrial sector continued to be
discussed during the war years. The objective was to develop a large scale post-war
investment program that would start the production of capital goods. Accordingly, its focal
points were mining, electricity, ports, machinery and equipment. Kemalists, the techno-
bureaucrat group, envisioned economic self-sufficiency by producing most of the goods
that were previously imported under the leadership of the state sector. However, this
extensive post-war industrialization through state efforts would require considerable
amounts of external financing. It was hoped that since the US had emerged from the war
as a winner, it would provide the necessary financing. In 1945 the Turkish government
asked for a loan ($500 million) from the American Export-Import Bank, which would be
used for infrastructural and industrial investment purposes. But, only $25 million was
made available to it in 1946 (Tezel, 1982).
In the post Second World War period, the domestic political situation also began to
change. The landlord-merchant alliance had prospered during the war by taking advantage
of the unusual opportunities for profiteering. Exceptionally high domestic demand coupled
with persistent shortages for even basic goods, relatively high export prices, and exorbitant
rates of inflation due to the government's mobilization expenditures all had fueled
speculation and black-marketing. The most prominent Turkish industrialists (e.g., Koc,
and Sabanci) managed to make their initial fortunes during this period. By 1945 the
capitalist class was strong enough to challenge the bureaucratic state. They demanded the
end of bureaucratic restraints and a transition to multi-party politics. These demands were
quite timely given the fact that the fascist regimes in Europe had just been defeated by the
liberal democracies. Most Turkish capitalists believed that Turkey's siding with the
Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan was in their best interest in that American capital
would take over from the Turkish state the role of developing capitalism in Turkey (F.
Ahmad, 1981). Given these significant external and internal political changes, a radical
departure from the Statist economic policies and a transition to a multi-party system
(parliamentary democracy) became inevitable. Finally, in 1946 a major opposition party,
the Democratic Party (DP) was established. This new party represented the landed interests
and the merchant capital, but swept into office with an impressive majority through the
general elections in 1950. This represented a turning point in domestic politics as the reign
of the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was established by Ataturk and had been
the single party since the founding of the Republic, came to an end. The landlord-merchant
alliance, the capitalist group that Statism had nurtured, finally wrestled state power from the
military bureaucrats.
In the post-WW II period Europe was entering a period of reconstruction under US
leadership. In 1945, Turkey, as a result of the serious crisis in her relations with Russia,
due to Russian demands for control of the straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles,
changed her foreign policy towards greater military, political and economic ties with the
US. With the Great Depression over, Turkey was ready to resume its former position that
of an exporter of agricultural goods and an importer of industrial goods in the international
division of labor. A new orientation towards a greater role for the private sector in the
economy is reflected in the preparations of the new economic program of the government.
Finally, in 1946 the new liberalization efforts took a concrete form as the "September 7
Resolutions". The TL was devalued on September 7, 1946 and most import restrictions
were eased. Among the official reasons given for the devaluation, the major one was to
lower the price of exports so as to increase export revenues. Despite the fact that Turkey
entered the post-war period with considerable gold and foreign exchange reserves, the
reason for this devaluation by 116% clearly was not to encourage exports. Since the
devaluation took place after the export season was over, and also given the relatively low
supply elasticity of agricultural goods, which were the main exports, the effects of the
devaluation on exports would be rather limited. In fact, the September 7 Resolutions can
be seen as a part of the effort to provide price and exchange rate stability to be able to take
part in the Bretton Woods agreements. Indeed, in 1947 Turkey succeded in becoming a
member of the International Monetary Fund.
In 1947 Turkey also entered the European Economic Cooperation Committee
(EECC) to work towards the European Recovery Programme. The proposed Turkish plan
for this purpose was the 1947 Vaner Plan. It was a development plan for the 1948-52
period with an emphasis on industry and commerce. This development plan targeted 8%
annual growth rate for the economy on the whole with agriculture growing at 6.5%,
industry at 14.8%, commerce at 10.2%, other services at 1.2%, and construction at 5.5%
(Tezel, 1982). However, the US government rejected the Turkish application for $615
million credit based on the Vaner Plan. According to the US government, this plan was a
"rational but ambitious development program" aiming at self-sufficiency and
industrialization mainly through the public sector investments. However, because Turkey
had remained outside the destruction of the war, the EECC should only pay attention to
those parts of the Vaner Plan which "would help the European recovery directly" (in Tezel,
1982, quoted from Tekeli and Ilkin, 1974). Undoubtedly, this required Turkey to return to
its previous role in the international division of labor as an exporter of agricultural goods
and importer of manufactured goods.
This new role for Turkey in the international division of labor was also approved by
international development organizations. According to the World Bank country report of
1951, for example, Turkey should expand production in agricultural goods, light metals,
contruction materials, leather, forest products, ceramics and handicrafts, but should not
make any investments in heavy industries such as steel, iron, chemicals, especially
fertilizers, paper and cellulose. Also, the public sector role in the economy should be
limited and the private sector should be encouraged to grow faster through special
incentives. However, as a result of the statist policies the economy was controlled by the
state to a great extent. According to the estimates, by 1947-48 the following activities were
100% in the hands of the state: " coal mining, cellulose and paper, chemicals, iron and
steel, all major mineral exploitations, tobacco, salt, tea processing, matches, sugar refining,
alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and postal-telephone-telegraph services. Also, about 50%
of textile production, 30% of cement, 10% of brick and tile, 70% of chrome, 30% of
leather, 70% of lignite, and 65% of the merchant marine were under the control of state
enterprises. On the other hand, metal working, wood processing, food processing, wine,
cotton ginning, flour milling, glass production, toy and furniture manufacture, handicrafts,
and the construction industry were entirely in private hands. Power production was a
public activity. The state also owned and operated both of the broadcasting stations in
service, was marketing a substantial percentage of farm machinery, owned almost 100%
of the nation's forest lands, was buying 20% of the major field crops, owned all oil
reserves and oil wells, and interests in a number of private banks and one insurance
company, and controlled all foreign exchange operations. Education was also a
government monopoly" (Robinson, 1963).
Finally, an appropriately revised version of this plan, which was to sharply reverse
the priorities of Statism, was accepted by the EECC in 1948. This new plan gave priority
to improving infrastructure, transportation and telecommunications, and also to increasing
agricultural production. All these developments were geared toward specialization in food
and raw materials exports to Europe, as this was to be the new role for Turkey in the post-
war international division of labor. Efforts of industrialization were listed at the very
bottom of the list of priorities of this ironically named plan, the 1947 Turkish Industrial
Development Plan. The sectoral distribution of investment clearly reflects these aims: 61%
in transportation, 13% in agriculture, 11% in mining, 6% in energy, and only 6% in
industry (Tezel, 1982). With respect to the financing of these targeted investments, the
basic strategy of the plan was to rely on foreign capital, especially loans from the US that
would be provided within the Marshall Plan framework.
External sources of capital formation: loans, aid, and direct foreign investment.
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, external borrowing was
kept low while the repayment of the old Ottoman debts continued to pose a considerable
fiscal burden: 18% of the yearly government budget. Although some external loans were
received during the war, as a result of a large accumulation of gold and foreign exchange
reserves,Turkey had entered the post war era without any external debt burden (Bulutolu,
1974). However, this situation was to change rather quickly in the 1950s. Indeed, Turkey
received sizeable foreign aid and credit that was to be used for public invesment in
infrastructure and for imports of tractors and other agricultural machinery. The total value
of foreign aid and long-term credits received due to the Marshall Plan was $391 million
between 1946 and 1950. After debt service charges this amount was $318 which was
much greater than the total aid and credits received between 1923 and 1946 (Schick and
Tonak, 1987).
Most of the external borrowing during the 1950s came from the United States. US
economic aid to Turkey averaged a little over 100 million dollars annually, nearly two-
thirds of which was in grants, and military aid was almost 200 million dollars annually.
Aid was extended under different arrangemets such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan, AID, and the PL 480 imports. During the implementation of the Marshall Plan,
1948-52, Turkey received 225 million dollars in economic assistance, two-thirds in grants,
and 305 million dollars in military grants (Tuncer, 1982). Up to 1950, the US aid was in
the form of loans, but between 1950 and 1960 it was mostly grants given the strong
political ties between the two countries (Table 3.1). According to the PL 480, payments
for the sale of surplus agricultural goods from the US went into a special Central Bank
account. It was to be used by the US for local expenditures and for financing American-
Turkish joint ventures, and by Turkey for financing the government budget and the SEE
deficits. This reflects a clear understanding of the newly established economic system of
state support for the private sector through joint ventures of the public and the private
(domestic and foreign) capital. Up to 1962, Turkey received $351 million through PL 480,
which was nearly one-third of the total debt accumulated between 1950 and 1962
(Kepenek, 1984). During 1946-1950, the US extended 496 million TL. in aid and 328
million TL. in credit which also continued after 1950 (Tezel, 1982). In addition, several
other countries also provided long-term aid in smaller amounts: The UK $23 million,
Austria $3 million, and Czechoslavakia $5 million. The IBRD contributed $16 million for
two seaport construction projects.
Although during the WW II period short-term commercial debt had declined,
towards the end of the 1940s it began to increase. Total aid and long-term credit amounted
to 1,094 million TL., out of which 203 million TL. consolidated debt service was paid out,
leaving a balance of 891 million TL. net foreign exchange. This sum was greater than the
total foreign debt accumulated during 1923-1945. The 1947-50 balance of payments deficit
guesstimate was 1,203 million TL., of which 980 million TL. was covered with aid and
long-and short-term credits. In short, by the end of the 1940s Turkey's trade dependency
had also led to financial dependency on the industrialized countries of the West (Table 3.2).
With respect to direct foreign investment, the Petroleum Law and various laws for
the encouragement of foreign capital were significant. After the establishment of the
republic the first law to encourage foreign capital investments was passed in 1950. This
was followed by another law in 1951 which opened most areas of the economy including
industry, mining, energy, transportation, tourism, and infrastructure to foreign capital, and
also permitted profit transfers in excess of 10%. However, because the 1950 and 1951
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Table 3.1
External Sources of Capital
(million $)
US Economic Assistance Other aid
Loans Grants Total
1946.48 45,4 - 45,4 5,0
1949 33,8 - 33,8 -
1950 40,0 31,9 71,9 80,4
1951 - 49,8 49,8
1952 11,2 58,4 69,6 35,2
1953 - 58,6 58,6 20,0
1954 - 78,7 78,7 3,8
1955 25,5 83,8 109,3 -
1956 25,0 104,3 129,3 -
1957 25,1 62,3 87,4 13,5
1958 23,2 90,4 113,6 125,5
1959 97,2 107,0 204,2 -
1960 26,5 99,0 125,5 37,0
1961 131,0 89,8 220,0 161,7
1%2 102,5 81,6 184,2 15,0
586,4 9956 1 582,0 497,1
Notes: 1. Other aid sources are IBRD, IDA, EPU, IMF, and
Germany. 2. In this period, total amount of military aid was
2023,8 million dollars.
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
Table 3.2
Turkish External Debt
(million $)
67.2
10.0
27.4
60.3
164.2
142.8
16.1
41.8
44.0
7.5
581.3
1927-1962
1950
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Total
Total
Source: Savas, 1980
1927
1930
1934
1938
1940
1942
1948
1947
1948
1949
Total
121.6
51.7
36.0
141.1
23.5
2.5
47.9
116.3
139.5
194.2
107.8
113.1
1.095.2
1.676.5
laws failed to attract enough foreign capital, another foreign capital law was passed in
1954. This new law placed no limits on profit transfer, and also opened all areas to foreign
capital including agriculture and commerce (Uras, 1979). It proved to be the most
important development in the encouragement of foreign capital investments. Under this
law foreign capital could enter Turkey in the form of capital (money) and also of machinery
and parts, licence, trademark and patent rights, etc. Interestingly, during the 1950s, about
75% of the foreign capital inflow was made up of machinery and such, and only 17% of it
was money capital. The 1954 Petroleum Law also encouraged foreign private investment.
During 1954-65 it amounted to 1,850 million TL, which was more than the capital received
under the above mentioned foreign capital law. In addition, from foreign private sources
some long term (project) credit was made available to the private sector (463 million TL
during 1946-62). However, the most foreign private credit was used in financing trade.
These short-term, high interest rate loans amounted to more than 50% of all foreign capital
inflow. Therefore, foreign private credit did not contribute to the productive sectors, but
mostly to commercial activities in Turkey. Also, although foreign private capital inflow
continued throughout the period, it always fell short of the anticipated (permitted) levels.
Internal sources of capitalformation: Money, credit, and public finance
During 1946-1960, developments in the domestic sources of capital formation, i.e.,
money, credit, and public finance, are summarized in Table 3.3. Money supply increased
continuously after 1950, and especially fast in the second half of the 1950s. During the
first half of the 1950s, bank credits increased much faster (at a yearly average of 30%) than
the direct money supply (at a yearly average of 10%). The unprecedented commercial
capital accumulation during the war years resulted in a rapidly developing private banking
sector soon after the war. Meanwhile, public banking efforts were geared towards
providing specialized credits, e.g., for housing, agriculture, etc. In 1951, the government
also lowered commercial bank interest rates to 8.5% from the previous 12%.
Undoubtedly, this contributed to credit expansion. However, credit expansion mostly
depends on the conditions of profitability. The distribution of bank credits among the
major sectors of the economy shows that more than 75% of the credits concentrated in the
service sector, especially in commerce, transportation, and housing. Therefore, credit
expansion had taken place outside the productive areas, and mostly in the speculative fields
of the economy. (Interestingly, this situation in the pre-ISI period is going to be repeated
Table 3.3
Internal Sources of Capital
Money Growth Bank Growth General Budget Deficit Expendi. Wholesale Annual
supply rate credits rate revenue expendi. (-) growth P index growth rate
1945 900 4,4 619 26,9 658,8 600,7 + 58,1 - 89
1946 975 -0,5 785 26,8 1041,5 1018,9 + 22,6 69,8 86 - 3
1947 888 -9,2 1087 28,4 1615,0 1564,2 + 50,8 53,5 87 + 1
1948 932 5,0 1188 9,3 1467,7 1401,8 + 65,5 -10,4 90 + 3
1949 803 -13,8 1069 -10,0 1628,2 1572,0 + 56,8 12,1 101 + 11
1950 862 7,3 1301 21,7 1419,4 1467,4 - 48,0 -6,7 91 + 10
1951 1007 16,8 1779 36,7 1646,0 1580,5 + 65,5 7,7 97 + 6
1952 1104 9,6 2620 47,3 2235,8 2429,0 - 13,2 42,2 98 + 1
1953 1286 16,5 3429 30,9 2272,1 2294,1 - 220 2,0 100
1954 1326 3,1 4311 25,7 2390,8 2564,7 -173,9 11,8 111 + 11
1955 1744 31,5 5062 17,4 3148,4 3308,9 -160,5 290 119 + 8
1956 2253 29,2 5 885 163 3 3048 3 487,2 -182,6 5,4 139 +20
1957 2853 26,6 7849 33,4 39%6,6 4 162,8 -196,2 19,4 165 +26
1958 2955 3,6 8737 11,3 4822,1 4977,1 -155,0 19,6 190 +25
1959 3295 11,5 9511 8,9 6 35,8 6728,0 -342,2 35,2 227 +37
1960 3 699 12,3 9640 1,4 6933,3 7320,3 -387,0 8,8 239 + 12
1961 3984 7,7 8366 -13,2 10933,8 11382,5 -448,7 55,5 246 +. 7
1962 4368 9,6 10 399 24,3 9017,8 9118,1 -1003 -20,0 260 + 14
* Currency in circulation
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
later in the 1980s, in the post-ISI period.) The main reason for this development was that
production increases could not keep up with the monetary expansion, and the resulting
price increases made the exchange (sales and distribution) rather than the production of
these commodities more profitable. Strong effective demand for consumer goods coupled
with various market imperfections led to this result.
Another important factor in the expansion of credit was the persistent general
government budget deficit. After 1950 (except in 1951), budget deficits continued to
increase. The major reason for this was the lack of an effective tax system. Despite the
aims of the 1950 government program, in general direct taxes did not yield enough
revenue. Furhermore, the leading sector, agriculture, was exempted from taxation
altogether. As a result, the share of the agricultural taxes in total government revenues
dropped to 27% in 1959 compared to 34% in 1950. Given the insufficient amount of tax
revenues, government turned to deficit financing to be able to meet increasing expenditures,
especially during the second half of the 1950s. This naturally fueled monetary expansion.
However, the nature of government expenditures was such that they did not directly
contribute to any productive activity. About 50-60% of government expenditures was
current, 25-30% was transfers, and the remaining 10-25% went into public investment
including building construction and materials (Kepenek, 1984).
Yet another development in the creation and distribution of money-credit was
related to the SEEs. The role of the SEEs in this respect was twofold. The first was due to
the pricing policy of the SEEs. It was such that prices of goods and services they produced
were kept below both their costs and the general price level. The resulting deficit,
appropriately called "deficit due to duty", was always financed through the Central Bank
credits, thereby directly increasing the money supply. The second was due to the
establishment of many joint ventures with private capital. Mostly due to the agricultural
and the SEE pricing policies, creation of high-powered money (currency+Central Bank
credits) had almost quadrupled between 1950 and 1958. The largest increases in high
powered money were in 1956 and 1957. The share of SEE credits in total high-powered
money was extremely high, with an average of 41% during 1950-54 and 39% during
1955-58 (Fry, 1972).
In the post war era, development of the private sector was given top priority.
Accordingly, the public sector, moving away from Statism, had to change its role
significantly. Throughout the 1950s, especially after 1953, the strategy was state support
of the development of private sector through the SEEs. On the one hand, the state
concentrated on developing infrastructure (roads, railroads, electricity, etc.) so as to
provide low cost services to the private sector, and on the other, it set up industries that
would provide cheap consumer goods (food, clothing, textiles, etc.) where private sector
efforts were lacking. Accordingly, the financial resources of the main SEEs were
generously expanded in the post-war period. For example, Sumer Bank and Eti Bank, two
of the largest SEEs to be managed independently for profit making purposes, provide good
examples of this effort. Sumer Bank was set up in 1933 and its basic function was to
oversee the state investments in manufacturing industries and to operate the factories to be
established. Sumer Bank had a total capital of 20 million TL. when it was set up. In 1946
it had increased to 200 million TL. and in 1950 to 431 million TL. The Eti Bank, which
was set up in 1935, was in charge of the state investments in mining and energy. Its total
capital was 29 million TL. in the beginning, later in 1946 increased to 150 million TL., and
by the end of 1950 it reached 405 million TL (Tezel, 1982). As a result of the rapidly
growing domestic market more goods and services had to be provided. However, the
private sector could not meet this effective demand without state support. Also, the
creation of employment opportunities through the SEEs was another important role the state
had to play for political reasons. Through SEE pricing policies, it was possible not only to
keep the general price level relatively stable, but also to provide the private sector with
cheap inputs that were necessary tfor continued industrial production. In addition,
distribution and sales of the goods and services produced by the SEEs was completely left
to the private sector. This, of course, directly aided the accumulation of private commercial
capital.
The second way of transfering resources from the public sector to the private sector
was through the establishment of many joint ventures. Generally, private capital had at
least 51% of the shares in these joint ventures, which were widespead in food, textiles,
mining, transportation, and banking-insurance. There are 38 of them, established in the
1950s and still operating in the 1980s (Kepenek, 1984). Many state enterprises, in line
with the economic liberalization strategy, were transferred to the private sector. Their
services, raw materials, power plants, and transportation facilities were also offered for
sale at "reasonable" prices. Consequently, the share of the private sector in manufacturing
had increased to 65% in 1954 from 58% in 1950 (Berberoglu, 1982). Among the private
industrial establishments with minimum of 50 employees, the number of those that were set
up during 1921-30 was 24, during 1931-40 it was 57, and it had jumped to 149 during
1941-50 (Soral, 1974).
The increasing strength of the industrial bourgeosie was reflected in the economic
policies of the RPP, which focused on the crucial role of the state in supporting private
capital accumulation. A symbol of this change was the establishment of the Turkish
Industrial Development Bank (TIDB). It was sug sted by the IBRD in 1949 and was set
up in 1950 by the RPP. In addition to the IBRD credit, special US funds within the
Marshall Plan provisions, and private US credits, some state capital was used for the
establishment of this bank. However, given their large share, the bank was under the
control of the private US interests. The major aims of this bank were declared as:
i). to support and to encourage the establishment of new private firms and to
modernize the existing ones;
ii). to encourage and to help the local and/or foreign firms to join the newly
established industries in Turkey;
iii). to help with the establishment of a modern credit-banking system.
Not surprisingly, the total amount of credit (project+program) extended to the private sector
constituted the major portion of the Turkish external debt (Tezel, 1982). In fact, the TIDB
gave priority to mining several strategically important materials such as chrome,
magnesium, and uranium (Rosaliev, 1974). As far as manufacturing was concerned, the
majority of the TIDB credits during the 1950s went into the light consumer goods
industries. According to the distribution of credits between 1953 and 1957, non-durable
consumer goods received 54.4%, intermediate goods 19.7%, and capital goods 9.3%
(Tuzun, 1976). Over time, the share of manufacturing credits increased, but the fastest
increase took place in the capital goods industries.
Investment
Gross capital formation during the 1950s was significant. The annual share of
investment in GNP increased to a yeariy average of 13.8% during 1950-59 from 8.9%
during 1940-49. Meanwhile, the fixed capital stock increased 8.1% annually during 1950-
60; this proves to be important compared to 7.3% yearly average during 1960-70 (Krueger,
1974; Tuzun, 1977). The composition of gross capital formation indicates that the
government's share in total investment rose continuously: from 38% in 1951, 42.4% in
1955 to 50% in 1960. It was especially high in construction (especially infrastructure), but
it increased faster in machinery and equipment. The share of private sector declined
continuosly, from 61.9% in 1951, 57.6% in 1955 to 50% in 1960. The government share
was high in dwellings and in machinery and equipment, but declined sharply in machinery
in 1955 (17.6%), and recovered later in 1960 (22%) (Krueger, 1974). The share of
manufacturing in total fixed capital investment was high during 1953-56, with a yearly
average of about 13%. However, it declined continuously throughout the rest of the 1950s
and into the early 1960s (Table 3.4). During the second half of the 1950s, due to import
restrictions and increasing inflation, private industrial investment had declined
considerably; it moved to mostly speculative areas. Therefore, the public sector had to
increase its investment to compensate, as Table 3.5 clearly demonstrates. However,
despite the efforts of the government, public investment failed to recover up to 1962.
Sectoral developments
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, industrialization efforts
have been based on import substitution. Between 1924 and 1929, the share of basic
consumption goods (especially cotton and woolen textiles, and sugar) in domestic
production increased substantially (Table 3.6). However, during the planned ISI in the
1930s, not only did the share of consumption goods continue to increase, but also a high
level of import substitution took place in iron and steel, paper and glass products (Tezel,
1982). Up to 1950 the import dependency (defined as the share of imports in total
domestic supply) of the industrial sector declined considerably. In 1950, the import
dependency of various subsectors was as follows: 3% in food, 18% in textiles, 1% in
clothing, footwear and leather goods, 20% in wood products, 37% in paper, 38% in
rubber-plastics, 26% in chemicals, 69% in basic metals, 70% in metal products, 32% in
non-metallic minerals, and 100% in petroleum products (Chenery, et al., 1953, as quoted
in Tezel, 1982).
The index of industrial production (1848=100) rose from 109.5 in 1950 to 141.4 in
1953, 154.2 in 1955, 176.2 in 1957, and 193.8 in 1960 (Tayanc, 1977). The distribution
Table 3.4
Share of manufacturing investment, %
1950 7.4 1953 11.6 1956 15.3 1959 6.7
1951 9.8 1954 11.8 1957 9.6 1960 7.1
1952 6.9 1955 12.3 1958 8.7 1961 7.0
Source: Tuzun, 1977
Table 3.5
Distribution of total industrial investment, %
Private sector SEE Public sector
1951 57 15 28
1955 44 27 29
1959 38 20 42
Source: Boruban, 1977.
Table 3.6
Total Supply and the share of Domestic Production in selected subsectors
iron-steel cement paper glass cotton woolen sugar
A B A B A B A B A B A B A B
1000 ton % 1000 ton % 1000 ton % 100 ton % 100 ton % 1O0 ton % 1O0 ton %
1924 87 0 32 75 16 0 11 0 23 4 3.2 19 53 0
1927 92 0 97 42 21 0 9 0 23 13 3.1 19 67 7
1929 163 0 144 49 23 0 6 0 25 12 3.3 24 77 10
1934 132 0 181 99 24 0 5 0 23 52 3.0 83 63 94
1936 147 0 199 97 30 13 5 61 22 55 3.5 86 88 75
1938 203 0 329 87 37 24 8 63 28 57 3.7 81 107 40
1940 38 32 275 97 23 39 8 91 25 84 4.1 98 99 90
1942 77 56 178 100 23 39 7 96 25 84 4.2 95 57 100
1944 96 56 295 96 30 43 7 97 25 88 5.1 98 92 98
1946 133 54 326 100 31 48 10 96 40 65 6.1 9897 100
1948 187 50 434 77 41 44 11 92 27 74 6.3 95 130 79
1950 306 33 530 75 44 43 8 95 29 79 4.2 95 137 100
A: Imports plus domestic production;
Source: Tezel, 1982.
B: Share of domestic production in A
of manufacturing production in 1950 was as follows: food 32.9%, tobacco 14.2%. textiles
26.1%, and basic metals, metal products, earth products, and transport vehicles around
2.5% each (Akbank, 1980). In addition to textiles, tobacco, food, leather, glass, and earth
products which required relatively simple technologies, chemicals, medicine, trasport
vehicles, electrical machinery and electronics which were based on more advanced
technologies, usually provided by foreign capital through licencing agreements, also
showed progress. Industrial production increased substantially during the 1950s. The
emphasis clearly was on the consumption goods sectors. The share of consumption goods
in manufacturing value added was 65.5% in 1950, 78% in 1955, but it dropped to 41% in
1959 and 40% in 1960 (Kepenek, 1977). In the intermediate goods sectors (especially in
cement, medicines, chemicals, construction materials, and rubber-plastics), which were
dominated by the public sector, there were important production increases. However,
thoughout the 1950s the share of consumer durables and capital goods remained very low.
In accordance with its role within the European Reconstruction Program as a
supplier of food to Europe, Turkey had also accepted a " Five Year Agricultural Program"
which aimed at boosting production and commercializing the agricultural sector.
Accordingly, there were advances in the areas of tractor imports, agricultural credit
provision, and irrigation facilities. Between 1948 and 1952, a large number of tractors
were imported, and to facilitate their sale a special agricultural credit program was
established by the Agricultural Bank. Both of the tractor imports and the agricultural credit
programs were financed by credits from the US. They mostly benefited the large
landowners who could afford them. Parallel to the increase in the number of tractors used,
which reached 43,727 in 1956 compared to 9,905 in 1950 and only 1,756 in 1948, the
share of the areas cultivated using tractors increased to 15% in 1956 from 1% in 1948. The
total amount of credit extended by the state to landowners for equipment and operational
expenditures rose from 3 million TL. during 1945-50 to 9.7 million TL. during 1950-56
(Table 3.7).
In addition to the tractor imports and the agricultural credit provision, the state
instituted an agricultural pricing policy that also immensely benefited the large landowners.
The price the state paid for agricultural goods then was twice as high as the world price of
these goods. The sum paid as agricultural price subsidies increased from 23 million TL. in
1949-50 to over 519 million TL. in 1954. Additionally, by law agricultural incomes were
Table 3.7
Agricultural Sector
Year Cultivated
area
1000 hectare
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
12664
13093
13575
13 900
13264
14542
15272
17361
18812
19616
20 998
22453
22161
22765
22940
23264
23076
23215
Growth Number Growth
rate, % of tractors rate, %
3,4
3,7
2,4
-4,6
9,6
5,0
13,7
8,4
4,3
7,0
6,9
-1,3
2,7
1,0
1,4
-1,0
1,0
1156
1356
1556
1756
9 170
16585
24000
31415
35600
37743
40282
43727
44144
42525
41 896
42136
42505
43747
17,3
14,7
12,9
422,2
80,9
44,7
30,9
13,3
6,0
6,7
8,6
1,0
-3,7
-1,5
0,6
0,9
2,9
Source: Kepenek, 1977.
Agri.
credit
m TL
1139
176
243
236
227
412
646
1 067
1 213
1 497
1558
1888
2.106
2 161
2313
2 392
1682
1953
Growth
rate, %
26,6
38,1
-2,9
42,8
22,3
56,8
65,2
13,7
14,0
4,1
21,2
11,7
2,5
7,9
3,4
-29,7
16,1
tax-exempt (Berberoglu, 1982). During the early years of the Republic, the state did not
pay much attention to irrigation. In 1928 the public irrigation projects had reached only
9300 hectares. Up to 1938 the annual irrigation expenditures varied between 1 and 1.6
million TL. (Tezel, 1982). However, between 1938 and 1950 this amount increased to
150 million TL. The total area irrigated through the public irrigation projects also increased
from 100,000 hectare at the end of the 1930s to 400,000 hectares in 1950. But, even in
1950 the total irrigated area was only 8% of all the cultivable areas.
During the 1947-1953 period, the GNP grew at 8.5% on average with agriculture
growing at 8% and industry at 7.3%. However, by the mid-50s the rapid agricultural
growth came to an end. Despite state efforts to increase the efficiency and the productivity
of agricultural production, during the 1926-1950 period the total increase in labor
productivity was only 15% and in land productivity 13%. One of the factors limiting the
productivity in agriculture was the insufficient use of pesticides. Also, the internal terms of
trade during 1945-50 had remained high compared to the 1930s. As it turned in favor of
the agriculture, the internal terms of trade was disconnected from the external terms of trade
due to the agricultural price support policies. Although the foundations of this policy was
set up during the 1947-50 period, it was increasingly implemented in the 1950s by the DP
with the purpose of keeping real agricultural incomes high. Most of the attempted
agricultural reforms aimed at creating a broad based and productive agricultural sector were
doomed to failure from the start so long as the traditional structure of the agricultural sector
remained intact. Under the economic and social pressure from the large landowners and
the usurer-merchant alliance, the mass of poor peasants iemained helpless. However, given
the favorable world conjuncture, due to high demand for Turkish exports during the
Korean War, export earnings showed a remarkable increase. But as soon as the war
ended, international demand for Turkey's agricultural exports declined considerably. This
situation, coupled with cultivable land usage reaching its limits, caused the rapid
agricultural expansion period to come to an end by the mid-1950s. Consequently, export
revenues started to decline.
Labor force
The number of workers in the industrial labor force (except construction workers)
was 560,981 in 1938, 713,780 in 1948, dropped to 476,00 in 1950, but rose to 801,85 in
1953 (Rosaliev, 1971). According to 1951 Industrial and Agricultural census data, the
sectoral breakdown of the workers was as follows: Of the 643,000 industrial workers
427,000 were in factories, 116,000 in small establishments, and 100,000 in transportation.
The total number of agricultural workers was 500,000-600,000. The mechanization of the
agricultural sector had driven most small and middle peasants to bankruptcy, resulting in
massive unemployment and underemployment in rural areas. During 1948-1952, 25% of
the small peasants, who had lost their land due to mechanization, migrated to the urban
areas (Tekeli, Erder, 1978). This eventually forced many more to migrate to urban areas,
but given the limited number of available industrial jobs, unemployment in urban areas also
increased. In 1951, there were more than 1 million unemployed in towns as a result of the
rural-urban migration, which was about 8% of the total labor force and more than 50% of
the labor force in urban areas (Berberoglu, 1982). The official Turkish statistics gave the
proportion of the unemployed industrial workers as 20% (Rosaliev, 1974).
The source of the working class was bankrupt small peasants and small
establishment owners, in addition to a small group of workers who inherit it from their
parents. In general, wages were extremely low and working conditions were very poor for
the industrial workers. During 1951-63 the income distribution shifted against wage labor.
Real wage increases were insignificant and always lagged behind increases in productivity
and in GNP per capita (Table 3.8). For example, in 1951 the general level of real wages
was only 1% higher than the 1938 level. As their numbers increased as a result of rural-
urban migration, industrial workers began to organize on a large scale. Following the
Labor Union Law of 1947 up to 1954, although the number of workers increased by 77%,
the number of unionized workers showed a remarkable 247% increase (Table 3.9). This
doubled the percentage of unionized workers in 1954, bringing it to 30% of all workers
(Berberoglu, 1982). According to the 1950 census of agricultural establishments and the
1952 surveys, large farmers and landlords held about 13% of all agricultural establishments
and 72% of all cultivable land, while 86% of all establishments held by small families had
only 25% of the cultivable land. Out of 2.9 million rural families, 489,000 had no land at
all and 1,507,000 ,or 52%, had 1-5 hectares of land; of the total 12 million peasants,
1,996,000 had either very little or no land at all (Rosaliev, 1971).
Table 3.8
Wage and Productivity Indices
1950 1963
Annual wage, per person (TL)
1. Industrial census
2. Large manufacuring
Productivity (VA/Labor) (TL)
1. Industrial census
2. Large manufacturing
Consumer price index
Manufacturing price index
GNP per person
(in 1948 prices)
Real wage per person
1. Industrial census
2. Large manufacturing
Real productivity index
1. Industrial census
2. Large manufacturing
1282
(100)
1480
(100)
4302
(100)
4663
(100)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
5611
(437.7)
6488
(438.4)
18570
(431.2)
20750
(445.0)
314.2
304.3
162.3
139.3
139.5
141.7
146.2
Source: Tuzun, 1977.
Table 3.9
The Trade Union Movement in Turkey (1948=100)
% of workers Increase in Increase in number
unionized number of workers of unionized workers
1948 15.78 100 100
1950 20.86 113 150
1952 26.61 148 250
1954 30.92 177 347
1956 32.41 196 402
1958 37.45 213 505
Source: Fisek, 1969.
International trade
Due to WW II, Turkey experienced significant changes in her external trade both
with respect to shares of imports and exports in GNP, and the composition of imports.
The share of exports in GNP (in 1948 prices) was 9% during 1929-38, but it dropped to
5% during 1939-46. Although it had picked up again after the war and reached 7% during
1947-50, total export revenue in constant prices, even in 1950 still remained below that of
1938. The share of imports in GNP also declined during WW I; between 1939 and 1946
this share was 5%; a sharp decline from 10% during 1930-38. The extent of this decline
becomes clearer when compared to 23% during the 1924-29 period. However, at the end
of the 1940s import volume began to increase as a result of the intense political and
economic relations with the US. In 1950 the share of imports in GNP reached 10%.
During 1923-1950 the composition of Turkish imports exhibited a certain change while that
of the exports stayed almost the same. The share of agricultural goods in current exports
remained at 80% throughout this period. The share of mining exports also remained
around 5%. However, even before the ISI during the Statist period, the composition of
imports had begun to change; the share of consumer goods imports in total imports began
to decline, while that of the intermediate goods and capital goods increased considerably
between 1924 and 1929. This trend continued during the 1930s, and after a break during
the WW II period, it resumed again in the post-war period (Table 3.10).
Between 1950 and 1952, exports grew only by 37%, in sharp contrast to imports,
which grew nearly 100% (Sonmez, 1982). At the same time, a sizeable decline in export
revenues was observed. Not only did international demand for Turkey's traditional exports
decline significantly, but the growth of agriculture reached its limits, mostly due to the
exhaustion of arable lands. This was in sharp contrast to continuously increasing import
expenditures. As a result of the 1946 devaluation, the external terms of trade turned against
Turkey. During 1945-48 the ratio of export price index to import price index declined by
44% (Table 3.11). Naturally, exporting food and agricultural raw materials and importing
manufactured goods (e.g. exporting raw cotton and importing cotton cloth) as the external
terms of trade declined, led to a worsening balance of trade (Table 3.12). After 1946,
Turkish external trade started registering irreversible deficits. Beginning in 1951 the trade
deficit began to swell: it showed a 400% increase from 1950. Continuous foreign
borrowing and expansion of credit to cover the deficit, however, meant an ever-increasing
Table 3.10
Composition and Share of Imports and Exports in GNP
Years Imports Exports Composition of imports, % Composition of exports, %
GNP GNP Investment Consumption Raw Agricultural Minerals Industrial
% % goods goods materials products products
1945 2,3 40
1946 3.3 6, -
1947 9.1 8,3 32.1 29,1 38,3
1948 8.1 5.8 39,2 24,8 36.0
1949 8.2 7,6 42,3 20.4 37.3
1950 8.3. 7.6 46.0 20,6 33,4
1951 9,7 7,6 43,0 24,8 32,2
1952 11,6, 7,6 50,5 22,1 27,4
1953 9.6 .7,1 52,0 19,8 28,2
1954 8,4 5,9 53.0 19,6 27,4
1955 7,3 4,6 54,3 14,6 31,1
1956 5,1 3.8 -58,2 11,1 30,7
1957 3,8 3,3 43,5 12,3 44,2
1958 2,6 2,0 43,3 12,2 44,5
1959 3.0 2,2 45,6 10,2 44,2
190 4,7 3,7 52,1 9,6 38,3
1961 9.2 6,3 448 9,9 45,3 81,3 5,4 13.3
1962 9,7 6,0 45,0 7,2 47,8 79.7 4.3 16,0
1%3 9.3 5,0 45,8 5,4 48,8 79,4 2,9 17,7
1964 6,1 5.2 45,7 4,9 49.4 77,9 3.6 18,5
1%5 6,8 5,4 42.2 4,3 53,5 78,0 4,5 17,5
Source: Akbank, 1980
Table 3.11
Terms of Trade
Extemal
terms of trade
1.00
0.97
1.03
0.84
0.80
0.77
0.69
0.61
0.65
0.72
0.81
0.78
0.61
0.71
0.57
0.63
0.69
0.80
0.83
0.96
0.83
0.71
0.54
0.56
0.69
Internal
terms of trade
1.00
0.%
1.04
0.94
0.65
0.55
0.49
0.45
0.49
0.68
0.73
0.74
0.74
0.73
0.58
0.93
1.32
1.23
0.81
0.86
0.79
0.81
0.91
0.99
0.87
to import price
indexSource: Tezel, 1982.
Years
1927-1928
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
External terms of trade: The ratio of export price index
Table 3.12
Foreign Trade
years Imports Exports Export-Import
million $ million $ million $
1923 86,9 50,8 
- 36,1
1924 100,5 82,4 
- 18,1
1925 129,0 102,7 
- 26,3
1926 121,4 %,4 
- 250,
1927 107,8 80,7 
- 27,1
1928 113,7 88,3 
- 25,4
1929 123,6 74,8 
- 48,7
1930 69,5 71.4 1,9
1931 59,9 60,2 0,3
1932 40,7 48,0 7,3
1933 45,1 58,1 13,0
1934 68,8 73,0 4,2
1935 7,6 76,2 5,6
1936 73,6 93.7 20,1
1937 90,5 109,2 18,7
1938 118,9 115,0 
- 3,9
1939 92,5 99,6 7,1
1940 50,0 80,9 30,9
1941 55,3 91,1 35,7
1942 112,9 126,1 13,2
1943 155,3 1%,7 41,4
1944 126,2 178,0 51,8
1945 97,0 168,3 71,3
1946 118,9 214,6 95,7
1947 244,6 223,3 - 21,3
1948 275,1 1%,8 - 78,3
1949 290,2 247,8 - 42,4
1950 285,7 263,4 - 22,3
1951 402,1 314,1 - 88,0
1952 555,9 362,9 -193,0
1953 532,5 3%,1 - 136,4
1954 . 478,4 334.9 
-143,5
1955 497,6 313,3 - 184,3
1956 407,3 305,0 - 102,3
1957 397,1 345,2 - 51,9
1958 315,1- 247,2 - 67,9
1959 470,0 353,8 -116,2
1949 468,2 320,7 -147,5
1%1 507,2 346,7 -160,5
1962 619,4 381,2 -238,2
1963 687,6 368,1 -319,5
Source: Akbank, 1980
external debt. Turkey's total foreign debt of 187 million T.L. in 1939 reached 775 million
T.L. in 1950. The amount of the funds from the State Treasury to cover the mounting debt
service charges was 209 million T.L. in 1951-52 and it was to rise to 244 million T.L. in
1955-56.
Another reason for the worsening balance of payments situation was mounting
military expenditures. Starting in mid-1947, the US further strengthened its ties with
Turkey by extending military aid through the Truman doctrine. Despite an initial rebuff,
Turkey was admitted to full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in 1952. Later, in 1959, the US also signed separate defense pacts with Turkey, Iran, and
Pakistan, thus forming the Central Treaty Organization. Turkey received $2.4 billion in aid
from the US between 1951 and 1960 and over $1.4 billion of it was spent for military
purposes. Additional military expenditures, such as the construction of air bases and
roads, and the purchase of weapons, ammunition and aircraft from other NATO countries,
however, posed an additional burden on the national budget. Military spending reached
29% of the national budget in 1951-52, and climbed to an amazing 34% in 1954-55. These
additional expenditures together with regular defense expenditures, increased military
spending to almost half the national budget during the 1950s (Berberoglu, 1982). In sum,
given the burden of the foreign debt and the debt service charges, together with mounting
military expenditures and the increasing trade deficit, the balance of payments deteriorated
sharply.
2. 1954-1960
The worsening balance of payments situation necessitated a return to the
protectionist economic policies as early as 1953. Thus, another open economy period,
which was a trial of a free market economy during 1950-1954 had to come to an end.
Accordingly, trade liberalization was gradually limited, and various import restrictions in
the form of ad valorem tariffs and selective quotas were finally introduced in 1954 (Tezel,
1982). Given the relatively high levels of protection thus provided, the traditional
commercial interest groups found the idea of starting the domestic production of industrial
goods for the domestic market highly attractive. Often in alliance with foreign capital, these
commercial interest groups started to invest in agro-based industries, mostly in food and
textiles, and also in the production of some luxury goods, imports of which were highly
restricted (Keyder, 1979). Eventually, a prolific transformation of commercial capital into
industrial capital resulted from these protectionist policies of the early 1950s (Payasli,
1961; Alpar, 1974). This seemed to be an especially appropriate transformation given the
long-standing complementary relationship between local commercial capital and
metropolitan capital. Throughout the "export economy" stage of development, most local
merchants acted as the agents of the metropolitan capital, which usually had originated from
the European capitals. These local merchants were involved in imports and distribution of
various manufactured goods produced by the European industrialists. However, with the
imposition of many import restrictions, it was in the mutual interest of these groups to turn
to local production of these previously imported goods in alliance.
The local production of consumer goods provided the most resourceful way to
effectively circumvent the protectionist trade policies and to recapture the domestic market.
As the imports of final goods were restricted, it became profitable to import parts and
assemble them into finished goods or to import their inputs and turn them into finished
products. Many domestic establishments engaged in this type of "assembly" production
flourished during the 1950s (Tuzun, 1976; Kavruk, 1978; Tezel, 1979; Kepenek, 1980).
Relatively high domestic inflation also helped to foster this process (Okyar, 1960;
Hershlag, 1968; Sonmez, 1980). In addition to making higher profits possible, inflation
also led to the overvaluation of the Turkish Lira given the fixed exchange rate system in
effect. During the 1950-53 period, annual average rate of inflation was 3.4%, but by 1954
inflation picked up and up to 1958 the yearly inflation rate reached 13.6%. (1953=100
taken as a base, the increase in the overall price index was 190 in 1958.) Compared to her
trade partners, the rate of inflation in Turkey was very high, e.g., the overall prices indices
in 1958: West Germany= 106, US= 108, Italy= 102. Given the fixed exchange regime,
the degree of overvaluation, parallel to inflation, also rose rapidly (Tunca, 1973). Thus,
the emergence of ISI during the second half of the 1950s did not result from deliberate
government planning as in the Statist period, but rather from a serious balance of payments
difficulties. This new strategy of development was also approved by the major
international organizations like IBRD and OEEC (see, for example, IBRD, 1951).
Although up to the mid- 1950s these organizations, in accordance with the priorities of the
Marshall Plan, had urged Turkey to give priority to agriculture and not to industry, in the
second half of the 1950s their recommendations began moving in the opposite direction
(Sonmez,1967; Hershlag, 1968; Avcioglu, 1969).
Although trade liberalization was reversed in the mid- 1950s, most of the other
trends in the reintegration of the Turkish economy into the international economy that had
started in the post-WW II period went on uninterrupted throughout the 1950s. In this
respect, an increasing emphasis on state support for developing the private sector, and a
restructuring of relations with foreign capital were especially important. Parallel to the
intensive industrialization efforts, the promulgation of the Law for the Encouragement of
Foreign Capital opened all areas of the national economy that were open to private initiative
to foreign capital as well, without any restrictions on the area or type of investment or on
the repatriation of profits. The fact that this law was prepared by a US foreign economic
planning commission, and was approved in its entirety by the Turkish government helps to
explain its generosity. The Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital together with
the Petroleum Law, both passed in 1954, have been instrumental in trasferring most of the
key industries from the state ownership to private ownership. As the denationalization of
the Turkish economy accelerated during the second half of the 1950s, the petroleum
industry, other major intermediates such as rubber and tires, fertilizers, chemicals, along
with electrical goods, food processing, and assembly were transferred to foreign capital
and/or joint ventures of foreign capital with the local private capital (Berberoglu, 1982). In
addition, many state resources were used for joint ventures with the (domestic and foreign)
private capital. The number of joint-stock companies increased, from 3 in 1950 to 56 in
1954 (Ergil, 1975; Berch, 1982). Thus, from the very beginning a monopolistic/
oligopolistic market structure began to emerge. Aided by the state, the local merchant-
turned-industrialists started industrial production in the key areas of the economy in alliance
with Multinational Corporations (MNCs) (TIB, 1975). Throughout the 1950s, the
relatively "easy" stage of ISI in non-durable consumer goods progressed under the "triple"
alliance of state capital, private industrial capital and foreign capital.
The most salient characteristic of ISI in the 1950s was that it took off under the
direction of foreign capital, both in the form of direct investment and aid (Table 3.13a).
The predominant share of the US in total foreign investment and the obvious concentration
of foreign capital in the petroleum sector can be observed from Tables 3.13b and 3.14.
Among the major oil companies which owned large shares of the Turkish petroleum
industry were Mobile, Shell, Esso, and Caltex. Besides the petroleum industry, foreign
capital also participated in other major key subsectors such as food processing, chemicals,
fertilizer, rubber and tires. In fertilizers, the Fertilizer Corporation of America held 51% of
the shares in the Gaubre Fabrikalari T.A.S.; in food processing the British-Dutch Unilever
Corporation in joint venture with Is Bankasi held 80% of all shares in Unilever-Is Turkish
Ltd. Company; the Benteler Weke A.G. of Germany in a joint venture with the Muhlis
Emek Company, which was producing pipes and fittings, owned 50% of shares; and the
General Electric Company in a joint venture with Is Bankasi (producing electric bulbs)
owned 51% of the shares. Pfizer, Philips, Goodyear, Pirelli, Michigan Chemical
Corporation, International Drilling Company, Foster and Whiller Corporation and many
others took place in the ISI process from the very beginning (Berberoglu, 1982).
Foreign capital has significantly affected the nature of ISI in Turkey, not only
through direct investment but also through program/project credits. Program credit in
general is used towards necessary imports by the borrowing country, but the creditor
determines which country these imports could come from. Project credit on the other hand,
is used to finance part of a local project, but imposes various conditions on the origin of the
necessary machinery to be imported, technical experts to be employed, and the insurance
and the transportation services to be provided, etc. Thus, foreign capital, in addition to
direct investment, also had the power to influence and condition the direction of
investment. After establishing its domination over the domestic market, foreign capital also
engaged in transfer of surplus value through various means such as "transfer-pricing", i.e.,
buying high-priced inputs from the "parent" company and selling the manufactures back at
relatively low prices. Ozgur, 1976 presents evidence for transfer-pricing as high as twice
the world price.
Table 3.13 a
Share of foreign private capital in investment and external resources (milliom TL)
Private C A foreign
Years Investment invesment deficit capital %, 4/2 %, 4/1 %, 4/3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1950 1.000,0 643,3 140,0 - - - -
1951 1.260,4 772,0 263,2 .3,4 0,4 0,3 1,3
1952 1.835,8 1.087,7 554,4 3,0 0,3 0,2 0,5
1953 2.087,7 1.077,4 459,2 1,2 0,1 0,1 0,3
1954 2.517,6 1.440,6 495,2 2,6 0,2 0,1 0,5
1955 3.006,1 1.518,4 495,2 8,0 0,5 0,3 1,6
1966 3.260,3 1.422,9 210,0 21,7 1,5 0,7 10,3
1957 4.017,0 1.718,0 179,2 10,5 0,6 0,3 5,9
1958 5.042,8 2.672,7 179,2 15,1 0,6 0,3 8,4
1959 6.989,0 3.445,6 1.305,0 19,8 0,6 0,3 1,5
1960 7.779,0 3.524,7 1.251,0 18,7 0,5 0,2 1,5
1961 7.368,0 3.305,0 1.530,0 43,1 1,3 0,6 2,8
1962 7.490,0 3.450,0 2.778,0 87,3 2,5 1,2 4,0
1963 10.140,0 5.000,0 2.520,0 91,4 1,8 1,0 3,6
1964 10.510,5 4.850,0 954,0 69,9 1,4 0,7 7,3
1965 11.950,0 5.430,0 684,0 95,6 1,8 0,8 14,0
1966 14.850,0 6.250,0 1.521,0 69,6 1,1 0,5 4,6
1967 22.996,2 10.711,0 1.026,0 67,7 0,6 0,3 6,0
1968 26.665,6 11.979,3 1.998,0 92,3 0,8 0,4 5,0
1969 29.614,4 13,604,1 1.926,0 61,4 0 ,5 0,25 3,0
1970 31.354,0 14.792,8 1.539,0 90,5 0,6 0,3 6,5
Source: Tuncer, 1968
Table 3.13 b
Foreign Investment in Turkey (TL)
Country Amount %of Total
United States 1,217,315,108 64.5
Britain 452,508,537 24.0
Switzerland 67,561,000 3.6
West Germany 61,619,157 3.3
Holland 42,759,000 2.3
Italy 13,563,000 0.7
France 6,201,944 03
All other countries 25,741,000 1.3
Total 1,887,268,746 100.0
Source: State Planning Organization, A Survey on Foreign Capital Investment
in Turkey, (Ankara: Deviet Planlama Teskilati, February 1964), p. 17;
Agency for International Development (AID), Economic and Social
Indicators - Turkey, (Ankara: AID, 1965).
Table 3.14
Foreign Investment in the Turkish Petroleum Industry, 1954-63 (TL)
Country Amount % of Total
United States 1,073,531,108 70.0
Britain 442,755,537 28.8
West Germany 16,862,157 1.1
France 8,944 0.1
Total 1,533,157,746 100.0
Source: State Planning Organization, A Survey on Foreign Capital Investment
in Turkey, (Ankara: DevIet Planlama Teskilati, February 1964), p. 17.
The distribution of foreign credit according to its origin reveals the important role
the US played in the development of the 1950s. Nearly 40% of total foreign credit
originated in the US. Holland, Switzerland, and West Germany followed it by 10% share
each. Thus, these four countries contributed most of the foreign credit. Although only
1/8th of the total foreign credit went into actual production, it played an important role in
directing local private investment into certain subsectors. The sectoral distribution of
foreign credit reflects the development priorites of the period: 95% in industry and most of
this in the production of non-durable consumer goods, e.g., 26% in plastic-rubber, 25% in
chemicals (medicine), 13% electrical appliances, and 11% food products.
In short, this period (1946-60) marks a new opening of the Turkish economy to
private foreign capital. In industrial production, foreign capital used simple technologies,
inefficiently small scales, and mostly imported inputs. The rapidly growing domestic
market and high import protection made the domestic market oriented industrial production
profitable. The scale of production established by foreign capital was much smaller than
the technologically efficient scales. But the highly protected domestic market made it
possible to gain high profits despite the inefficient, and thus high cost techniques
employed. Throughout the1950s, profit transfers out of Turkey amounted to 30.8% of the
total foreign capital inflow (Hershlag, 1968). Another major characteristic of foreign
investment was that mostly imported inputs were utilized in production. This presented
two serious problems. One is the lack of development of backward linkages that would
stimulate the rest of the economy. The second is the disruption of industrial production
during the foreign exchange difficulties. This characteristic contributed greatly to the
increasing foreign trade deficit throughout ISI. Moreover, the cyclical crisis of this nature
was to define each stage of ISI in the next 25 years to come.
Sectoral developments
Throughout the 1950s, ISI rapidly progressed and the "hungry" domestic market
absorbed whatever was produced. Behind the high tariff walls the production of high-cost,
high-priced consumer goods flourished. Not only the manufacturing sector, but the
industrial sector on the whole grew significantly (Table 3.15). From 1950 onward
industrial production increased more rapidly than agricultural production. The annual
growth rate of the industrial production averaged 9.3% between 1954 and 1958. While the
share of the industrial production in GNP was 12% in 1950, it reached 14.3% in 1960, but
the share of the manufacturing in the overall industrial sector remained unchanged at 81%
(Sonmez, 1980). The growth rate of agricultural production was a modest 3.3% over the
1954-58 period; however, without including the damaging drought in 1954, this would
have increased to 7.6% for the period of 1955-58. The share of the agricultural sector in
GNP declined continuously after 1954, in sharp contrast to that of the industrial sector. It
was 40.5% in 1947-53 and a low 37.7% in 1954-58 (Table 3.16).
Towards the 1960s, the manufacturing sector underwent a considerable structural
change. While the share of non-durable consumer goods in value added and employment
both declined, that of the intermediate and capital goods increased (Table 3.17). It is
important to note here that capital goods produced in the private sector are, in fact, durable
consumer goods. The share of the public sector in manufacturing, with respect to
production, value added, and employment all declined, while that of the private sector
increased. Also, the public sector increasingly turned to the production of intermediate
goods, especially those that required modem technologies and large-scale establishments
and, therefore, were not profitable for the private sector at least in the short run. Instead of
decreasing the role of the public sector, however, this represented a change in the division
of labor between the public and private sectors; the public sector now aimed at providing
the private sector with the necessary inputs for the production of consumer goods. Toward
the end of the 1950s, the private sector slowly shifted from its previous emphasis on non-
durable consumer goods to the production of durable consumer goods (Table 3.18).
Following the balance of payments crisis in 1958, the top priority was given to the
necessary imports such as oil, fertilizer, and various capital goods while restricting or
completely banning the imports of consumer goods. As a result, production of textiles,
tobacco, food products, leather and earth-products industries was greatly encouraged.
Table 3.15
Indices of net production in industry
Year Mining Manufacturing Construction Gas, electricity All industry
water
1948 100 100 100 100 100
1950 123,1. 108 162,2 1181 109.5
1955 191,6 148,2 245,5 258,3 154.2
1960 215,1 188,9 352,6 479,0 193.8
Source: Korum, 1976.
Table 3.16
The Changing Industrial Structure of Turkey
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Share in GDP 1%):
Agriculture and related industries (A sector) 44.42 41 02 40.92 34 10 29A)6Minin. manufacturing. construction. utilities.
transport nd communication (M + sector) 24 16 2787 2722 3245 3667
Bervices (S sector) 3142 31.11 3186 3345 3427C Division (Trade. Banking other finance) 901 10.27 10-92 1056' 11.44(B Division (Prufassional. personal and business
services, government, other services) 22.4 k 20 4 20.94 22.89 2283
Shore in Lobor Force
(eacluding unpaid family workers) (%)
A Sector 58.40 6014 5945 5640 50 82
U + 6ecent 21.15 23.03 2345 25 16 29 15
a Sector 20-45 16.83 17.10 1844 2003
C Division 6.40 669 6-26 576 552
0 Division 14.05 10.14 10.84 12.68 14.51
Distribution of U + Sector
a. Mining 369 1.78 1.84 197 1.73
b. Manufacturing 1069 11.30 1140 1467 1757
c. Construction 600 7.55 662 697 7.28
d. Eectric. as and water 053 0.77 0.97 I.17 129
e. Thasport and communication 5.29 6.47 6.79 7.67 8.10
eative Sectoral Product per Worker:
A sector to countrywide 07606 0.6821 0.6813 0.6046 0 5718
P+ sector to countrywide 1.1423 1 2102 1.1608 1.2897 I 2580
6 sector to countrywide 15364 18485 1.8631 1.8140 17109
U+ and S sector to A sector 1 7565 2.1693 2.1166 2.5000 25227
8 sector to M+ sector I 3450 1.5274 1.6050 1.4065 13600
C Division 3,4078 1.5351 1.7444 18333 20725
08 Division 1.5950 2A552 19317 1.8052 15734
CM 0.8826 0.7469 0.9030 1.0156 1,3172
Source: Ozotun, 1975
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Table 3.18
Manufacturing production
Share of consumer goods, %
Year Number of Employment
firms
1950
1960
57.60
53.69
Value added
76.20
63.15
Share of intermediate goods, %
Year Number of Employment
firms
1950
1960
33.70
36.81
72.70
65.12
Value added
20.60
24.97
19.00
27.20
Share of capital goods, %
Year Number of Employment Value added
1950
1960
firms
7.10
7.53
12.10
11.22
7.9
7.46
Source: Korum, 1976.
Besides these areas, various durable consumption goods such as agricultural machinery,
electrical machinery, and electronics also gained importance later (Kepenek, 1983). In
addition, foreign capital was also increasingly involved in the same areas, directly or
indirectly through technology transfer, especially via licensing agreements.
Another important change in manufacturing industry during the 1953-60 period was
the accelerated concentration of capital, and the increasing domination of the economy by
monopoly capital. This was realized through the joint ventures of industrial capital with
transnational monopolies. The average size of private firms increased by 63%, from
employing 40 workers on average to 65 workers (Tuzun, 1976). Also, the share of the
firms employing 500 or more workers in total private industrial investment increased to
40%, in employment to 30%, and in value added to 34.5% (Sonmez, 1982). Meanwhile,
in 1963 the share of the traditional small establishments (employing less than 10 workers)
in the manufacturing sector was still 52.5% in employment, 24.7% in output, 20% in value
added and 14.1% in wages and salaries; compared to 55.9%, 27.6%, 26.4%, and 21.5%,
respectively, in 1950 (Korum, 1975).
The capitalist transformation of Turkish agriculture was pursued through the
landlord-controlled, but foreign credit-led mechanization of agriculture. The number of the
tractors used showed a manifold increase: from only 2,749 in 1948 to 40,282 in 1955, and
to 44,144 in 1957. However, the distribution of these tractors matched the existing land
ownership patterns, as only 2% of all imported tractors were used by the state farms, 90%
belonged to the large landowners, and about 8% went to the middle farmers (Berberoglu,
1982). Moreover, the area cultivated using imported tractors almost tripled: from 1,
250,000 hectares in 1950 to 3,160,000 hectares in 1960. On approximately two-thirds of
the large farms, with 3-3.5 million hectares of land out of a total of 8.5 million hectares,
production was carried on a capitalist basis.
In the late 1950s, in addition to the serious balance of payments crisis, the inflation
rate also started rising due to several reasons. A rapid increase in government expenditures
after 1954 added to inflationary pressures tremendously. The share of government
expenditures in GNP was 15.6% in 1950, but increased to 17.4% in 1955. The
agricultural support price policy, largely financed by the Central Bank credits, together with
the increasing credits to the SEEs, further aggravated the situation. Once inflation was
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underway, the government tried to stop it by keeping the sale prices of the non-agricultural
goods produced by the SEEs constant. But given the rapidly increasing costs, these SEEs
were unable to cover their own deficits, and they too had to borrow from the Central Bank.
The total amount of credits allocated to the SEEs from the Central Bank increased from
745m T.L in 1950 to 1,844m T.L in 1956, and to 3,247m T.L in 1958. Thus, both the
agricultural price support and the SEE deficits led to large increases in the money supply.
During 1950-61 the average annual increase in money stock was 14.5%, but 14.1% was
accounted for by the changes in the high-powered money (Krueger, 1974). Given the fact
that there was no corresponding increase in production, these large increases in the money
supply generated further inflation. Furthermore, some exogenous events, e.g. a 20% fall
in agricultural production between 1953-54 due to a drought also contributed to the
inflationary pressures. The overall price index, from a base of 100 in 1948, rose to 119 in
1953 and to 134 in 1955..
Labor force
The rapid mechanization of agriculture, however, led to unprecedented levels of
rural unemployment. According to a survey of 448 villages, conducted by the Political
Science Department of the Ankara University in 1954, the number of share-croppers
(which was the traditional form of rural employment) who became unemployed as a result
of the introduction of tractors was: 1,152 in Central Anatolia, 3,271 in the Aegean, 1,977
in South-Eastern Anatolia, 9,268 in the Mediterranean, 1,396 in the Marmara region, and a
low 199 in the Black Sea region. (These figures are based on approximately 1% of all
villages in Turkey; a total of 40,000 villages exist.) As most of the middle and small
farmers were driven to bankruptcy, wage labor increasingly became the most common way
of labor participation in the production process. In 1950 the landless peasant families
constituted 14.5% of all agricultural families; in 1968 it increased to 17.5%, and in 1973 it
reached 21.8% (Tekeli, Erder, 1978). After losing their land to the large farmers, most
small farmers decided to migrate to the cities with the hope of finding jobs. (A detailed
analysis of labor surplus in agriculture is provided by Hamurdan, 1970.) This marked
only the beginning of a long period of rural-urban migration in Turkey. The reasons for
the internal migration can be grouped into three categories. The first was the "push"
factors, such as the unequal land and income distribution, and rapid mechanization and low
productivity in agriculture. The second was the new developments in infrastructure in
general, such as the expansion of the highway networks connecting the rural areas to the
larger urban centers, the increases in the number of transportation vehicles (the number of
trucks and buses increased by 187% and 274%, respectively, between 1953 and 1965), the
widespread developments in the public communication systems (TV, radio) and education.
The third was the "pull" factors, such as the expected employment opportunities outside
agriculture and the "bright lights" phenomenon. On the whole, almost 3 million people
migrated from the rural areas to the urban areas between 1950 and 1960 (Robinson, 1958).
Given the total population of Turkey in 1950 (20.9 million) and in 1960 (27.7 million), this
was a massive migration. The percentage of the urban population (urban areas are defined
having greater than 10,000 people) increased from 18.7% in 1950 to 26.3% in 1960; it
later reached to 36% in 1970 and 40% in 1975 (Keles, 1978).
Rapid urbanization aggravated the already serious unemployment problems in the
urban areas. The result of high population growth coupled with the very limited
employment opportunities in the urban areas in general, and in manufacturing in particular,
was a growing volume of surplus labor. The share of the industrial sector in GDP showed
an increase from 24.16% in 1950 to 27.22% in 1960, and in labor force from 21.15% to
only 23.45% (Ozotun, 1975). In the industrial sector alone the total number of workers
was 643,000 (5.1% of the total labor force) in 1950, and by 1960 it had increased to
975,509 (7.5% of the total labor force), i.e., an increase of 52% (ILO, Yearbook of
International Statistics,1965). The total size of working class reached about 2.5 million,
which equaled nearly 19% of the total labor force.
Real wages in most industries declined or at best stagnated during the 1955-59
period. The average annual increase in real wages for 1956-59 was 0.5% in industry,
while it was 2.2% in manufacturing; 1.8% in mining and quarrying; -1.0% in construction,
and -0.8% in the transport, storage, and communications sectors (Tables 3.19a and 3.19b).
Since these statistics only cover insured workers and salaried employees, the industrial
average on the whole, including the uninsured and unorganized majority, had to be
considerably lower. Salaries in the public sector remained unchanged between 1948 and
1959; a 100% increase in 1959 was effectively wiped out by high inflation due to the
implementation of austerity measures in 1958 (Sonmez, 1980). Also, the relative
employment increases in the transportation, construction, and utilities sectors had been
much higher than that in the manufacturing sector. Employment indices for 1953-63 were:
Agriculture: 111, mining: 144, manufacturing: 141, utilities: 227, construction: 220,
transportation: 180, services: 118, and total: 116 ( Celasun, 1983).
Table 3.19a
Average Daily Wages* in Various Branches of Manufacturing Industry, (1955=100)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 A verage Annual
Money Real* Money Real Money Real Money Real Money Real Increase in Real
Branch of Industry Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages (1956-59)
T.L. I I T.L. I I T.L. I I T.L. I I T.L. I I
Food 6.71 100 100 7.78 116 103 8.43 126 99 9.81 146 103 12.29 183 103 + 0.8%
Beverages 9.54 100 100 9.64 101 89 10.62 111 87 11.52 121 85 14.21 149 84 -4.2%
Tobacco 4.85 100 100 5.42 112 99 6.01 124 98 7.03 145 102 9.20 190 107 + 1.7%
Textiles 6.77 100 100 7.72 114 101 9.04 133 105 11.55 171 120 12.63 186 105 + 1.7%
Clothing 7.90 100 100 9.36 118 104 8.68 110 87 10.27 130 91 13.19 167 94 - 1.1%
Printing & Publishing 10.52 100 100 11.45 109 96 12.92 123 97 14.38 137 96 19.03 181 102 + 0.5%
Chemicals 8.64 100 100 10.01 116 103 11.44 132 104 13.66 158 111 16.63 192 108 + 2.0%
Basic Metals Industries 8.40 100 100 8.96 107 95 10.85 129 101 11.67 139 98 15.89 189 107 + 1.9%
Machinery 8.74 100 100 9.84 112 99 10.20 117 92 11.94 137 96 14.65 168 95 - 1.2%
Transport Equipment 8.89 100 100 9.62 108 95 10.02 113 89 11.81 133 93 14.98 168 95 -4.7%
* Including salaries. See note in Table 19.
* See note in Table 19.
Source: International Labour Organization, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1965, Table 19, p. 555.
Table 3.19b
Average Daily Wages* by sector (1955=100)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 A 'erage Annua:
Money Real** Money Real Money Real Money Real Money Real Increase in Real
Sector Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages Wages (1956-59)
T.L. I I T.L. I I T.L. I I T.L. I I T.L. I I
Manufacturing 6.80 100 100 7.87 116 103 8.97 132 104 10.86 160 112 13.17 194 109 + 2.2%
Mining and Quarrying 5.43 100 100 6.62 122 108 7.65 141 111 8.57 158 111 10.32 190 107 + 1.8%
Construction 8.17 100 100 9.19 112 99 10.04 123 97 11.41 140 98 13.99 171 96 - 1.0%
Transport, Storage, 8.62 100 100 8.61 100 88 9.85 114 90 11.43 132 93 14.76 171 96 - 0.8%
and Communications
Average (all industry) 7.25 100 100 8.07 112 99 9.13 126 99 10.57 146 103 13.06 180 102 + 0.5%
Including salaries. All wages and wage indices, including real wage indices, are based on gross wages, ie. wages before
the deduction of taxes and social security contributions.
** Real wage indices were obtained by dividing money wage indices (derived from ILO data given in T.L.) by cost of
living indices averaged for Ankara and Istanbul as provided in Table 21.
Source: International Labour Organization, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1965, (Geneva: International Labour Office,
1965), Tables 20, 21, 22; pp. 567, 573, 578; my own computations added.
The intensifying struggle of the working class to improve its position in the face of
the worsening situation resulted in widespread unionization in the industrial sector. The
number of unionized workers increased by 405% between 1948 and 1958, bringing the
percentage of unionized workers in the total to 37.4% in 1958 from 15.8% in 1948
(Table 3.20). This struggle also assumed an increasingly political character towards the
end of the 1950s. In addition to declining real earnings, working conditions got worse,
e.g., the number of the industrial accidents showed a three-fold increase betweeen 1950
and 1960 (Yurukoglu, 1979). As a result, living conditions deteriorated sharply and the
majority of the urban workers were forced to live in "gecekondu" (temporary slum
dwellings). By 1963, 39.5% of the total number of dwellings in Istanbul were gecekondu,
and 45% of the population lived in them; in Ankara these numbers were 64.6% and 59.2%,
respectively. Throughout the country the situation was very much the same in the major
urban areas. The burden of rapid urbanization was hard to bear: there were not enough job
opportunities in industry, although services showed an increase, the result was high
unemployment; as the pressure on the rather scarce resources of the cities (public utilities,
land,water, electricity, education, health services, etc.) led to increasing differences
between the rich and the poor areas within the cities, in addition to the rural-urban
differences; also the main direction of the internal migration was consistently from the east
to the west, which further worsened the existing regional imbalances.
International trade
As a result of rapidly increasing imports, but rather stagnant traditional exports, the
percentage of the imports financed by export revenues declined to 68.6% in 1960 from
92% in 1950. The share of imports in GNP over the period of 1954-58 was 5.4%,
whereas the share of exports only averaged 3.9%. The share of imports in GNP was 9.5%
in 1952, and in 1958 it had dropped to 2.5%; the share of exports was 6% in 1952, 4.3%
in 1955, and only 1.9% in 1958 (Akbank, 1980). The resulting trade deficits continued
throughout the 1950s.(Table 3.21). The changing composition of imports clearly reflected
the nature of the ISI process in Turkey: between 1954 and 1959, the share of consumer
goods in total imports dropped to 10.2% from 19.6%; the share of capital goods also
declined to 45.6% from 53%; and the share of raw materials showed a large increase
reaching 44.2% from 27.4%.
Table 3.20
The Trade Union Movement in Turkey (1948=100)
% of workers Increase in Increase in number
Year unionized number ofworkers unionized workers
1048 15.78 100 100
1950 20.86 113 150
1952 2t.6 I 148 250
1954 30.92 177 347
1956 32.41 196 402
1958 37.45 213 505
Source: Berberoglu, 1982.
Table 3.21
Turkish Foreign Trade
(million TL)
Year Imports Exports Deficit (-)
Surplus(+)
1940 68.9 111.4 + 42.5
1945 126.2 218.9 + 92.7
1950 799.8 737.6 - 62.2
1951 1,125.8 879.4 - 246.4
1952 1,556.6 1,016.2 - 540.4
1953 1,491.0 1,109.0 - 382.0
1954 1,339.4 937.8 - 401.6
1955 1,393.4 877.4 - 516.0
1956 1,140.6 854.0 - 286.6
1957 1,112.0 966.6 - 145.4
1958. 882.3 692.4 - 189.9
1959 1,316.0 990.6 - 325.4
1960 4,213.7 2,886.6 - 1,327.1
Source: United Nations, Statistical Office, Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics, 1950; 1975.
In addition to the trade deficits, the continuous borrowing and the extension of
credit meant an ever-increasing foreign debt. The external debt incurred through the
foreign financing of "development projects", which were mostly tied to imports from the
donor countries, also worsened the balance of payments and necessitated further external
borrowing. Moreover, due to the foreign exchange difficulties that developed after 1954,
the government failed to make most of the import payments on time. These past-due
obligations perpetuated the external debt. Consequently, during 1946-1960, the total
external debt had increased by 750% in TL terms and 410% in $ terms. The big difference
was mostly due to the 1958 devaluation. On the whole, however, the total external debt
increased faster than the national income. In 1960 the sum of principal debt and interest
payments had reached 33% of export revenues. Total debt soared to over 5 billion T.L. in
1960 from 775 million T.L. in 1950. In 1958 the total amount of debt was greater than
10% of GNP and arrears alone were greater than 20% of GNP (Krueger, 1974).
Most of the necessary imports were financed by suppliers' credits; however, as the
volume of these obligations exceeded the foreign exchange resources of the Central Bank,
Turkey became the first country to overdraw her IMF quota and also the first to request an
extention of time when payment came due (Krueger, 1974). The seriousness of the foreign
exchange situation can be seen from Table 3.22, which shows the amount of net foreign
exchange receipts, i.e., the difference between the amount of external debt incurred and the
payments made. It is interesting that in 1955, 1956, and 1957 the amount of payments
exceeded the amount that was actually received (Savas, 1980). The persistently high
demand for foreign exhange and the complications with the allocation of import credits
resulted in double payments and application of multiple exchange rates. Meanwhile, an
unofficial capital market ("parallel market") emerged as a powerful institution that was to
shape many important politico-economic developments to come (Dogan, 1980).
The first crisis and the Stabilization Measures of 1958
Towards the end of the 1950s, an increasingly serious foreign exchange crisis
coupled with hyperinflation finally led to the 1958 Stabilization program after lengthy
negotiations with the IMF, the US, and the OEEC. It included a 320% devaluation of the
T.L., a rescheduling of debt in the amount of $600 m, and a $350 m new credit extension
(Sonmez, 1980). The US pledged $200 m, Germany $50 m, and the UK $10 m. The
Net foreign exchange
Table 3.22
acquisition as a result of borrowing
(million $)
Year External debt External debt Net foreign exchange
payments acquisition
1950 121.6 15 106.6
1952 51.7 22 29.7
1953 36.0 20 16.0
1954 141.1 73 68.1
1955 23.5 106 -- 82.5
1956 2.5 89 -86.5
1957 47.9 83 -35.1
1958 116.3 69 47.3
1959 139.5 60 79.5
1960 194.2 65 129.2
1961 107.8 84 23.8
1962 113.1 97 16.
Total 1.095.2 783 620.4
Source: Savas, 1980.
remaining was made up of short term loans from the European Payments Union, and the
IMF, as well as small loans from ten other European countries. More importantly, there
were two important developments toward the establishment of a systematic protection
regime which did set the stage for the "planned" ISI to come during the 1960s. One of
these developments was the introduction of global import quotas, together with devaluation
for a stricter control of imports. Devaluation would hurt industrial investments the most,
since most of the necessary capital and intermediate goods had to be imported. But the
highly overvalued exchange rates had encouraged an uncontrolled expansion of imports.
Therefore, if a conscious ISI policy were to be followed, the control of imports was
essential to the success of this policy. It would be hard to argue that the devaluation would
help to increase export earnings, because the devaluation rate for the traditional exports was
kept relatively lower: The purchasing power of one dollar worth of traditional export in
1958 was only 55% of its 1953 value, and the same percentage for the non-traditional
exports was 68% (Hershlag, 1968; Akbank, 1980). The real exchange rate for capital
goods imports remained constant, while for the consumer goods imports it was 75% higher
than that of the capital goods imports and later it was reduced to 25% of it (Krueger, 1974).
On the whole, the 1958 economic measures, in addition to devaluation and stabilization,
through a systematic import protection regime aimed at establishing the necessary
conditions for ISI to be followed.
This objective becomes even clearer when we consider the second major
development that took place. It was the establishment of a "Coordination Ministry" which
would oversee the allocation of investments within the framework of a development plan.
Although economic planning and government intervention in the economy was avoided
until the mid-1950s, the IMF, the OEEC and the US began pressuring Turkey to start
national planning. Accordingly, in 1960 after the military coup, the State Planning
Organization (SPO) was finally established (Avcioglu, 1969; Sonmez, 1980; Korum,
1977). It is interesting to observe that the establishment of the SPO was perceived as a
concession to the Kemalists who favored the Statist ISI policies within the framework of
central planning. However, in the following decades it increasingly became clear that the
SPO had no real interest in Statism.
Among the official reasons for the 1958 devaluation were the apparent disruption of
economic activity, growing political dissatisfaction, and pressure from foreign creditors
who otherwise would not extend new credit. The disruption of domestic economic activity
was due to increasing import stringency, which became so severe that most of the
established capacity was left idle as early as 1954. With declining foreign exchange
earnings from exports and no further foreign credit possibilities, import licensing had to
cease. All categories of imports suffered a decline from 1953 to 1958. The decline in raw
materials seriously affected capacity utilization, but declining imports of capital goods had a
major impact on real industrial investment. Imports represented 22.6% of the value of
construction investment in 1953 and fell to 7.2% in 1958. Imports of machinery and
equipment represented 86.8% of the value in machinery and equipment investment in 1953,
but fell to 67% in 1958 (Krueger, 1974). Excess capacity due to a shortage of imports was
widespread in the second half of the 1950s (EIU, 1955). Although the extent of the
underutilization of capacity is hard to estimate exactly due to the lack of reliable data, it was
serious enough to disrupt industrial production and to lead to a real decline in investment.
The stabilization program of 1958 included various other measures besides a
devaluation, such as the imposition of a ceiling on Central Bank and commercial bank
credits and also on the government budget, and some limited raises in the SEE prices.
There was also a change in the export regime. Since a sizable trade deficit was to be
financed by foreign credits, new export taxes were imposed to be able to provide Turkey
with "substantial non-inflationary revenue" (Krueger, 1974). The total foreign capital
inflow following the stabilization amounted to $359 m, out of which $75 m was from the
OEEC, $25 m from the IMF, and the rest from the US. However, this foreign credit was
hardly enough to cover the current increases in imports: import expenditures during the first
three months of 1958 exceeded 40% of that of the whole year of 1957.
In summary, the worsening economic situation, with stagnant output, high levels of
inflation and unemployment, a sizable trade deficit, a large and ever-increasing external
debt, and the resulting balance of payment crisis, also led to serious political and social
unrest. The IMF intervention in August 1958 failed to resolve the serious politico-
economic crisis of the late 1950s. Political struggles among the highly divided bourgeoisie
intensified. The liberal faction of the Democratic Party broke away to form the Freedom
Party. The opposition party, the Republican People's Party, called for restraints and
increasing control. The DP resorted to increasingly repressive measures against the rising
opposition, mainly from the urban intelligentsia. The general concensus was such that only
the armed forces could put an end to this grave situation. Finally, on May 27, 1960 a
group of thirty-eight officers led a successful military coup under the banner of Kemalism.
This represented the beginning of a tradition of what may be described as "Collective
Bonapartism" (Ahmad, F., 1977). It meant the introduction of a system of controls on
party politics by the upper echelons of the military and the state bureaucracy.
IV. ISI IN DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS: THE 1960s
The liberal 1961 Constitution, which was introduced immediately following the
first coup, ushered in a variety of democratic reforms and civil liberties, such as freedom of
the press and of organization, and the right to strike and to hold collective bargaining
agreements. This democratization of Turkish politics, for the first time in its modem
history, led to a flourishing of socialist and social democratic clubs. In 1961, the Workers'
Party of Turkey was established, mainly by certain trade unionists and intellectuals.
Consequently, in addition to the fragmentation of the right, a powerful leftist movement
also emerged in the 1960s. This diversification shaped the four successive coalition
governments that followed the 1961 national. elections. During this time there was a
persistent move towards the right, and also two attempted but unsuccessful military coups
took place. All these developments demonstrated the practical difficulties of implementing
the liberal constitution of 1961, despite the growing strength of the progressive forces and
of the working class. Meanwhile, as internal party factionalism also increased in the right,
the RPP felt the need to move to a centrist position. Finally the Justice Party, a self-
proclaimed successor to the DP, came to power through the general elections of 1965.
Also managing to secure the next elections in 1969, the JP remained in power until the
1971 military coup. It is ironic that by the end of the 1960s another serious economic crisis
coupled with the extremely repressive politics of the JP government against the popular
forces, created a situation similar to that of the late 1950s. Not surprisingly, however, the
solution was another military intervention on March 12, 1971.
By the early 1960s, the first stage of ISI was almost completed. Domestic
production of the basic consumer goods, i.e., food products, especially sugar, beverages,
tobacco, textiles and clothing, etc., satisfactorily met domestic demand (Kepenek, 1982).
Consequently, the focus of industrialization policy shifted to the second stage of ISI,
namely, the consumer durables stage. The main objective of this policy was to decrease the
external dependence of the Turkish economy. This further "deepening" of ISI was
expected to lead to further foreign exchange savings. With the promulgation of the First
Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP) (1963-67), import-substitution became the official
industrialization policy in Turkey. However, compared to the ISI policies of the 1950s,
which had followed from the protectionism necessitated by foreign exchange bottlenecks,
starting in the early 1960s ISI was pursued in a systematic way as a development strategy.
According to Krueger, 1974, "foreign trade and payments policy of the 1960s can be
generally regarded as consciously coordinated with the development goals, in sharp
contrast to the 1950s when policy was formulated on an ad hoc basis in response to
individual events". At the international level, the reaction to the policy of continued ISI
was mixed. While the IMF and the OECD group approved it (OECD,1966), the US
opposed the ISI policy, favoring industrialization based only on the private sector, with a
limited role for the SEEs (Harris,1972). Actually, this disagreement on ISI created a major
strain in US-Turkish economic relations. Direct US investment was replaced by aid
through the OECD channel; moreover, economic aid (lending+gift) was halved later during
the Second Five Year Development Plan Period (1968-72).
The Turkish ISI strategy was based on two sets of policy measures: One was the
protection of the domestic market from foreign competition, and the other was the
encouragement of industrial investment through income tax rebates, import-tax holidays,
deferred import tax payments, easy credit access, etc. The division of labor between the
public and the private sectors was determined accordingly. Since "the change from an
underdeveloped and stagnant economy to a progressive and dynamic one may be achieved
through systematic and rational measures taken by the central authority, ...the state should
be in the vanguard of progress in the industrial sector also by setting up enterprises which
require high levels of technical knowledge and capital investment, especially in the new
fields of production." (FFYDP, 1963).
The basic instrument for determining the levels of protection for the domestic
market was an import program. A typical import program included a "Liberalized List" and
a "Quota List". A Liberalized List was designed to encompass imports of those
commodities that were deemed necessary for achieving the development plan targets but
were not domestically available. A "Quota List" was more restrictive, covering
commodities "of which domestic production could only partly meet the needs" or which
were deemed less essential to development. If the internal production of some commodities
were quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to meet domestic demand at fair prices, they
were not included in the import lists at all. Given the above explained logic of protection,
the pace of domestic production basically determined the commodity composition of the
lists in the import programs. When the domestic production of an item from the Liberalized
List began, it was either moved to the Quota List if the new producer's capacity would be
inadequate to meet domestic demand, and therefore additional imports would be needed, or
imports of it would be banned if the new productive capacity was thought sufficient
(Krueger, 1974). Import programs also included a "Bilateral List" which contained
imports of goods that were available from the bilateral agreement countries. Imports of
investment goods were generally included in the "self-financed" imports category, where
project credit was expected to play a major role.
In addition to protection through import controls, various industrial investment
incentives, e.g., deferred payments of customs duties and charges, import tax exemptions,
(building) construction tax exemptions, also complemented the encouragement of domestic
industry. However, on the whole, the quantitative restrictions provided far greater
incentives than the price incentives for ISI (Krueger, 1974). The effective rate of
protection in industry ranged from -11% for metal drums to over 1000% for plastics and
steel billets, with the median being 42% (Table 4.1). Estimated domestic resource costs
were generally low (indicating increased export potential) for food and beverages, textiles,
forest products, leather, stone and clay products, glass and ceremics, but very high for
most of the import-substituting industries (indicating negative foreign exhange savings)
such as iron and steel, machinery and parts, transport equipment, paper, plastics, rubber
and chemicals (Krueger, 1974).
The actual import levels during the FFYDP period were very close to the
Liberalized List and Quota List imports, but the "self-financed" category of imports showed
a consistent gap due to the shortfall of project credits. However, actual imports by end-use
categories were different from the planned levels. In particular, imports of investment
goods substantially fell short, while raw materials and intermediates were consistently
greater than the plan target levels. Imports of consumption goods on average appeared to
be below plan levels (Table 4.2). The pattern of actual imports indicated a clear shift in
eligible imports away from the finished consumer goods towards the raw materials and the
intermediate goods. Although it is well known that smuggling of consumer goods, and the
evasion of the import regime, through resale and a substantial degree of under-invoicing of
imports, were also widely practiced (Krueger, 1974).
In the 1960s, according to the division of labor between public and private
enterprises, the SEEs produced intermediate goods that were required by the private
industries for the production of consumer durables. The industrial SEEs increased their
Table 4.1
Effective Rates of Protection
Financial and Economic Rates of Return
Industry Effective Protection Financial Rate Economic Rate
of Return of Return
Metal drums -11 33 12
Transformers 
-2 21 49
Tires -1 12 31
Chemicals 0 41 44
Motor pumps 0 21 10
Canning vegetables 0 27 33
Glass wool 6 7 14
Tomato paste 15 16 22
Wood/formica 24 44 18
Cement 29 19 28
Textiles 40 19 14
Cement 42 30 19
Plumbing supplies 53 20 12
Textiles 96 9 0
Light bulbs 118 63 48
Textiles 153 52 22
Textiles (synthetic) 197 29 9
Metal parts 276 33 12
Steel wire/rods 291 12 neg.
Copper/steel wire 294 36 2
Ceramics 363 100 neg.
Plastics 1,060 26 neg.
Steel billets 1,911 44 neg.
Median 42 26
Source: World Bank, 1975.
Table 4.2
Composition of Imports
1950 1960 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979
Capital goods 46.0 52.1 47.1 41.4 38.9 34.6 31.5
Intermediate goods 33.4 38.3 47.9 54.3 58.0 62.5 66.6
Consumption goods 20.6 9.6 5.0 4.3 3.1 2.9 1.9
Source: Sonmez, 1982.
Table 4.3
Total Foreign Capital Inflow, actual
(Million TL)
and permitted levels
years foreign capital cumulative actual cumulative (4)/(2)
inflow, permitted total capital inflow total %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1951 4 4 3 3 75.0
1952 26- 30 2 5 16.6
1953 18 48 1 6 12.5
1954 108 156 2 8 5.1
1955 48 204 8 16 7.8
1956 66 270 21 37 13.7
1957 42 312 10 47 15.1
1958 57 369 15 62 16.8
1959 69 438 19 81 18.5
1960- 48 486 18 99 .20.4
1961 80 566 43 142 25.0
1962 133 699 87 229 32.7
1963 243 942 91 320 33.9
1964 125 1.067 69 389 36.5
1965 93 1.160 95 484 41.7
1966 229 1.389 69 553 39.8
1967 170- 1.559 67 620 '39.8
1968 196 1.755 92 712 40.5
1969 373 2.128 61 773 36.3
1970 152 2.280 90 863 37.8
1971 67 2.347 102 965 41.1
1972 145 2.492 129 1.094 43.9
1973 136 2.628 374 1.468 55.8
1974 6 2.634 - - -
Total 2.634 1.468
Source: Uras, 1979.
share of total SEEs' value added (from 44% in 1952 to 47% in 1962) and fixed investment
(from 51% in 1962 to 70% in 1972), and a steady proportion for employment at 45%.
However, the performance of the SEEs was not satisfactory within the standard profit
maximization framework . Despite such privileges as the import priorities, tax breaks, etc.,
and the use of captive funds by the SEEs, the result was low profitability. This was due to
not only inefficient operations, but more importantly to the non-economic objectives of the
SEEs in general (IBRD, 1975). Among the non-economic objectives were "overstuffing"
for political purposes, encouraging the development of backward regions, income
redistribution related concerns, and various consumption and production subsidies.
Keeping the prices of goods produced by the SEEs low and subsidizing agricultural
incomes led to increasing resort to the Central Bank credits during the 1960s. The policy
of rigid SEE prices, in the face of general inflation in the economy, was followed as both
as a restraint on the general price level and as an input subsidy to the private industries.
Public sector pricing policy has been shaped by mainly political concerns, except
for the 1964-1971 period. The law no. 440, which was passed in 1964, gave the SEEs the
right to determine their own prices, except the prices of "basic goods". As a result, during
1964-71 the mark-up rates in the public sector increased steadily. However, as the
government extented the definition of basic goods to include most of the goods produced
by the SEEs as basic goods by 1967, this policy of own pricing lost its effectiveness.
Despite the price increases, the SEEs were unable to increase their profitability. Again,
starting in 1971, public sector mark-ups declined continuously (Aksoy, 1982).
Denationalization of the Turkish economy continued unabated during the 1960s.
Transfer of the major SEEs to private capital (local and foreign) accelerated, e.g., the SEEs
in mining, especially chromium, iron and steel, manufacturing, and raw materials
processing. The Divrigi Mines were transferred to the privately owned Turkish Iron and
Steel Corporation, 75% of the chromium mining was handed over to local and foreign
private corporations, the state owned Karabuk iron and steel mill was transferred to the
Turkish Iron and Steel Works. In the rubber industry, 80% of the production came to be
controlled by three foreign firms (Goodyear, Pirelli, and Royal Tyre); in the petroleum
industry, Mobil, Shell, and British Petroleum continued their dominance. Unilever,
Philips, Squibbs, Pfizer and Abbot also continued to expand their operations (Sertel, 1969,
cited in Berberoglu, 1982).
The process of foreign penetration into the Turkish economy also accelerated in the
1960s through various joint ventures with local private capital and the SEEs. Foreign
investment grew much faster in the 1960s than in the 1950s, because ISI finally had
become an established strategy. Consequently, foreign investment increased by 229%
between 1962 and 1963, compared to the 1951-61 period. Even though total yearly
average foreign capital inflow reached only 32% of the permitted levels between 1960-69
(Table 4.3). Within the total capital inflow, the share of the "in kind", i.e., machinery,
equipment, etc., was 44%, of the credit/money 55%, and of the non-monetary component,
i.e., patenting agreements, technical information, consulting services, etc., was 1% (Uras,
1979). Within the sectoral distribution of foreign investment, food products, tire,
chemicals, electrical instruments, and transport equipment had significantly larger shares
(Table 4.4). Among the countries where foreign investment originated, Germany,
Holland, Italy and Switzerland followed the US lead (Table 4. 5).
Despite the relatively large amounts of foreign capital inflow, it did not amount to
much as a source of foreign exchange. Net foreign exchange receipts as a result of foreign
capital inflow met 1% of necessary imports (Table 4.6). Indirect foreign exchange savings
due to foreign capital was not much either. The high degree of dependence on imported
raw materials and intermediate goods (statistics for which will be provided later, together
with the 1970s) and the assembly/montage type of production in the ISI industries clearly
limited this possibility (Table 4.7). During the 1960s, most foreign borrowing consisted of
program credit, as opposed to project credit. However, net foreign exchange entry through
borrowing was about half of total borrowing due to continuing debt servicing obligations
(Table 4.8).
Following the first military coup in 1960, the Turkish armed forces also began
entering the economy through investments in banking, industry, and commerce. OYAK
(Army Mutual Assistance Association), established in 1961, required all regular
commissioned officers in the airforce, the navy and the ground forces to pay 10% of their
salaries into a fund to be reimbursed at a later date. By 1972, OYAK had collected more
than $100 million, and by the early 1970s this fund managed to acquire the controlling
interests in the Turkish Automotive Industry, a company that assembles International
Harvester trucks and tractors; MAR, a truck and tractor sales firm; the OYAK Insurance
Table 4.4
Foreign Capital Inflow,
(at the subsectoral
(thousand $)
1950-1974
level)
In kind Moneraty Non-monetary Number Total
of firms
Agriculture 350 44 - 3 394
Mining 407 390 18 5 815
Food processing 3.163 8.013 - 8 11.176
Beverages 706 2.129 75 4 2.910
Tobacco processing 114 813 - 3 927
Textiles & clothing 859 1.727 - 7 2.584
Forest products 109 - - 1 109
Paper 
- - 637 1 637
Banking 
_ 2.140 -. 2 2.140
Rubber products 13.550 3.568 413 5 17.529Chemcals 7.405 16.423 262 31 24.090Ceramics 3.372 3.353 137 10 6.862Pipes - 222 - 1 222
Metal products 5.563 470 142 11 6.175
Machinery 3.757 2.180 2.204 15 8.141
Electrical appliances 9.784 11.229 269 18 21.282Transport vehicles 16.569 6.472 82 11 23.123Other manufacturing 655 189 - 5 844Construction 27 - - 1 27Commerce 78 549 - 3 627Services 489 6.676 - 13 7.165Glass products 124 50 - 1 174
Total 67.081 66.635 4.239 159 137.955
Source: Uras, 1979.
Table 4.5
Foreign Capital Inflow, according to countries
(million $)
Permitted Actual Actual, %
USA 61.9 33.2 53.6
Germany 56.6 19.7 34.8
Switzerland 32.7 14.6 44.6
Italy 21.2 15.8 74.5
France 16.5 5.6 33.9
Holland 16.2 16.2 100.0
UK 8.9 6.1 68.5
Source: Uras, 1979.
Table 4.6
Foreign Exchange Acquisition
due to Capital Inflow
(million $)
Foreign Capital Profit Transfer Net Foreign
Inflow Exchange
1963 21 -8 13
1964 24 -10 14
1965 22 -15 14
1966 30 -16 7
1967 17 -25 -8
1968 13 -32 -19
1969 24 -32 -8
1970 58 -33 15
1971 45 -36 9
1972 43 -35 8
1973 27 -35 -8
1974 88 -71 17
1975 153 -36 117
1976 27 -84 -57
1977 67 -116 -49
1978 47 -47 0
Source: Savas, 1980.
Table 4.7
Imports, Industrial Investment and Production
(million TL)
Fixed Capital Industrial Raw
investment goods production material
imports (2/1) imports (4/5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1%9
1969
1970
1971
IM
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
9644
10277
11548
14714
16854
20256
23608
27342
32 203
40573
53416
72%5
106703
145%6
199724
2846,3
2228,3
2190,3
3098,3
2937,5
3 328,7
3070,0
4480,8
7521,4
10741,4
13806,8
17549,0
28613,6
36139,6
40 641,8
29,45
21,68
18,97
21,06
17,43
21,09
16,43
13,00r
16,39
23,36
26,47
20A
25,85
24,05
26,82
21,33
20,34
9 938,9
11132,2
12874,3
15 506,6
17827,2
20711,4
23275,5
26021,5
34 418,8
42040,0
55299,5
79517,8
97205,7
119794,0
149483,4
3036,4
2411,6
2777,5
3098,1
2974,9
3275,6
3441,5
3705,2
9288,1
9961,3
14081,1
25283,0
29066,6
30021,3
38 522,0
30,6
21,7
21,6
20,0
16,7
21,0
15,8
14,8
14,2
27,0
23,7
20,2
25,5
31,8
29,9
25,1
25,8
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
petrok
2347
8357
14249
22458
Table 4.8
Net Foreign Exchange Acquisition
due to Borrowing
(million $)
Debt Debt Net Foreign
Payment Exchange
121.6
51.7
36.0
141.1
23.5
2.5
47.9
116.3
139.5
194.2
107.8
113.1
1.095.2
1950
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1981
1962
Total
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
15
22
20
73
106
89
83
69
60
65
84
97
783
124
116
173
125
111
106
126
178
138
297
166
258
242
336
574
645
106.6
29.7
16.0
68.1
-- 82.5
-- 86.5
-35.1
47.3
79.5
129.2
23.8
16.
620.4
70
42
130
60
85
139
144
161
181
410
73
63
1.112
1.824
2.270
476
Source: Savas, 1980.
194
158
203
185
196
245
270
339
319
698
239
321
1.354
2.160
2.844
1.121
Company; Tukas, a food canning firm, and a $3 million cement plant. OYAK also owned
20% of the Petkim Petrochemicals plant, 8% of state-owned Turkish Petroleum, and 7% of
the Goodyear tire factory. Despite the claims of coexistence with the private and the state
sectors, OYAK enjoyed special priviliges, e.g., tax breaks. It was exempt from paying the
25% corporation tax on its earnings and the 10% stamp tax charged for business
transactions; moreover, payments to and from its members were untouched by income or
inheritance taxes. The total value of the fund's assets was estimated to be $300 million at
the end of 1972 (Time, September 11, 1972). In addition, Oyak Investment Holding, with
a total capital of 200 million T.L. in 1980, was among the leading monopoly capital groups
in the country. By extending its control over a wide variety of large industrial enteprises,
the OYAK's management also achieved the nation's best investment records: the rate of
return on OYAK's total investment was 23% in 1972 and averaged 17% per annum for the
1961-72 period. In short, by the early 1970s, the armed forces had become an integral part
of the "quadruple alliance", also consisting of the local industrialists, the state, and the
MNCs.
Internal sources of capital: Money, credit and public finance.
During 1962-70, the annual growth rate of the money supply was 14.6%. The
increase in demand deposits was greater than that of currency demand throughout the
1960s. Total Central Bank credits increased by 381% during the first FYDP, but only by
92% during the second FYDP period. These credits were increasingly used to finance the
public sector deficits in which agricultural price support policies always had a large share.
However, Central Bank credits to the private sector also increased during the 1960s, and
were mostly channeled to agriculture and the commercial sector, not to the industrial sector.
Commercial bank credits also showed a considerable increase during both the first and the
second plan periods 130%, compared to 100% during the third plan period (1973-77).
Only about 10% of the bank credits were utilized by the public sector, of the remaining
90%, 60% was used in commerce, 20% in agriculture, and a mere 3% in industry. More
interestingly, these patterns continued throughout the 1963-78 period; relatively higher
profitability in commerce and other sectors as compared to the productive sectors (industry,
agriculture, energy, etc.) continued these patterns. Because Central Bank and commercial
bank credits were mostly utilized by the commercial sector, increases in the money supply
were not used for productive purposes. In other words, money capital did not turn into
productive capital. Since the source of industrial capital in Turkey has been commercial
capital from the beginning, only sufficiently high industrial profit rates could make
commercial capital tum into industrial capital.
Public Finance
Total public sector revenues never reached planned levels. The ratio of total public
sector revenue to GNP has been low (Table 4.9). During the 1962-70 period, total tax
revenue as a share of GNP was about 13%, as opposed to the planned 16.5% over the
1962-70 period. Turkey's taxes heavily depend on direct taxation. Taxes on income,
especially personal income taxes, provide about half the total tax revenue. The share of the
personal income tax in total tax revenue was 35.6% in 1962 and 39% in 1972 (IBRD,
1975, pg. 71). On the other hand, taxes on imports and production continuously declined
during the 1952-72 period. Despite government attempts to raise taxes, the gap between
government spending and total tax revenue continued to grow. Government expenditures
increased more rapidly than tax revenues mainly because of the government's desire to
meet plan targets for public investment. Salary increases in the public sector in 1971 also
significantly contributed to the budget deficit.
During the 1960, total government expeditures were greater than government
investment, which in turn, was greater than total transfers. However, over time
expenditures and transfers grew faster than investment. Within total government
expenditures, the share of the transfers was about 20%, but the realized levels of transfers
were consistently above planned levels (Table 4.10). The fact that this divergence was
usually 30-40% indicates that the use of the government revenues was far from efficient.
On the other hand, public investment was realized at 79% of the planned levels during
1953-62, 87.6% during 1963-67, and 82% during 1967-72 (IBRD, 1975; Kepenek,
1983). In general, 40-45% of government investment was through the SEEs. Current
expenditures had the largest share in total government expenditures, and moreover, realized
current expenditures were almost at planned levels. Due to overstaffing in the public sector,
which was necessary for political reasons, public wages and salaries had the largest share
in the current expenditures category.
100
Table 4.9
Public Revenue
(million TL)
Planned Realized Public Revenue/ Tax revenue/
Direct Indirect Non-tax Total Direct Indirect Non-tax Total GNP GNP
Planned Realized Planned Realized
1962 7854 5447 13301 2336 7025 4686 11711 24,7 21,6 14,6 13,6
1963 9762 6367 16129 2747 8538 6171 14709 26,4 22,9 16,0 13,3
1964 11234 6506 17740 3039 9417 6170 15587 26,5 22,5 16,7 12,5
1965 12495 7083 19578 3408. 10427 6646 17073 26,5 23,4 16,9' 12,8
1966 14329 8499 22828 4197 12588 8040 20628 27,3 - 23,6 17,1 13,3
1967 16287 9543 25830 5070 15029 9196 24225 27,0 25,3 17,3 14,3
1%8 5173 12989 11036 29198 5695 10744 10627 27066 27,2 25,2 17,3 14,1
1969 6050 14882 12463 33395 6775 12625 10846 30246 - 27,5 24,9 17,8 14,9
1970 7280 17737 15487 40504 8640 14453 17590 40683 28,1 28,1 18,1 15,5
1971 9456 22632 21236 53324 11844 19596 16018 47458 29,0 25,8 18,5 16,6
1972 16526 23726 15609 55861 16526 23726 15609 55861 29,2 24,1 21,1 17,1
1973 23160 31252 20138 74550 22489 29408 20565 72462 25,2 24,9 21,7 16,8
1974 34008 44067 31 822 109897 30879 34372 22227 87408 26,3 21,2 22,2 15,3
1975 44916 58124 37366 140400 45230 49580 29444 124254 27,1 24,2 23,0 17,7
1976 60441 76184 42241 178866 60139 64528 29694 154361 27,9 24,2 23,9 18,8
1977 85377 105 120 58793 249 290 90927 75897 31362 198 186 28,7 23,8 24,9 .19,2
1978 126000 119300 69700 315000 139800 111200 50800 359 300 27,5 26,0 - 19,1
Source: Third and Fourth Five Year Development Plans.
Table 4.10
Public Expenditure Patterns
(million TL)
Planned Realized Realization, % Additional
Current Investment Transfer Total Current Investment Transfer Total Current Investment Transfer Total finance
1%2 8119 5182 13301 8076 3698 11765 99,5 71,2 88,5 -54
1%3 9838 6291 16291 9874 4754 14628 100,4 75,6 90,7 -43
1964 10399 7341 17740 10741 5427 16168 103,3 73,9 91,1 -581
1%5 11454 8124 19578 11855 6080 17935 103,5 74,8 91,6 -862
1966 13357 9471 22828 13289 7855 21 144 99,5 82,9 84,2 -486
1967 15142 10688 25830 15025 9004 24029 99,2 84,2 93,0 -- 1%
1968 13680 11380 4138 29198 12422 11156 4753 28331 90,8 98,0 114,9 97,0 -1265
1%9 15609 13189 4597 33395 13678 12263 5759 32200 87,6 %,8 125,3 96,4 -1954
1970 18531 16149 5824 40504 16820 14442 9261 40523 90,8 89,4 159,0 100,0 -157
1971 23562 21547 8215 .53324, 24645 16203 12942 53790 104,6 75,2 157,6 100,9 -6332
1972 27950 21780 14093 63828 27954 21780 14093 63823 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 -4623
1973 36570 36010 13192 75772 36816 26705 20100 83621 100,7 74,2 152,4 110,4 -7196
1974 52547 49642 17863 120052 47000 45033 20800 112833 89,4 .90,7 116,4 94,0 -23136
1975 66618 65757 21239 153614 63883 65841 31183 160907 95,8 100,1 146,8 104,8 -32489
1976 83863 88355 26056 198274 84615 75227 35177 203545 100,9 85,1 135,0 102,7 -41118
1977 111890 123100 33786 268776 120.000 114346 48077 282423 107,3 92,9 142,3 105,0 -78271
1978 169900 121500 55100 345500 150000 134900 131400 416300 88,3 111,0 138,5 120,5 -57000
Source: Third and Fourth Five Year Development Plans.
The government budget deficit was increasingly financed by borrowing from the
Central Bank. Internal borrowing was done either within the budget through treasury
bonds or outside the budget through the development banks. Treasury bonds were held by
commercial banks (50%), the SEEs (30%), and by private corporations and individuals
(20%). The portion of the internal borrowing that was outside the budget was based on
bonds issued by the State Investment Bank with the purpose of financing the SEEs.
Especially after the 1970s, the share of these bonds in total internal borrowing increased
rather rapidly. During the 1960s the annual average increase of internal borrowing was
10.9% (Kepenek, 1983). In total internal borrowing, the share of borrowing that was
within the budget was 70.4% during 1963-69 (Table 4.11).
Investment
During the first FYDP (1963-67), the target share of total fixed capital investment in
GDP was 18.3%, but the realized share was only 16%. For the second plan period (1968-
72) these numbers were 21.3% and 16.1%, respectively. This was due to the fact that both
the internal (private+public) and the external (borrowing+direct foreign investment) sources
of capital failed to reach target levels (Table 4.12). During the first plan period, total
private (fixed capital) investment realized at 102.9% of planned levels whereas total public
(fixed capital) investment was only at 75.6%. However, despite intensified second plan
period efforts to encourage private investment, total fixed investment realization ratios were
reversed. It increased to 92.30% in the public sector, and decreased to 90.35% in the
private sector. On the whole, the investment realization was 90.6% for the first plan period
and 91.39% for the second plan (Table 4.13). With respect to the sectoral allocation of
investment, during both the first and the second FYDP periods, industry and construction
exceeded the target levels while agriculture and the services, especially social services,
could not reach target levels. The share of the transportation sector was also relatively high
(Table 4.14).
Sectoral developments
1959-62 was a crisis and a transition period. The growth rates of GNP and
industrial production both declined, and following the stabilization program, the inflation
rate also declined. However, from 1963 onward a new period of growth began. During
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Table 4.11
Public Sector, Internal Borrowing
(million TL)
Annual General
General Non-budget increase budget
budget public sector Total % expenditures (1/5)
1963 9033 1339 10372 - 11726 77,0
1964 10233 1758 11991 15,6 13534 75,6
1965 10169 2429 12598 5,1 14488 70,2
1966 13106 2804 15910 26,2 17248 76,0
1967 14597 3664 18261 11,4 20288 64,6
1968 15431 5191 20622 12,9 21322 68,5
1969 16378 6272 22640 9,8 25387 60,8
1970 17 424 7 526 24 950 10,1 32866 49,8
1971 20950 8625 29575 18,5 46270 37,7
1972 23857 9237 33094 11,8 50921 41,1
1973 26733 11783 38516 16,3 64267 37,1
1974 28107 14888 42995 11,6 74777 36,1
1975 48013 18490 66503 54,6 114228 42,0
1976 70639 26352 96991 45,8 155028 45,6
1977 88259 45937 134196 38,4 240201 36,7
1978 118455 60240 178698 33,2 347703 55,6
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
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Table 4.12
Planned Investment Levels, % of GNP
First Five Second Five Third Five
Year Plan Year Plan Year Plan
Fixed Capital Investment P G P G P G
Share of Investment in GNP 18,3 16,0 21,3 16,1 21,9 20,2
Internal Resources 14,8 14,2 19,4 15,5 21,1 16,0
External Resources 3,5 1,8 1,9 0,6 0,8 4,2
P= planned; G= realized.
Source: DPT, Third Five Year Development Plan.
Table 4.13
Total Fixed Invesment
(billions TL)
P G G/P P G GAP P G GIP
Public 35,7 27,0 75,6 58,6 54,1 92,30 158,4 129,9 82,0 898,3
Private 23,9 24,6 102,9 52,9 47,8 90,35 122,7 124,5 104,4 677,5
Total 59,6 51,6 9,6 111,5 101, 91,39 2812 254,4 90,5 1575,8
P= planned; G= realized.
Souce: DPT, Third and Fourth Five Year Development Plans.
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Table 4.15
Shares in GDP, %
Agricultur
Industry
1960
40.4
16.6
1967
33.1
19.8
1972
27.8
22.8
Source: IBRD, 1975, pg. 339.
Table 4.16
Size of industrial establishments, %
1963
Establishments
1.9 69.4 80.6
98.1 30.6 19.4
1970
Number of workers
2.75 61.0 88.3
97.25 39.0 11.7
1980
Value added
4.9 100
95.1 n.a
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
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Large
Small
100
n.a
the First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP) period (1963-67) growth rates were
relatively high, although they were lower than planned levels except for the service sector.
In general, GNP and industrial production exhibited high growth rates: 6.5% and 10.6%,
respectively. While the share of the agriculture in GDP declined, the share of industry
continued to rise (Table 4.15). Throughout the 1963-77 period, growth in the mining
sector in general, and in the energy sector in particular, consistently lagged behind planned
levels. Not only were investment and production targets not reached, but the dependence
on external energy resources increased. Energy policy, instead of developing locally
available coal and natural gas resources, increasingly depended on oil, which in addition to
serious foreign exchange bottlenecks, also led to energy bottlenecks as ISI proceeded. The
service sector showed unbalanced growth: the growth of investment in the service sector
was greater than that of the productive sectors.
The emerging industrial structure included many small- and medium-sized
establishments (Table 4.16). The small establishments, which are defined as employing
less than ten workers, constitute the so-called informal sector. Although in 1963 98.1% of
all the establishments were small, only 19.4% of the total value added was contributed by
them. However, 30% of the total industrial workers were employed in the informal sector.
In 1970, the value added share of the informal sector dropped to 11.7%, and its
employment share increased to a significant 39% (Kepenek, 1983). According to the
Second Five Year Development Plan (1968-72), the public sector would concentrate in the
production of intermediate goods, while small establishments would mostly provide spare
parts to the durable goods industries in the private sector (Second Five Year Development
Plan, 1968-72).
The informal sector was pushed to the periphery of the national economy; it
subsisted on rather erratic demand from the formal sector, and relied on outdated
technologies and relatively cheap labor force from the "secondary" labor market. These
"marginal" workers, including women and children, were available at relatively low wages
because they did not belong to labor unions and did not have any social security benefits.
Small establishments concentrated in either consumer goods (textiles, clothing, leather
production), or capital goods (metal products, machines and transport equipment)
subsectors. Especially in machinery and transport equipment, production in small firms
totally depended on the large establishments. Because their role was to provide parts for
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Table 4.14
Sectoral Distribution of Fixed Investment, %
Sectors P G P G P G P
Agriculture 17,7 13,9 152 11,1 11,7 11,8 12,2
Mining 5,4 5,6 3,7 3,3 5,8 3,7 6,1
Industry 16,9 20,4 22,4 26,8 31.1 - 28,2 27,4
Energy 8,6 6,5 8,0 9,0 8,5 7,4 104
Transportation 13,7 15,6 16,1 16,0 14,5 20,6 16,3
Tourism 1,4 1,3 2,3 2,1 1,6 1,0 1,2
Construction 20,3 22,4 17,9 20,1 15,7 16,9 14,6
Education 7,1 6,6 6,7 4,7 5,0 3,3 4,8
Health 2,3 1,8- 1,8 1,5 1,4 1,1 1,4
Other Services 6,6 5,9 5,9 5,4 4,7 6,0 5,5
P= planned; G= realized.
Souce: DPT, Third and Fourth Five Year Development Plans.
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repair and maintanence demanded by the formal sector. This generally was done through
subcontracting. Furthermore, demand from the formal sector went up only when there was
a foreign exchange shortage and, therefore, domestic inputs were cheaper and more readily
available than imports. Also, due to fierce competition among the large number of small
establishments, large firms could easily keep the prices of inputs produced by the informal
sector to a minimum.
The second stage of ISI, that of consumer durables, was basically completed during
the 1960s. However, it remained dependent on imported inputs and technologies and thus
was only able to produce high cost consumer goods for the domestic market. In general,
industrial production was integrated with the post-production stages (distribution,
marketing, sales, service, etc.), and not with the pre-production stages. That is, only
horizontal integration existed. As far as technology, intermediate inputs, raw materials and
capital investments are concerned, industrial production was mostly based on foreign
resources. The main vertical integration took the form of spare parts production by the
informal sector. This naturally allowed only small-scale operations utilizing outdated
technologies. As a result, the industrial base remained weak; thus, the development of an
integrated industrial structure that could sustain growth became impossible.
Throughout the 1963-77 period, the growth rate of agricultural production did not
reach the planned levels. In the first FYDP period (1963-67), the average annual growth
rate was 3.1%, in the second FYDP (1968-72) 3.5%, and in the third FYDP 3.3%.
Despite increases in available agricultural inputs (tractors, fertilizers, pesticides), and
improved infrastructure, agricultural productivity did not respond much. Agricultural price
supports helped to keep agricultural incomes relatively high. However, until the end of the
1960s, the internal terms of trade (agricultural pricelindustrial price) was against
agriculture. This, coupled with the low money supply growth, explains the relatively low
inflation rates of the 1960s. Increasing inequality in the distribution of land and the
mechanization of agriculture both continued. As a result ,the number of landless peasants
grew. This further increased rural unemployment and fostered massive migration to the
cities throughout the 1960s, which in turn contributed to high urban unemployment.
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Labor force
Parallel to the rapid industrialization experienced during the 1960s (a 140% increase
in industrial production from 1962 to 1971), the size of the working class also increased
(Table 4.17a). The number of workers in industry doubled from 1960 to 1970, and the
proportion of industrial workers in the total labor force grew from 7.5% to 12.1%
(Table 4.17b). However, even this rapid industrialization was unable to absorb the large
masses of the urban unemployed. Furthermore, continuing rural-urban migration made the
situation worse toward the end of the 1960s. During 1963-1968 only 24.6% of all the
villages had no out migration; 46.3% had 1-10% and 29% had more than 10% out
migration (Tekeli, Erder, 1978). By 1967, the total number of unemployed (1,444,00) had
reached 11% of the total labor force. In the face of high urban unemployment and the poor
prospects for any improvement, from 1961 to 1966 1,032,500 workers decided to seek
employment abroad. In 1961, Turkey signed an agreement with West Germany for the
exportation of workers for limited periods of work (Paine, 1974). Although later similar
agreements were signed with Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, Switzerland and
Australia, most prefered to go to Germany. The rapidly increasing outflow of migrants and
their dependents reached quite large proportions by the end of the 1960s. The exact
numbers are imprecise because of the large numbers of unofficial emigrants, and the data
for those who have returned are even less precise. According to the best available
estimates, in 1961 approximately 7,000 left Turkey, by 1965 it was up to 67,000, and by
1970 it reached 150,000 to 180,000. Thus between 1961 and 1971, the total number of
workers recruited abroad was 750,000 to 790,000. Including the dependents
accompanying the workers, about 1 million people left Turkey, while the returnees were
252, 500 (Paine, 1974).
Although the average daily wage in industry slightly increased during the early
1960s, it stagnated or declined towards the 1970s, except for 1967-69. The average annual
increase in real wages of insured industrial workers during the 1961-71 period was only
2.8%. The official wage (11.33 TL) was half the average wage of the insured workers in
industry (22.66 TL). However, the overall average wage of workers during the 1960s was
even lower when the extremely low wages of the agricultural workers, non-unionized and
uninsured workers, and workers in the service sector are taken into account. As a result of
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Table 4.17a
Population and Employment
(thousands)
1962 1967 Annual 1972 Annual 1977 Annual 1978 1979 1980
increase, % increase, % increase, %
Total population 29655 32 724 2,519 37132 2,00 42078 2,065 43144 44438 45356
Labor supply 13133 13868 1.12 15013 1,65 16161 1,53 16640 16646 17183
Labor participation 44,3 42,4 40,4 38,4 37,6 37,9
Labor demand 12643 13238 0,94 13917 1,03 14726 1,16 15249 15238 15231
Unemployment 95 1050 2,10 900 -2,86 740 -3,56 720 700 700
Urban 490 830 5,71 1096 14,79 1435 6,19 1391 1640 1951
Total 1440 1880 1996 2175 2111 2340 2651
Unemployment rate 11.0. 12.1 13,3 - 13.5 - 12.7 14,1 15,4
Migrant workers 20 165 1,45 600 0.60 711 0,15 888,2
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
Table 4.17b
Sectoral Distribution of Employment
(Thousands)
Yearly growth rate
1962 % 1967 % 1972 % 1977 % 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77
Agriculture 9740 77,0 9556 72,2 9307 66,9 9100 61,9 -0,4 -0,5 -0,4
Industry 995 7,9 1222 9,2 1491 10,7 1859 126 4,2 4,1 4,5
Services 190 15,1 * 2460 18,6 3119 22,4 3767 25,6 5,2 4,8 4,2
Total 12 43 tMA 13 238 INS 13917 IO's 14726 INA 0,9 1,0 1,1
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
soaring inflation, growing unemployment, and declining basic social services, the real
income of the working people eroded continuously. This led the workers into an intense
political struggle throughout the decade.
The working people were mobilized by trade unions and party organizations using
newly won rights given by the 1960 Constitution. While union membership doubled
between 1963 and 1965, the total number of workers also almost doubled by 1970
compared to 1966. There were many strikes and demonstrations over the unemployment
situation and real wages. Especially in the latter half of the 1960s, the workers' struggle
gained momentum and became more and more political and anti-imperialistic in character.
Bloody clashes became commonplace between the workers, and the police and the armed
forces during labor demonstrations. After the establishment of the Confederation of
Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) in 1967, workers' militancy increased to the level of
factory occupations and massive strikes. Because of these struggles, there was a
temporary improvement in the relative position of the workers during 1968-73.
International trade
While the government tried to cover the domestic deficit by printing money, it
increasingly turned to foreign borrowing to finance the external trade deficit. As the highly
import-dependent ISI continued, borrowing became the major means of covering the deficit
given insufficient export earnings. Although imports increased rapidly, export earnings
stayed low (Table 4.18). This was due to several reasons. The first is that large industrial
firms enjoyed monopoly profits from the protected domestic market. Because of higher
pricemark-ups, industrialist produced manufactured goods for the domestic market, instead
of exporting them. To encourage manufactured exports, an export tax rebate was put into
effect and its coverage was progressively widened. But all these export encouragement
schemes failed as long as the domestic market remained attractive.
The second reason was that the fixed exchange rate system, while encouraging
imports, ended up discouraging exports. As long as the currency was overvalued,
importing necessary inputs and producing final goods domestically was more profitable.
Also, high tariff protection had led to relatively high input costs which were traslated into
higher prices. These high prices combined with the generally low quality of consumer
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Table 4.18
Foreign Trade
(million $)
Exports Growth Imports Growth Trade Growth Exports/ Terms of Total trade/ Exports/ Remittances
rate rate deficit rate Imports trade GNP GNP
1963 368,1 -3,4 687,6 11,1 319,5 34,1 53,53 90,8 14,26 9,31 -
1964 410,8 11,6 537,2 -21,9 126,4 -60,4 76,44 90,8 12,23 6,84 9
1965 463,7 12,9 572,0 6,5 108,3 - 14,3 81,08 96,4 12,21 6,77 70
1966 490,5 5.8 718.3 25,6 227,8 110,3 68,29 99,1 11.96 7,13 115
1967 522,3 6,5 684,7 -4,7 162,4 -28,7 76,28 100,1 10,76 6,12 93
1%98 496,4 -4,1 763,7 11,5 267,3 64,6 65,00 100,0 10,14 6,16 107
1%9 536,8 8,1 747,3 -2,2 210,5 -21,2 67,00 99,1 9,30 5,43 141
1970 588,5 9,6 885,8 18,5 297,3 41,2 62,10 96,8 10,83 6,50 273
1971 676,6 15,0 1088,2 22,8 4116 38,4 57,79 97,6 13,27 8,55 471
1972 885,0 30,8 1 508,0 38,6 625,6 51,8 57,03 103,8 13,89 8,96 740
1973 1 317,1 48,8 2036,7 35,0 719,6 15,1 64,07 106,4 15,20 9,39 1183
1974 1532,2 11,7 3719,7 82,6 2187,5 204,0 41,19 84,6 17,21 12,25 1426
1975 1401,1 -8,6 4738,6 27,4 3 337,5 52,6 29,57 76,0 16,62 12,88 1312
1976 1960,2 39,9 5128,6 8,2 3 168,4 -5,1 38,22 81,6 16,97 2,38 988
1977 1753,0 -10,6 57%,3 13,0 4043,3 27,6 30,24 76,9 16,67 12,83 982
1978 2 288,2 30,5 4 599,0 20,0 2310,8 -42,9 49,75 79,9 14,11 9,48 983
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
goods effectively ruled out competition in international markets. The third reason for the
low level of exports was the obstacles that the MNCs had created for increasing
manufactured exports. In general, licenses obtained from the multinationals for the
production of consumer goods brought many export restrictions with them. These controls
varied from the total restriction of exports of manufactured goods, to allowing only certain
products to be exported and/or only to certain countries. For example, Renault, through
licensing agreements, successfully restricted automobile exports from Turkey to only the
CENTO countries.
During the 1960s, compared to the 1954-60 period, the shares of both imports and
exports in GNP remained high. However, the share of exports (4.7%) was smaller than
that of imports (6.7%). This tendency increasingly led to the creation of foreign exchange
bottlenecks, especially towards the end of the decade. During the 1960s, although exports
did not show any considerable increase, demand for imports continued to rise (Table 4.19).
To counteract this, beginning in the early 1960s various import controls were enacted.
Besides import quotas for the purpose of dampening the effects of the overvalued exchange
rate on imports, a new 5% import tax was imposed in 1963. It was increased to 10% by
1967. In addition, import liberalization lists were cancelled from time to time. The rate of
advance payments for imports was also raised to 125%. Despite these policies to restrict
imports and encourage industrial exports, Turkey continued to register trade deficits.
Increased military spending and debt service payments further aggravated the balance of
payments deficit; by 1968, it reached crisis proportions. Finally, another agreement with
the IMF in 1970 introduced the standard stabilization measures and a 66% devaluation, in
addition to a set of export incentives for non-agricultural commodities. These export
incentives were provided through changes in the rebate system, replenishment schemes,
and export credit availability at low interest rates (Krueger, 1974).
The Second Crisis and the Stabilization Measures of 1970
The most salient characteristic of the planned import-substitution, contrary to its
original rationale, was its dependence on foreign capital. Not only did industrial
investment depend on imported capital goods, but industrial production also depended on
imported inputs and raw materials. Thus, the industrial sector could grow only when there
was enough foreign exchange. Towards the end of the 1960s, the rate of the industrial
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Table 4.19
Import, Planned and Realized Levels
(million $)
Capital goods Intermediate goods Consumption goods Total
IP G G/P P G G/P P G G/P P G G/P
1963 241,1 256,0 1,06 234,5 327,4 1,34 71,4 104,21 1,46 567,00 687,6 1,21
1%4 274,1 197,3 0,72 261,5 295,9 1,13 76,4 44,2 0,58 627,0 537,4 0,86
1965 2%,0 197,0 0,66 299,5 313,0 1,05 84,5 62,0 0,73 630,0 572,0 0,91
1966 332,5 257,1 0,77 325,0 396,3 1,22 87,4 64,9 0,74 674,9 718,3 1,06
196, 363,0 206,0 0,56 363,5 423,0 1,16 93,5 55,1 0,59 704,0 684,7 0,97
1. KP
TopIaM 1586,7 1113,4 0,74 1484,0 1756,2 1,18 413,2 330,4 0,80 3202,9 3200,0 0,99
1968 332,0 255,0 0,77 418,0 447,0 1,07 85,0 61,7 0,72 835,0 763,7 0,91
1%9 350,0 251,0 0,72 460,0 431,0 0,93 90,0 119,2 1,32 900,0 801,2 0.89
1970 370,0 284,0 0,77 510,0 527,0 1,03 95,0 136,6 1,44 975,0 947,0 0,97
1971 385,0 340,0 0,83 555,0 720,8 1,30 100,0 110,0 1,10 1040,0 1 170,8 1,12
1972 405,0 450,0 1,11 605,0 775,0 1,28 105,0 90,0 0,86 1115,0 1315 1,18
II. KP
Toplan 1842,0 1 580 0,86 2 548, 2 900,8 1,14 475,0 517,5 1,09 4865,0 4 998,t 1,03
1973 490,0 %7,0 1,97 845,0 986,1 1,17 95,0 83,6 0,88 1 430,0 2036,7 1,42
1974 530,0 1248,0 2,35 902,0 2 319,7 2,57 100,0 152,0 1,52 1 532,0 3719,7 2,43
1975 575,0 1 %1,1 3,41 952,0 2 574,3 2,70 110,0 203,2 1,85 1 637,0 4738,6 2,89
1976 625,0 2 239,3 3,58 1004,0 2732,9 2,72 120,0 156,5 1,30 1749,0 5 128,6 2,93
1977 680,0 2255,1 3,32 1 040,0 3 363,2 3,23 130,0 178,0 1,37 1850,0 5 796,3 3,13
III. KP
ToplaM 1900,0 8670,5 2,99 473,0 11976,2 2,53 655* 773,5 1,18 8 298, 21419,9 2,58
P= planned; G= realized.
Souce: DPT, Third and Fourth Five Year Development Plans.
growth dropped sharply as a result of foreign exchange bottlenecks. Compared to a 12%
average during the 1965-69 period, the industrial growth rate was 1.5% in 1970 (Table
19). The continuous trade deficits in the post-war era were partially offset by workers'
remittances between 1964 and 1970. For 1970-71 remittances were high enough to cover
the trade deficit. However, the balance of payments deficit steadily deteriorated from the
mid- 1950s onward. Increased military spending (an average of 24.4% of the budget
during the 1960-68 period) was one of the major reasons for the deficit. The worsening
balance of payments situation had led to extensive borrowing from abroad; this in turn
further aggravated the balance of payments deficit, thus leading the country into perpetual
debt bondage. In short, by the end of the 1960s, as in the late 1950s, the economy was in
a critical state. In response to the intensified economic and political crises, the Turkish
armed forces once again came to the rescue of the Republic on March 12, 1971.
Throughout the 1960s, benefits of high economic growth were relatively better
distributed. Democratization of Turkish politics following the 1960 Coup combined with
the planned implementation of ISI, created a developmentalist/populist class alliance which
provided a solid basis for the economic boom of the 1960s. All the different interest groups
in the society (the working class, the intelligentsia and the professionals, the small indusri-
alists, the agricultural, industrial and commercial capital) had benefitted, although to varying
degrees, from successful growth under ISI in the 1960s. This inward-looking industrial
development had a statist/nationalist appearance, although it was very different in nature
from the Statist period. The ISI of the 1930s was based on domestic inputs, the production
of basic consumer goods, a mass market orientation, and was accomplished without any
foreign capital involvement. In contrast, the ISI of the 1960s was based on imported
inputs, the production of consumer durables, and a heavy involvement of foreign capital.
The increasingly powerful labor movement managed to secure increases in real
wages, and thus contributed to the expansion of the domestic market by creating demand for
industrial goods. The urban professionals and the intelligentsia provided broad based
support for the ideology of ISI. The small industrial establishments also flourished, although
they were totally dependent on the large import -substituting industries. Agricultural price
subsidies helped to keep the agricultural incomes high, which meant a widening of the
internal market. Since industrial production was not based on domestic inputs, high
agricultural prices and incomes was not in conflict with the interests of the industrialists.
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Agrarian capital retained its independence, as export earnings originated in agriculture, but
were used to finance necessary imported inputs for industry. Therefore, there was no
conflict of interest between agricultural and industrial capital due to the ISI. The balance of
power between industrial and commercial capital varied depending on the state of the foreign
exchange regime. When there was a foreign exchange shortage, the importer/exporter group
gained the upper hand; when there was ample foreign exchange, the industrialists became
more powerful (Oncu, 1978). However, towards the end of the 1960s the industrial
bourgeoisie became increasingly dominant in the society and the conflict between capital and
the labor also intensified. In fact, the "solution" to the politico-economic crises of the late
1960s, through the 1970 [MF Agreement and the 1971 military coup, was rapid
monopolization of capital and repression of the powerful working class movement.
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V. ISI IN INTERMEDIATE AND CAPITAL GOODS: THE 1970s
Towards the end of the 1960s, an increasingly serious balance of payments crisis
led concerned international institutions like the OECD and the IMF to pressure Turkey to
abandon its over-valued exchange rate policy and to resort to export-promotion. However,
given strong domestic demand, ISI could be sustained for some more time. The 1970 IMF
agreement aimed at increasing foreign exchange earnings through a devaluation coupled
with various export incentives to the industrial sector. Indeed, exports of industrial goods,
in addition to traditional (agricultural) exports, showed a remarkable increase in the early
1970s. The share of industrial exports in total exports averaged 27.5% per year during
1970-74, increasing from 17.5% in 1970 to 38.6% in 1974. However, the share declined
during the rest of the decade. The share of exports in GNP grew from 4.3% in 1970 to
5.0% in 1974, while that of the imports grew from 6.5% to 12.2%. Meanwhile, workers'
remittances also reached unexpectedly high levels. From $273 million in 1970, remittances
increased to $1426 million in 1974. Moreover, the IMF agreement made further extention
of foreign credits possible. As a result, foreign exchange reserves reached $722 million at
the end of 1971 from only $477 million in July 1970. This made it possible for import
capacity to recover, providing a strong incentive for ISI to continue.
The export expansion of the early 1970s took place mostly in basic consumer
goods, production of which was based on domestic inputs, e.g., food processing, textiles,
and clothing. This necessitated a significant change in the structure of the industrial sector.
In the 1960s, ISI had proceeded mainly in durable consumer goods while the share of non-
durable consumer goods in industrial output had declined. As a result of the export
expansion in the early 1970s, however, the share of the non-durables started to increase.
Thus, this switch from an inward-oriented industrialization to an outward-oriented one
required a change in the allocation of resources in the national economy. Accordingly, the
new economic policies, formulated following the 1971 military coup, attempted to bring
about the necessary changes. These policies encouraged large industries and increased the
monopolization of productive capital so as to take advantage of economies of scale.
Moreover, lowering both agricultural support prices and industrial wages provided the
additional means of resource transfer to large industries. Actually, during the 1971-73
period both industrial wages and agricultural support prices declined in real terms.
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However, this period of export orientation did not last very long. Despite the
increases in both exports and remittances, Turkey continued to register trade deficits during
the 1970s. This was because imports continued to grow disproportionately faster than
exports. The initial success of export encouragement policies had been short-lived. This
was mainly because the domestic market continued to be attractive. As long as production
for the domestic market was profitable, most industrial firms preferred to remain domestic
market-oriented. As foreign exchange bottlenecks were temporarily eased, ISI could
continue during the second half of the decade. Given the apparent failure of export-
promotion, an alternative way of resolving the foreign exchange problem was to decrease
foreign exchange expenditures. Since the first and the second stages of ISI were both
completed, this would amount to a further "deepening" of the ISI process, i.e., a transition
to the third stage, which was geared towards the production of capital goods. This
transition was the leitmotiv of the third Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) (1973-77)
which was prepared shortly after the 1971 coup. Here a short digression into the
objectives of development planning in Turkey might be helpful.
The first FYDP (1963-67) stressed the need for perspective planning for a higher
standard of living for the population. The long-term pespective plan would set the main
directions for economic and social development to be achieved within the next 15 years,
and three short-term plans would be prepared within this framework. The first FYDP was
conceived during the liberal/populist period following the economic and political crises of
the late 1950s, and naturally leaned towards a balanced and stable development strategy.
Its long-term goals were "training sufficient number of high level scientific and technical
personnel in every field as required for Turkey's development; achieving a 7% annual rate
of growth; solving the unemployment problem; reaching a balance in external payments,
and realizing these targets according to the principles of social justice." The first plan
placed almost equal emphasis on accelerating economic growth and promoting a more equal
distribution of national income to rectify regional and social inequalities, which had
worsened during the period of "unplanned" economic growth of the 1950s. The second
FYDP (1968-1972), assumed that faster growth would lead to substantial increases in the
absolute living standards of all groups and all regions. The emphasis of this plan was on
promoting the private sector to create greater national prosperity that would directly or
indirectly (trickle down effect) benefit all other groups in the economy.
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Actually, during the first and second FYDP periods, the GDP grew at an annual
rate of 6.6% and industry, the "leading sector", at 9% with manufacturing at an impressive
10.5%. However, this impressive growth record did not bring about the achievement of
other development objectives. In other words, growth did not bring development and
greater social justice. In addition, the change in relations with the EEC necessitated a new
long-term strategy of growth, and thus the 1963-77 perspective plan was put aside.
Following the 1970 EEC agreement, the third FYDP (1973-1977) announced the first
phase of a new long-term development strategy which aimed at a rapid economic
transformation that by 1995 would bring Turkey to "the level of income and the type of
economic structure " Italy had in 1970 (Third FYDP, p. 128). This was supposed to make
it possible for Turkey to eventually become a full member of the EEC.
Given this major aim, the third FYDP (1973-77) recognized that the achievement of
its long-term goals required not only a stronger emphasis on industrial growth, but also a
major structural change in industry. Increased coordination with the other economic
sectors according to the industry's needs for investment and large imports of advanced
technology would be necessary. However, the achievement of its economic objectives
would require a series of long-term "sacrifices" including the postponement of some social
objectives. Thus, the third FYDP recognized the need for trade-offs between the
conflicting priorities of accelerated economic growth and greater social equity (Kucuk,
1972). Overly ambitious macroeconomic targets of the third FYDP also included a five-
fold increase in annual per capita income, from $320 to $1,500. Accordingly, at the end of
the 1973-95 period, the share of the industry in GDP was expected to rise to 37% from
25% while the share of agriculture would drop to 12% from 26%. Manufacturing output
was supposed to grow more than 12%, and intermediate and capital goods sectors by 14%
and 17%, respectively, or more than twice the rate of the consumer goods sector. By the
1980s the share of non-consumer goods sectors in total manufacturing output would
increase to 70% from 49%.
To match these production targets, national savings and investment were also
supposed to show a large increase. The rate of marginal savings in national savings was
expected to more than double, i.e., from 18% to 40% by the 1980s. The share of
manufacturing investment in total investment would rise from 37% to 50% with four-fifths
being allocated to the intermediate and the capital goods sectors. Two-thirds of the increase
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in national savings was expected to come from the public sector. The plan also assumed an
incredibly high marginal savings rate of 63% for the public sector compared to 20% for the
private sector. This increase was planned to come from a 33% annual increase in the SEE
surpluses; a large increase in tax revenue (31% compared to 21% during the second
FYDP); a restraint on the growth of current expenditures to 8% a year and a renewed long-
term internal borrowing. Clearly, in this structural transformation the public sector was
expected to lead the way, although encouragement of the private sector would continue.
Accordingly, various policy proposals were extended in the third FYDP, including a
reorganization of the SEEs, a better tax collection system, more efficient taxation of
agricultural incomes and the introduction of a value added tax. In addition, an improved
mobilization of private resources would be achieved through monetary and credit policies
such as the tax exemption for interbank transactions to increase flow of funds within the
banking system, increased medium and long-term financial credit for private industrial
investment, allocation of a large percentage of agricultural credit to export-oriented
agricultural activities, and a reorganization of credit provision to small industries through
changes in the interest rate policy.
In Turkey, deposit banks include government owned "special law" banks, i.e.,
banks which specialize in lending to agriculture, real estate, etc., and also various
specialized development banks, e.g., State Investment Bank, Turkish Industrial
Development Bank, Industrial Investment Credit Bank. The State Investment Bank lends
exclusively to public enterprises and draws most of its resources from the workers'
compulsory insurance funds. Conversely, the Turkish Industrial Development Bank and
the Industrial Investment Credit Bank provide medium and long-term credit to private
industries. But, given the rather limited private capital market, total bank credit accounts
for less than the 40% of private industrial investment. Most private firms are family-
owned; the sale of corporate securities in general played a negligible role in their financing.
As a result, more than 60% of private industrial investment was financed directly from the
entepreneurs' own resources (IBRD, 1975). Direct financial assets (government bonds,
corporate bonds, and corporate stocks) as a percentage of GNP were 38% in 1963 and
29% in 1971. Outside the banking system there was very little development of financial
assets as of 1973.
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Strict control over the structure of interest rates dates back to 1938. The policy has
been to keep the interest rate below its market rate, to reduce the cost of credit to investors
and other borrowers. Because of ceilings on interest rates and increasing price inflation,
however, depositors have earned a negative real return on both the sight and the time
deposits throughout the 1960s. However, the imposition of ceilings on interest rates have
not achieved their major purpose, namely, reducing the cost of borrowing to the investors.
Most commercial banks rely on commissions, taxes and fees for a major part of their
income and prefer short-term credits to medium-term investment credits, and also
established borrowers to new entrepreneurs. In early 1973, the interest rate structure was
changed to favor borrowers in the priority sectors by lowering ceilings, by granting them
tax exemption, and by paying direct subsidies, e.g., credits for export-oriented projects are
exempted from banking transactions tax. Removing the ceilings on interest rates was
expected to help mobilize savings through the expansion of time deposits and to encourage
the growth of the bond market. But, it would also increase the cost of borrowing by the
government.
Monetization of the economy continued to increase throughout the decade. Money
and quasi-money (currency in circulation and total deposits) was 20% of the GNP in 1952
and increased to 32.6% in 1972. Between 1965 and 1971, 34% of total investment in
industry, 63% in agriculture, and 9% in housing and construction was financed by
commercial bank credit. In general, credit flows were forced through rigid channels. The
allocation of increases in outstanding credits between 1963-71 demonstrates the major role
the public sector played in total fixed investment (IBRD, 1975). Agricultural credit to the
private sector (24% of total credit to the private sector) and the industrial credit to the public
sector (57% of the total credit to the public sector) were so high a proportion of the
expansion of credit that their shares in total fixed investment were 11% and 32%,
respectively. Only 34% of the increases in the credits to the private sector went into
industry and mining.
To accelerate the growth of industrial exports, most tax rebate procedures were
simplified. Since the import requirements of planned development always exceeded
projected foreign exchange receipts, a large volume of import-substitution, supplemented
by import restrictions and controls, aimed at conserving foreign exchange while reducing
necessary imports of capital goods and raw materials. The planned shift from ISI to
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export-oriented industialization was expected to increase the share of manufactured exports
from 17% to 42% while the investment goods imports were expected to rise from 55% to
70% of total imports.
On the social objectives side, the shifting priorities of economic planning were
clearly demonstrated. The share of investment targeted for basic social services (housing,
education, health) had dropped to 22%, as compared to 29% in the first and 26% in the
second plan. Moreover, the rapid introduction of the advanced capital intensive
technologies was expected to increase urban unemployment to about 15% from its already
painful 11% (IBRD, 1975). The third FYDP also aimed at the increasing total tax revenues
substantially through improvements in tax administration and in the collection of taxes, the
introduction of a value added tax, and higher taxation of the agricultural incomes. Total tax
receipts were expected to rise from 17.1% of GNP in 1972 to 24.9% in 1977. In addition,
as a new source of revenue, there was growing interest in forced savings in the form of
social insurance funds to be supported by compulsory contributions from all the major
occupational categories. The existing insurance program for workers was expanded and
new social insurance funds was established for the civil servants, the artisans, and the
professionals. Another one was proposed for the agricultural producers. These funds
were to be administered by various professional associations themselves and expected be
used to finance the new industrial enterprises approved by the State Planning Organization
(SPO). Thus, these social insurance programs represent an important source of the captive
capital that can be channeled into industrial investments.
For this new "associational" capitalism, there was a highly successful prototype,
namely, OYAK (Army Mutual Aid Society) which was established shortly after the 1960
military coup. The extention of the OYAK experience would lead other major professional
associations to act as instruments of involuntary capital accumulation and potentially as
investors and entrepreneurs. By corporatizing the associational life in the major economic
sectors, Turkey would be transformed from representational democracy to an "organized
democracy". While imposing greater restrictions on the pluralist network of private
voluntary associations, the Justice Party and the martial law governments tried to promote a
system of compulsory, semi-official and hierarchically controlled representational cartels.
Through such organizations, the key associational leaders could cooperate with the state in
the implementation of the major economic policies. This policy would conveniently
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structure and coordinate mass political and economic demands. Most importantly, it could
moderate and control them, especially at times when weak governments were unable to do
so. Such a policy was needed because these developments were taking place in a transition
period when the populist/developmentalist alliances of the 1960s were in the process of
dissolving. The usefulness of these alliances, corresponding to the second stage of the ISI,
ended with the announcement of the "New Strategy". The new corporatist political strategy
can be summed up as the promotion of rapid economic growth at the expense of a broader
political participation and economic redistribution; the promotion of the associational
channels of interest representation at the expense of the party-electoral and plebiscitarian
channels; and the promotion of the corporatist interest groups at the expense of the pluralist
interest groups in structuring and regulating associational life.
Engineering Industries (SAN'li kuruluslar)
The third FYDP envisaged a transition to the final stage of ISI, namely, ISI in
intermediate and capital goods industries. (These industries are also called the "engineering
industries" and classified as categories #35-38 by the International Standard Industrial
Classification.) Although in the early 1970s Turkey had sufficient resources to enable her
to attain a significant level of development in the engineering industries, by the early 1980s
achievements in this area were rather limited. This was due to a combination of the techno-
economic, financial and political obstacles (Tuzel, 1981).
Technological obstacles: Among the techno-economic obstacles, supply side obstacles
result from the use of labor and capital with low efficiency due to the oligopolistic structure
of production during ISI, i.e., given the high degree of product differentiation, the overall
demand for capital goods was neither sufficient nor uniform. Moreover, inter-industry and
intra-industry specialization was limited by the size of the market. Overcoming these
difficulties required strategies to increase the productivity of both labor and capital.
Improvements in process design and in the ratio of product quality to factor use would help
to increase the labor productivity. Horizontal or vertical integration, increasing capacity
utilization through domestic or foreign subcontracting, and intregrating the existing small
scale establishments through financial and technological support would improve capital
productivity. However, all these strategies require internalization of technology through
research and design. Also, state support in the pre-investment information externalities
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(such as in gathering, best method search, control engineering and consulting services,
standardization, etc.) was necessary. Government intervention can also be important in
overcoming demand side constraints. Due to the capital intensity, large scale investments,
and efficient technological organization needed for the production of capital goods, state
support would help by guaranteeing demand and by decreasing market uncertainties.
The third FYDP aimed at overcoming these technological/economic difficulties
through various policies and measures, but these remained ad hoc. The first serious
attempt at this started with the fourth FYDP (1983-1987). Because empirical studies of the
engineering industries for other LDCs were done in the 1970s. Turks could not take
advantage of these examples. Furthermore, the Soviet studies were not used by the DPT
for ideological reasons (Mitra, 1979). Despite efforts and incentives for investment in
engineering industries from the mid- 1960s to the late 1970s, no development took place in
this field. One major reason was the zero or deferred tariff on imports of capital goods,
i.e., lack of protection for domestic industries producing capital goods. Moreover, among
the financial problems, in the face of the increasing domestic demand, was the lack of
suppliers' credit for marketing capital goods. Neither the public nor the private investment
banks acted willingly; instead credit demand was met by the Treasury and/or external
sources.
Financial obstacles: In the early 1970s it became clear that the private sector could not or
would not initiate a meaningful development of the engineering industries. Moreover, the
possibility of the recurrence of the BP crises of the late 1960s, due to a large demand for
capital goods imports, forced the public sector to turn to direct investment in engineering
industries. However, the public sector faced serious constraints in both creating and in
allocating new financial sources for investment. The problem of resource allocation to the
engineering industries stemmed from the fact that at the beginning of the third FYDP period
the existing project stock was already very large, yet it continued to show a large yearly
increase throughout the 1970s. Not only the value of the total project stock increased, but
also the average investment maturation period did . A rough estimate of this is the ratio of
the value of projects in stock at the beginning of the plan period to the annual targeted
average of total public sector investments during the plan. This was 3.11 years during the
third plan, but it jumped to 6.91 years during the fourth plan (1979-1983).
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During 1973-80, the ratio of the value of the total industrial sector project stock to
the value of the total public investment project stock did not show much increase. The
1973-80 annual average share was 27% (23% in 1973, 30% in 1979, and 27% in 1980).
The total share of the engineering industries in the public industrial program was also small
in terms of both the project value (the 1973-77 annual average was 10%, the 1978-81
average was 15%) and the annual investment share (the 1973-77 annual average is 9.6%,
the 1978-81 average is 15%). This share dropped after 1981, following increases from
1977 to 1980. The share of the engineering industries' projects in total engineering
investment , however, showed a marked increase after 1977. The 1977-81 annual average
share of these projects was 55.5% and of the investment program 46.5%. There was a
marked change in the public investment pattern; instead of railroad transportation and
shipbuilding, most investments were transferred to other engineering industries such as
electronics, metal products, and machine parts. However, the ratio of realized investment
to actual investment in the engineering industries was low compared to total industrial
investment. It was 58% between 1973-76, but dropped to 50.5% during 1977-80
(Table 5.1). During the 1973-80 period the average share of intermediate goods
investments in total public industrial investment varied from 41.2% to 65.5%. Actual
investment in industrial projects at the subsectoral level was not uniform; projects with
large investment requirements such as petroleum products and petrochemicals seemed to
lose their initial importance, especially following the world oil crises (Table 5.2).
Most financial establishments for the purpose of creating new investable sources
and channelling these resources to the engineering industries relied on workers'
remittances. In 1975 Desiyab (State Industrial and Workers Investment Bank) was
established for this purpose. In addition, power struggles for the distribution of Central
Bank credits between the Desiyap and the SEEs caused the crises of the several coalition
governments. Following the establishment of the Desiyap, between June 1976 and
February 1977, five major engineering industries were established. The share of the
Desiyap was planned to be later transferred to the migrant workers and other share holders,
mostly small savers. But, as this plan failed to materialize, most engineering industries
were converted into SEEs after 1978 and the Desiyap became an investment bank for the
establishments to be funded by local savings and migrant workers remittances.
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Table 5.1
Public Investment Projects and Budget Allocation
(billion TL)
173 1974 1975 1976 1077 1978 1970 1060 1061
1. Total investment project stock 134.9 192.5 2922 441.8 886.4 1254.1 1612.9 3217.9 50.2
2. Total industrial investment stock 31.4 512 68.7 1155 255.9 343.4 544.5 879.5 1876.9
3. Engineering industries investment projects 5.667 2.876 4.148 9.520 34.3 W.5 75.9 15. 23.
4. Five major engineering industries - - - 26.9 ? 26.4 37.4 101.4 148.5
5. Total investment allocation 26.0 39.0 51.0 81.3 126.0 145.1 210.6 308.4 672
6. Industrial investment allocation 6.752 9.360 12.933 19.730 36.0 32.2 41.5 66.2 139.1
7. Engineering investment allocation 0.52s 0.689 0.843 1.842 6.008 941 6.3W 10.757 15.706
8. Allocation for five major engineering industries - - - - - 2.450 2.700 5.188 8.64
9. 1/5 52 4 9 s.7 5.4 7.0 8.0 8.8 10.4 8.9
10. 2/6 4.7 5.5 53 5.9 7.1 10.7 13.1 13.3 13.5
11. 3f7 10.8 4.1 4.9 5.2 5.7 10.5 11.9 148 15.2
12. 4/8 - - - - -
13. 2/1 23 27 24 28 29 27 30 27 3114. 3/2 18 0 6 a 13. 18 14 18 13
15. 4/3 - - - - 47 49 64 02
16. 7/6 8 7 7 9 17 18 15 16 11
Source: Turel, 198 1.
Table 5.2
Public Sector Investments, %
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total public investment 89 85 96 88 76 83 100 98
Public industrial investment 88 82 116 87 65 76 90 93
Investment in engineering industries 45 45 73 70 26 29 76 80
Source: Turel, 1981.
Political obstacles: The lack of ability on the part of the 13 coalition governments that were
formed between 1973 and 1980 to provide the necessary politico-economic framework for
the establishment of the engineering industries, and conflict of interest among the
industrialists and the commercialists made it impossible for these industries to be fully
established. The lack of political will to provide support to the engineering industries
coupled with indifference from the technocrat/bureaucrat group, due to a new Public
Employee Law which made it less attractive for the skilled technical personnel to work in
the public sector, resulted in the failure to achieve the third stage of ISI.
During 1975-77 as the political clout of the MSP increased, there was a push for
these industries. In 1976 engineering projects were finally added to the investment
program. But, insufficient technological and financial planning made a full implementation
of it impossible. In 1978-79 the coalition of the RPP with the independents undertook the
feasibility analysis and technical studies on the composition of output, capacity and cost
effectiveness with the aim of preparing concrete investment projects. But, increasing price
inflation, and the devaluations after 1977 resulted in large increases in costs and serious
decreases in the capacity utilization, and therefore, necessitated major project revisions.
Although in 1978-79 ideas for concrete projects had matured, the allocation of investment
funds were largely delayed.
In 1980-81 a gradual dissolution of the investment plan for the engineering
industries began despite the fact that a comprehensive plan for project coordination,
including their spatial studies, were completed. With the January 12,1980 measures, the
efforts towards a transition to the third stage of the ISI were mostly abandoned. Instead, a
strategy of export-promotion was launched. Following the US-Turkish Mutual Defense
and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1980, public investment also changed direction.
Instead of the engineering industries of the late 1970s, most public investment went into the
new industrial/military complex. It included seven capital goods projects and many others
for manufacturing weapons parts through subcontracting.in cooperation with several
foreign (US) corporations. Moreover, some of these engineering industries were now
opened to foreign capital, since they were converted into the SEE status, e.g., Tumosan
(Sonmez, 1980).
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Fourth FYDP (1979-1983)
Although the first three FYDPs were implemented to a large extent, the fourth plan
was not only prepared with a one year delay in 1978, but its implementation increasingly
lost momentum. It was a time of serious economic and political crises under the coalition
of the RPP with the independents. Accordingly, the fourth FYDP tried to bring a solution
to the balance of payments crises of the late 1970s by increasing industrial exports and
output in the mining and energy sectors. The targeted annual growth rate was 8.2%, as
compared with the 7.6% achieved during the first three plan periods. The major aims of
this plan reflected current problems: to continue with the ISI, especially relying on public
sector investments and also to make an effort to increase manufactured exports to boost
foreign exchange earnings. An interesting point about the fourth plan was its emphasis on
economic growth with improved income distribution. For this purpose, in agriculture there
was a lot of support for the peasants through the newly established cooperatives and also
through increased public participation in agriculture. This new concern about income
distribution was due to the fact that in 1978 during the coalition of the RPP with the
independents, the RPP had assumed a "left-of-the-centre" role.
External sources of capital: Aid, direct investment, borrowing
The most important change in the foreign relations of Turkey in the first four FYDP
periods (1963-1983) was that the EEC replaced the US as far as both private investment
and lending.are concerned. US aid was no longer made up of grants but loans. In
addition, during the second plan period (1968-72) Turkey received loans from the Soviet
Union, which were used to finance several industrial projects. Following the world oil
crisis, Arab nations also started extending credits to Turkey. On the whole, throughout the
planned period dependence on foreign capital increased; it reached especially high levels
during the third FYDP period (Table 5.3). The structure of industrial production resulted
in increasing external dependence which in turn led to increasing external debt.
During the third FYDP (1973-1977), there were significant changes in the capital
account stemming from both workers' remittances and short- and medium-term credit. The
latter increased by more than ten fold compared to the second FYDP period. Under the
invisibles, interest payments on external debt increased much faster than profit transfers
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Table 5.3
External Sources of Capital
(million $)
- 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77
Invisibles:
Interest payments (debt) 163 234 862
Profit transfers 74 168 342
Project credit service 27 130 131
Tourism - -65 55 74
Remittances 287 1732 5886
Other invisibles 2 15 1002
Balance 488 2334 8042
Infrastructure 161 62 95
Other Capital:
Principal payments (debt) 508 616 714
Private foreign capital 115 183 3
Project credit 317 921 1931
Program credit 723 516 181
Imports with waiver 38 142 444
Imports PL480 165 197 -
IMF credits 213 225 -
Capital account balance 1063 1568 1204
Reserve movements 87 -1139 783
SDR - 39 472
Short and medium-term credits -121 413 4375
Source: DPT,Third and Fourth Five Year Development Plans..
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and payment on project credits. Tourism revenues, which had grown during the second
plan, declined sharply during the third plan period. Workers' remittances, which had been
increasing since the mid-1960s, were finally channelled into investment during the third
plan. The infrastructural investment credit provided by NATO had declined in the late
1960s, but it showed a small increase in the 1970s. The PL-480 credits from the US
practically came to a halt during the third plan. On the whole, while project credits
increased program credits declined. Foreign exchange and gold reserves also declined
during the first and third plans, but they increased during the second plan. During the third
plan, a new external credit instrument, Special Drawing Rights (SDR) was extensively
used. However, the most important development was in the use of short term credits,
especially in the form of the Convertable Turkish Lira Deposits (CTDLs) during May 1975-
July 1977.
Total private capital inflow continuously increased during the planned period.
During the second plan period, it increased by 59% compared to the first plan period, and
during the third by 97.8% compared to the second plan period. However, so did profit
transfers; the ratio of profit transfer to foreign capital inflow was 55.7%, 91.8%, and
95.6% during the first three plan periods, respectively. Therefore, on the whole the net
contribution of foreign capital to capital accumulation in Turkey became less significant as
the time went by. There were two basic characteristics of foreign investment during 1963-
83. The first was that it was concentrated in the industrial sector: 83% during the first and
the second plan periods and 86.5% during the third. The next largest category was
services with about 10%. Furthermore, foreign investment increasingly moved to the
production of consumer non-durables. During the 1970s, foreign investment mostly
concentrated in motor vehicles, chemicals, electrical machinery, electronics, and banking
(Table 5.4). The second was that the concentration of capital increased over time.
Although the amount of foreign capital investment had increased, the number of firms with
foreign capital involvement actually declined.
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, Turkey's external debt continued to increase.
But, especially after 1975 it reached unusual proportions, mostly due to the increases in
project credits. Borrowing by the state, which was made up of long term project credit,
was channeled into infrastructure, intermediate goods production, and agriculture. Private
borrowing was mostly used to meet immediate investment needs. In the post-1975 period,
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Table 5.4
Sectoral Distribution of Joint Ventures
under Foreign Capital Law
Number of Foreign Sectoral Total Share of
joint ventures capital distribution capital foreign capital*
I. INDUSTRY
Food, beverages, tobacco 7 1116 11,6 1 915 58,3
Textiles, clothing i 374 3,9 499 75,0
Paper 1 49 0,5 87 56,0
Rubber 3 532 5,5 1008 52,7
Plastics 1 4 * 10 38,4
Chemicals 21 954 9,9 1 281 74,5
Glass 2 226 2,3 2150 10,5
Motor vehicles 8 1740 18,0 5460 31,9
Metal products 12 435 4,5 4345 10,0
Machinery 6 337 3,5 764 44,1
Agricultural machinery 1 18 02 70 25,0
Electrical machinery 17 2 391 24,8 5510 43,4
Cement 1 84 0,9 280 30,0
Construction materials 3 154 1,6 525 28,0
Industry total 84 8414 87,3 23931 35,2
II. AGRICULTURE I 1 -* 2 50.0
III. MINING 1 20 0,2 20 100,0
IV. SERVICES
Tourism 7 385 4,0 679 56,6
Banking 5 809 8,5 3724 22,0
Research and design 2 14 0,1 34 40,0
Non-industry total 16 1229 12,9 4459 27,8
General Total 100 9643 100,0 28 390 34,0
* Share of foreign capital in
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
total capital in joint ventures.
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the "debt trap" syndrome became clearer: current borrowing was mostly to meet principal
and interest payments on previous loans. As it became more and more difficult to meet
(long term) debt service, more short term credits were extended. Although, in the early
1970s short term credits were almost non-existent, by 1977 they increased to 60% of the
total debt. This not only resulted in increasing interest charges, but it also shortened the
period in which the average debt payments had to be made. From 1973 to 1977, the
interest burden increased to 7.6% from 4.4%; and the average debt repayment period
declined from 22.1 years to 12.7 years.
In addition to internal borrowing and printing money to cover the internal deficit, the
goverment also increasingly resorted to foreign borrowing to finance the external trade
deficit. By 1974 the external trade deficit tripled from 1973! However, this added debt and
debt-servicing obligations, and thus, further aggravated the balance of payments crisis. The
current account deficit , not including the amortization of the public debt, increased to $3.4
billion in 1976 from $720 million in 1974 and $122 million in 1971 (Berberoglu, 1982).
Turkey's total foreign debt was only $2.2 billion in 1970, by 1975 it had grown to $3.5
billion. The total foreign debt skyrocketed to $15 billion in 1979, from $13.5 billion in
1978, and $12.5 billion in 1977. The external debt situation reached crisis proportions
during the late 1970s (Table 5.5). Turkey's international credit rating also declined rapidly;
it was the fifth lowest among the 93 debtor countries according to the Institutional Investors,
NY. The situation turned into a vicious circle: increased indebtedness necessitated further
borrowing which was realized under increasingly difficult conditions (Table 5.6). Finally,
the external debt situation deepened the economic crisis of the late 1970s to such a great
extent that major politico-economic policies came to be determined by it.
Starting in 1975, besides consortium credits, various forms of short-term credits
such as private bank credits and the more innovative "convertible Turkish Lira deposits"
(CTLDs) were also resorted to. The CTLDs were started in 1967 to attract worker's
remittances from abroad through relatively high interest rates. The ruling Nationalist Front
Coalition adopted a series of mini devaluations beginning in April 18, 1975 bringing the
exchange rate to 13.85, to the US dollar, from 13.70, and finally to 17.50 in June 1977
(Dogan, 1980). Moreover, to increase credit to the private sector, the CTLDs were
resuscitated. However, instead of workers' remittances, 95% of the CTLDs were made by
135
Table 5.5
Turkish External Debt
Payable in US dollars Payable in TL
annual annual
Public Private Total growth rate Public Private Total growth rate
1964 561 385 946 -
1965 839 243 1081 142 2054 1121 3175
1966 1009 223 1231 13.8 2188 1107 3295 3,7
1967 1179 165 1344 9,1 2140 1154 3294 -
1968 1403 126 1529 13,7 2096 1088 3184 -3,3
1969 1607 98 1705 11,4 2033 1086 3119 -2,0
1970 1830 99 1929 11,1 2466 1707 4173 33,7
1971 2105 104 2209 14,5 2333 1513 3846 -7,8
1972 2163 138 2301 4,1 2240 1501 3741 -2,7
1973 2460 195 2654 15,3 2147 1491 3638 -2,7
1974 2659 242 2901 19,3 2072 1355 3427 -5,7
1975 2728 284 3012 3,8 2071 1342 3413 -0,4
1976 3427 395 3822 26,8 2081 1336 3417 0,1
1977 3770 640 4410 15,4 2150 1395 3545 3,7
1978 5361 765 6126 38,9 2363 1610 3923 12,1
1979 8503 748 9251 51,3 2763 2113 4876 22,7
1980 10839 535 11374 22,9 5252 4311 9564 44,4
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
Table 5.6
External Debt Indicators, %
1973 1874 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Total deb/GNP 13.6 10.6 8.9 9.2 9.8 12.9 20.0
Total debt/Exports 97.8 91.2 99.7 100.0 133.8 107.5 232.2
Total debt/Foreign exchange 125.9 137.6 234.0 262.8 390.1 412.9 428.3
reserves
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1980.
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foreign banks. This unexpected turn of events aggravated the balance of payments deficit
beyond imagination. Finally, by 1977 when it became absolutely impossible to pay these
short-term credits back, the CTLD program came to an end. By the end of 1977 the total
CTLD debt was $2 billion; by 1978, at $2.97 billion, it had reached 32% of the total
external debt. Starting in 1978, additional long-term credits were extended from various
international organizations. So the vicious circle continued.
What was surprising about the CTDLs was that this type of external financing later
created its own nemesis. The government subsidized private sector borrowing by
providing blanket protection against foreign exchange risks. This was to ensure foreign
exchange availability for its own needs while preventing private sector crowding-out.
However, the amount of this implicit subsidy to the private sector was not fixed, but rather
it depended on the expectations of the rate of depreciation of the Turkish Lira (TL) and
hence the current exchange rate disequilibrium. As long as the TL was expected to
depreciate, over-borrowing took place. This in turn caused the present exchange rate to
become more over-valued (Table 5.7), and fueled expectations of further depreciation.
This vicious circle continued until the foreign banks finally understood what was
happening. Meanwhile, the government had already incurred a large exchange loss under
the guarantee. In 1975 the government CTLD subsidies amounted to 1.1% of GNP, but in
1976 they reached 20% and in 1977 50%! (Rodrik, 1986). The share of short-term debt in
total debt under the CTLD increased from 8.9% in 1973 to 54.0% in 1977. The CTLDs
were eventually consolidated and rescheduled in August 1979. The burden of servicing the
CTLD debt in the 1980s was substantial especially in a period of large real depreciations of
the TL. Indirectly, the Central Bank had to pay the subsidies of the CTLD scheme; it did
so partly by further external borrowing, and partly by the inflation tax.
Investment
During the 1973-1977 period, although total investment grew fast, total domestic
savings (private plus public) failed to keep up with it. Total investment grew by more than
100% while the national savings grew by only 60%. Especially towards the end of the
1970s, this situation led the government to resort to increased internal borrowing, which
resulted in internal deficits as well. On the whole during this period (1973-77) public
investment increased by 300%, but public savings did not increase. To be able to finance
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the public deficit, the Central Bank resorted to printing money. However, as increases in
production in general failed to match increases in the money supply, deficit financing
proved to be highly inflationary.
Despite the formation of 13 coalition governments of varying political convictions
between 1973 and 1979, a sustained investment boom also occured during this period
(Table 5.8). The share of investment in GNP increased greatly; it was 25% in 1977
compared to 18.1% in 1973. Also, while the private investment share in GNP stayed
almost the same, the public sector share increased to 13.1% in 1977 from only 7% in 1973.
Clearly, the public sector spearheaded the investment effort in the 1970s. However, this
increase in investment was largely financed through external borrowing. The net use of the
foreign savings jumped to 6.9% of GNP in 1977 from -2.2% in 1973. This meant an
increase of 9.1% in the external borrowing ratio, of which 76% was used for investment
purposes, and 24% for consumption purposes.
Sectoral developments
During the third FYDP the annual industrial growth rate was 9.9% and the share of
industry in national income reached 23.7% in 1977. Despite this high growth rate
compared to other sectors, industrial growth was slower than during the first plan period
(10.9%), and only slightly higher than in the second plan period (8.7%). The structure of
the economy did not change much. The number of small establishments remained high.
The share of large establishments increased from 1.9% in 1963 to 2.7% in 1970, and by
1980 it reached only 4.9% . However, in terms of the size of the labor force and the share
in value added, large establishments continued to dominate (Table 5.9). Their share in
value added increased to 88.3% in 1970, but their share in total industrial employment
decreased to 61% in 1970 from 69.4% in 1963. Meanwhile, the share of the public sector
in industrial value added, in labor force, and in the number of establishments all declined.
Although the share of the private sector in the total industrial labor force continued to
decline (indicating the increasing use of capital intensive technologies), in the total number
of the industrial establishments showed a slight increase, and in value added fluctuated.
In 1980, the share of the private sector in reached 66.6% from 47.3% in 1963 and 45.1%
in 1970.
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Table 5.7
Overvaluation of the TL, %
1974 1975 1976 1977
Overvaluation 5.5 23.3 26.5 56.7
Source: Rodrik, 1986.
Table 5.8
Investment-Savings Balance and Growth
(% of GNP)
of Real Expenditures
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Investment 18.1 20.7 22.5 24.7 25.0
Private 11.1 10.0 10.3 13.1 11.9
Public 7.0 10.8 12.2 11.6 13.1
Domestic Savings 20.3 18.4 17.4 19.3 18.0
Private 11.6 11.0 8.5 11.2 11.7
Public 8.8 7.4 9.0 8.1 6.4
Foreign Savings -2.2 2.3 5.0 5.4 6.9
Sectoral Savings-
Investment Balances
Private 0.5 1.0 -1.8 -1.9 -0.2
Public 1.8 -3.4 -3.2 -3.5 -6.7
Total 2.3 -2.4 -5.0 -5.4 -6.9
Growth of Real
Expenditures (M
Private 3.7 7.3 7.4 9.6 2.7
Public 7.4 10.3 20.2 12.5 9.0
Total 4.5 7.9 10.0 10.2 4.2
Source: SPO, 1980.
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The structural change in industry was such that the share of intermediates and
capital goods production in total industrial production increased while that of consumer
goods decreased (Table 5.10). Contrary to the main objective of the five year development
plans to achieve an industrial trasformation which would decrease external dependence,
industrial production continued to be geared towards consumer goods. The production of
durable consumer goods, compared to the production of basic consumption goods, showed
a large increase. Among the intermediate goods, even the basic ones like chemicals and
iron-steel grew much slower than the rest. Transportation equipment and electrical
machinery had the largest production shares among the capital goods sectors, while
agricultural machinery and machinery in general lagged behind planned targets.
The emerging industrial structure exhibited three major characteristics. First, the
second stage of the ISI process was completed by the early 1970s, but the third stage was
not successful. Industrial production continued to be highly dependent on imported inputs
and capital goods. Its high cost, and therefore domestic market oriented character, also did
not change. Second, the role of the public sector in the economy, especially in providing
necessary intermediate goods to the private sector, was highly important. Third, small
establishments continued to coexist with large industries, but only through subcontracting
for parts. Technological and financial integration of the informal sector failed to
materialize. This was because from the beginning the industial sector was integrated with
the commercial sector. Industrial production has been integrated in the post-production
stages (distribution, sales, repair, etc.) and not in the pre-production stages; as far as the
intermediates, investment, and technology are concerned, production has been dependent
on foreign resources. The fact that industrial production was not based on domestic
resources resulted in a dual industrial structure: A formal sector where only a small number
of large oligopolistic firms were engaged in the production of high cost, low quality
consumer goods for the domestic market and an informal sector where a large number of
small firms existed on the rather erratic demand from the large firms for the production of
parts utilizing outdated technologies.
In summary, the process of industrialization was once again in crisis following the
completion of the second stage of the ISI. In the short run, due to the unavailability of
imported inputs, the existing industrial capacity could not be satisfactorily utilized. In the
long run, of the provision of the necessary intermediate and capital goods, and
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Table 5.9
Structure of the Industrial Sector, %
Number of establishments 1963 1970 1980
Public 7.9 5.3 4.9
Private 92.1 94.7 95.1
Total large establishments 1.9 2.75 4.9
Small establishments(private) 98.1 97.25 95.1
Labor force
Public 44.1 36.3 35.8
Private 55.9 63.7 64.2
Total large 69.4 61.0 100.0
Small 30.6 39.0 n.a.
Value added
Public 52.7 54.3 33.4
Private 47.3 45.1 66.6
Total large 80.6 88.3 100.0
Small 19.4n.a. 11.7 n.a.
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
Changes in the
Table 5.10
Composition of Industrial Production, %
1962 1967 1972 1977 4th FYDP
Consumer goods 62.3 52.9 53.2 49.0 36.8
Intermediates 27.8 35.4 33.9 37.7 43.3
Capital goods 9.9 11.7 12.9 13.3 19.9
Source: Kepenek, 1984
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encouragement of efficiency in production, and the promotion of exports of industrial
goods remained to be resolved. The heart of the problem was that the industrial sector
could not mobilize the necessary internal and external resources for its own needs. Instead,
given the highly inflationary situation, industrial and commercial capital found speculative
commercial activities more profitable than industrial production. Not only did the direct
transfer of resources from the agricultural sector fail to materialize, but industrial exports
also failed to reach the necessary proportions to provide enough foreign exchange for
imports of intermediate and capital goods. These major problems with the ISI process led
to a switch, in the 1980s, to export-promotion industrialization that was supposed to solve
all these problems simultaneously.
The increasing dependence of industrial production and industrial investment on
imports was a direct result of the industrialization policies and their implementation. The
ratio of the industrial production to imports of raw materials declined during the first two
plan periods, but it increased sharply during the third plan period with the value of
imported inputs doubling by the end of this period compared to the earlier period
(Table 5.11). As far as the share of imported inputs in total output, during the first two
plan periods mining, tobacco, beverages, forest products, leather, petroleum products, and
non-metal products increased. During 1968-73, this was also valid for the economy on the
whole, not just for the manufacturing sector (Korum, 1977). During 1973-77 fertilizer,
plastics, petroleum sectors also exhibited an increased ratio of imported inputs to output.
Conversely, imported input dependency in paper, agricultural machines, and consumer
durables declined. The ratio of capital (investment) goods imports to fixed capital
investment shows the extent of dependence on foreign production technologies. Parallel to
the increasing imported input dependence, imported capital goods dependence also rapidly
increased during the third plan period, especially after 1970 (Table 5.12). An important
point about dependence on imported (intermediate) inputs versus imported capital goods is
that in the case of imported input shortages capacity utilization, and therefore output,
declined temporarily. However, in the case of the lack of imported capital goods new
investments become impossible, which directly retarded the growth of the economy.
Moreover, industrial investment increasingly turned to other non-productive (commercial,
speculative) activities.
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Table 5.11
Composition of Imports, %
1950 1960 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979
Capital goods 46.0 52.1 47.1 41.4 38.9 34.6 31.5
Intermediates 33.4 38.3 47.9 54.3 58.0 62.5 66.6
Consumer goods 20.6 9.6 5.0 4.3 3.1 2.9 1.9
Source: Sonmez, 1982.
Table 5.12
Import Dependency in Industry
FYDP averages industrial prod./imported inputs imported capital goods/
fixed industrial investment
First FYDP 21.3 21.09
Second FYDP 20.2 20.24
Third FYDP 27.3 23.67
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
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Labor force
During the 1970s, the general condition of the working class also worsened. The
industrial slump of the late 1970s exacerbated the unemployment problem. Unemployment
reached 2 million in 1971, but further increased to 3.4 million (or 20% of the total labor
force) by the end of 1978 according to the OECD and 7 million according to official
Turkish sources! As the total number of workers increased, the proportion of unionized
workers also grew. In 1970 wage workers accounted for 27.3% of the total labor force,
and 44.4% of this total were industrial workers. By 1975 the size of the working class had
increased to 36% of the labor force, and in industry it had reached 14.8% of the total labor
force. Union membership in 1971 was 30% of all wage earners; in 1975 it reached 42.8%.
As a result of the high rate of unionization, money wages increased through better wage
contracts in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. However, nominal gains in money wages
were basically wiped out by runaway inflation. The annual average increase in real wages
was only 0.4% during 1971-78.
International trade
During the first three plan periods imports were in general larger than planned
levels. Furthermore, this gap between the planned and the realized levels progressively
grew larger (Table 5.13). About 95% of total imports were intermediate and capital goods.
The share of intermediates in total imports was 55-60% and the share of capital goods was
35-40%. Total imports increased, especially after the 1970 devaluation and up to 1974.
This occurred as import restrictions were eased due to increasing workers' remittances and
implementation of convertible lira deposits. During the third plan period imports reached
258% of planned levels. Although oil price increases accounted for this to a great extent,
imports besides oil also reached high levels. However, quantity increases were much less
than total expenditure increases. This situation worsened during the third plan period
(Kepenek, 1984).
Imports of intermediates and raw materials were in general much larger than
planned levels, while imports of capital goods were below target levels during the first and
the second plan periods, but above the target levels during the third plan period
(Table 5.14). However, actual investment during the third plan period was lower than
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Table 5.13
Sectoral Distribution of Imports, planned and realized levels
(million $)
193 1964 1%5 1%6 1%7 1%86
282,4 292,3 325,5 343,8 382,5 409,0
292,3 319,9 361,8 389,8 426,6 405,0
103,5 109,5 111,2 113,4 111,5
47,8 68,3 71,0 87,7 104,0 100,0
64, 75,9 80,9 77,4 74,9 65,3
135,6 111,1 114,0 88,2
17,5 14,6 13,5
10,8 14,9 20,9
62,0 102,4 155,5 126,2
Total
planned 347,7 375,2 410,0 450,0
actual 366,0 410,7 . 463,6 490,5
1%9 1910 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
441,5 450,0 466,0 484,0 587,0 570,0 1145,0 235,0 1460,0
405,0 442,5 491,3 607,4 831,9 851,9 792,6 254,4 1041,4
99,0 91,7 98,4 105,4 125,5 141,7 149,4 69,2 101,6 71,3
100,2 118,0 132,0 150,0 273,0 480,0 780,0 715,0 900,0
%,9 103,3 145,2 242,5. 443,4 600,4 502,9 595,8 585,7
72,1 65,3 96,8 87,5 110,0 161,6 162,4 125,1 66,2 83,3 65,1
18,5 23,5 31,0 33,3 32,0 42,0 56,0 40,0 50,0 95,0 150,0 140,0
23,3 20,7 26,1 34,8 42,9 40,1 35,1 41,7 79,8 105,5 110,0 125,8
88,2 84,0 104,6 133,4 95,5 62,7 104,3 159,7 111,1 73,3 89,9
10,0 540,0 575,0 600,0 640,0 690,0 900,0 1100,0 2000,0 100,0 2500,0
522,2 496,7 536,7 588,5 676,6 885,0 1 314,0 1 532,1 1 401,0 960,2 1 752,9
105,8 109,5 113,7 105,0 102,4 91,9 93,3 98,1 105,7 128,3 146,3 139,3 70,05 93,3 70,1
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
Agriculture
planned
actual
actual, %
Industry
Planned
actual
actual, %
Mining
planned
actual
actual, %
actual, %
Table 5.14
Composition of Imports, planned and actual levels
(million $)
Capital goods Intermediates Consumption goods Total
P G P/G P G P/G P G P/G P G P/G
1963 241,1 256,0 1,06 234,5 327,4 1,34 71,4 104,21 1,46 567,00 687,6 1,21
1964 274,1 197,3 0,72 261,5 295,9 1,13 76,4 44,2 0,58 627,0 537,4 0,86
1965 296,0 197,0 0,66 299,5 313,0 1,05 84,5 62,0 0,73 630,0 572,0 0,91
1966 332,5 257,1 0,77 325,0 396,3 1,22 87,4 64,9 0,74 674,9 718,3 1,06
1% 363,0 206,0 0,56 363,5 423,0 1,16 93,5 55,1 0,59 704,0 684,7 0,97
15 6,7 1113,4 0,74 1434,0 1756,2 1,18 413,2 330,4 0,80 3202,9 3200,0 0,99
1968 332,0 255,0 0,77 418,0 447,0 1,07 85,0 61,7 0;72 835,0 763,7 0,91
1969 350,0 251,0 0,72 460,0 431,0 0,93 90,0 119,2 1,32 900,0 801,2 0,89
1970 370,0 284,0 0,77 510,0 527,0 1,03 95,0 136,6 1,44 975,0 947,0 0,97
1971 385,0 340,0 0,83 555,0 720,8 1,30 100,0 110,0 1,10 1040,0 1 170,8 1,12
1972 405,0 450,0 1,11 605,0 775,0 1,28 105,0 90,0 0,86 1115,0 1 315 1,18
1642,0 150,0 0,6 2548,6 2906,8 1,14 475,0 517,5 1,09 4865,0 4998,3 1,03
1973 490,0 967,0 1,97 845,0 986,1 1,17 95,0 83,6 0,88 1 430,0 2036,7 1,42
1974 530,0 1 248,0 2,35 902,0 2 319,7 2,57 100,0 152,0 1,52 1 532,0 3 719,7 2,43
1975 575,0 1961,1 3,41 952,0 2574,3 2,70 110,0 203,2 1,85 1 637,0 4738,6. 2,89
1976 625,0 2239,3 3,58 1004,0 2732,9 2,72 120,0 156,5 1,30 1749,0 5128,6 2,93
1977 680,0 2255,1 3,32 1040,0 363,2 3,23 130,0 178,0 1,37 1850,0 5796,3 3,13
2900,A 8 670,5 2,99 473,0 11 976,2 2,53 655,A 773,5 1,18 8296,0 21 419,9 2,58
Planned, G: Actual.
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
planned levels. Given the increasing share of capital goods in total imports,i.e., the external
dependence of industrial investment had clearly become more serious. Actually, this fact
led to the crisis of the second stage of ISI by the end of the 1970s.
Besides the traditional exports (cotton, hazelnuts, tobacco, etc.), the government
introduced various export incentives before the 1970 devaluation to promote industrial
exports. However, these efforts proved to be inadequate (IBRD, 1974). The most
important of these measures was the provision of free foreign exchange, typically 20-35%
of the value of the export commitments, by the SPO . This free foreign exchange could be
applied towards imports of inputs used in the production of export commodities. Tax
rebates on exports were also established in 1963 to stimulate exports of non-traditional
manufactured goods. The scheme refunded mostproduction and sales taxes. Profits from
these exports were also exempted from the personal and the corporate income taxes. The
application of tax rebates was broadened over time to include an increasing number of
manufactured articles, e.g., food products, textiles, chemicals, non-ferrous metals,
cement, leather, and wood products. The share of the eligible exports in total exports were
3% during the first plan period. In a sharp contrast, it rose to 24% and 42% during the
second and the third plan periods, respectively. Despite all these encouragements,
industrial exports did not reach expected levels during the third plan period.
The export credit policy was also an important element of the export incentives
package. Lack of adequate data makes it difficult to analyze the extent of credit incentives.
Generally, export credits have lower maximum lending interest rates than general lending
rates. Moreover, the government also introduced interest subsidies for export credits. For
the short term export credits, for example, the general rate was 8% (in 1970, 73) but with
the interest subsidy the lending rate would be 3%. Also, during the planned period on
average 10% of medium-term bank credits extended to the private sector were used for
export purposes and were exempt from the 25% interbank transactions tax (Kepenek,
1984). Among the industrial incentives, investment tax allowances, exemptions from the
custom duties, and import taxes were the most important ones. These incentives also
included the deferred payment of customs duties and charges, and tax exemption from
building construction. The cumulative present value of all investment incentives was equal
to about 54% of total investment (fixed investment plus working capital). The approximate
range of benefits from investment incentives for the individual projects, depending on
import requirements, access to subsidized credit, etc., appears to be 30-60%.
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Over the planned period, the share of agricultural exports in total exports fell, while
that of industrial exports increased (Table 5.15); however, both were below the target
levels. The share of the industrial exports was 17.6% in 1963, 14.3% in 1967, 27.4% in
1972, and reached 33.4% in 1977. Most of industrial exports were food products,
beverages, tobacco, textiles and clothing. In 1977 the share of these sectors was 76% of
total exports, compared to only a 0.3% share of electrical appliances, machinery, and metal
products. This tendency continued throughout the planned period. Given the structure of
production, these were the only industrial exports at which Turkey could be competitive in
international markets. On the other hand, the share of agricultural exports fluctuated. It
was 79.4% in 1963, 81.7% in 1967, 68.6% in 1973, and 59.4% in 1977. The major
traditional exports of cotton, tobacco, hazelnuts, raisins, wheat, and beans continued to
face rather elastic demand in the world market. However, actual agricultural exports were
on average higher than planned levels. Exports of minerals were made up of chrome and
boron products. Despite the fact that Turkey was a leading world producer of both, they
were less than 10% of total exports. The basic problem was that these minerals were
exported raw, without being processed, and therefore, at relatively low prices. Also, the
export potential of some other minerals, especially of choromium, had not yet been
exploited.
In summary, despite generous export incentives, the total amount of export
earnings failed to meet import needs. The failure to increase industrial exports resulted
directly from ISI policies, which made the production for the domestic market far more
profitable than exports. Naturally, a significant level of industrial exports could not be
sustained without being competitive in the world market; import-substituting industries in
Turkey, given their high costs and low quality products, failed to do so. The continuous
devaluations also hurt exports, in addition to increasing the cost of domestic production
through higher import prices. In other words, problems with foreign trade directly
followed from the structure of production under the ISI strategy.
Throughout the 1970s, due to the rapid growth of imports while exports lagged far
behind, Turkey continued to register trade deficits (Table 5.16). Especially after 1974 the
trade deficit deteriorated quickly; by 1977 it had increased ten fold from 1971. In the early
1970s workers' remittances from abroad helped to offset the balance of payments deficit,
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Table 5.15
Composition and Share of Imports in GNP
Imports Exports Composition of imports Composition of exports
GNP GNP Z shares % shares
Investment Consumption Raw Agricultural Minerals Industrial
Years Z % goods goods materials products products
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1979
1979
1980
7,1
6,1
6,2
5.4
6,5
8,5
8,9
9,4
12,2
12,9
12,3
12,0
8,8
8,1
13,4
47,5
47,2
48,0
43,8
47,1
43,7
50,1
.47,5
33,6
41,4
43,7
38,9
34,6
31,5
20.6
47,5
47,9
47,2
49,4
47,9
51,3
45,2
48,4
62,4
54,3
53,3
58,0
62,5
66,6
77,2
79,5
81,7
81,6
75,1
75,2
72,6
68,6
63,2
55,6
56,6
64,0
59,4
67,4
59,4
57,4
4,8
4,0
5,3
6,5
7,3
5,9
4,0
4.3
5,8
7,5
5,6
7,2
5,4
5,9
6,6
15,7
14,3
13,1
18,4
17,5
21,5
27,4
32,5
38,6
35,9
30,4
33,4
.27,2
34,7
36,0
Source: Kepenek, 1984.
but in the mid- 1970s when the recession in Europe began thousands of workers were sent
home, and remittances were greatly reduced. The total amount of workers' remittances fell
to $982 million in 1976 (and stayed the same in 1977 and 1978) from $1.4 billion in 1974
(Table 5.17).
The Third Crisis and the Stabilization Measures of 1977-1980
After a period of high growth in the early 1970s, the world oil crisis and the
deteriorating balance of payments in the latter half of the 1970s pushed the process of ISI to
its limits. A staggering external debt, an explosive inflationary situation, and industrial
stagnation were the major elements of the crisis in the late 1970s. Due to declining
industrial investment, the increasing tendency of the profit rate to fall in industry, especially
in manufacturing, and lower capacity utilization because of the lack of imported inputs,
stagflation had replaced growth at the end of the 1970s.
Beginning in 1977, investment in the manufacturing industries declined sharply.
Aside from the conservative response of big business to Ecevit's left-of-the-centre politics,
this was also due to decreasing capital productivity in manufacturing. Between 1965 and
1975, it had decreased by almost 50%. As the fixed capital stock and the capital/labor ratio
rapidly increased (more in the public sector than in the private sector), profitability in
industy declined. In the public sector the productivity of capital (the ratio of net revenue to
fixed capital stock) increased until 1968, but declined continuously afterwards . In 1965, it
was 52.8% and increased to 68.2% in 1968, but fell to 30% in 1975. In the private sector
in 1965 it was 53.7% and increased by about 5% in 1972. However, it started to fall after
1973 and by 1975 it was a low 26.3% (Sonmez, 1980). On the whole, from 1965 to 1975
capital productivity in manufacturing dropped by about 50%.
During the 1965-1975 period, the capital intensity of the manufacturing production
had increased rapidly. The fixed capital stock increased 2.7 fold in the public sector, and
5.1 fold in the private sector (Table 5.18). Especially after 1973, a crisis of capital
overaccumulation began in the manufacturing sector. Given prevailing profit rates and low
industrial capacity utilization, manufacturing investment started to decline. The sectoral
incremental capital-labor ratios show the change in the capital intensity of manufacturing.
The economy average was 373,000 TL for 1962-67, 523,000 TL for 1968-72, but
150
Table 5.16
Turkish Foreign Trade
(million $)
Imports Exports Trade Deficit
1970 9,598.1 6,407.7 - 3,190.4
1971 16,474.4 9,090.0 - 7,384.4
1972 21,564.1 11,875.9 - 9,688.2
1973 29,263.3 18,037.4 - 11,225.9
1974 52,310.9 21,197.3 - 31,113 A
1975 67,553.6 20,075.1 -47,478.5
1976 80,753.1 30,775.5 -49,977.6
1977 103,031.0 31,338.5 -71,692.5
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1977.
Table 5.17
Workers' Remittances/Imports, %
1964 1.6
1965 12.2
1966 16.1
1967 13.6
1968 14.1
1969 17.6
1970 28.8
1971 40.3
1972 48.4
1973 56.6
1974 37.7
1975 27.6
1976 19.1
1977 16.9
1978 21.3
1979 24.3
Source: Savas, 1980.
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increased to 722,000 TL during 1973-77. This shows that the amount of investment
needed to create an additional job increased two-fold from 1962-67 to 1973-77. In other
words, during 1962-77 investment was increasingly less effective in creating employment.
Although this was true for the economy in general, the greatest increase in the capital
intensity of investment was in manufacturing (IBRD, 1980, p. 130). On the other hand the
productivity of labor (GDP/Labor force) remained low in agriculture. But, in industry,
following a stagnation in 1955-60, labor productivity increased by 5.5% per year in the
1960s despite increasing capital intensity in manufacturing. Overall, it increased by 3.8%
per year during the 1955-1970 period.
Towards the end of the 1970s capacity utilization in manufacturing also declined
considerably (Table 5.19). In addition to the declining profit rate in manufacturing, this
was due to the unavailability of necessary imported inputs. These sharp decreases in the
capacity utilization bankrupted many small and medium-sized industrial establishments, and
thus fueled the monopolization of productive capital. In 1978 the number of firms that
went bankrupt increased by 336% compared to 1977. However, the number of
establishments employing more than 10 workers, while 5110 in 1972, went up to 5565 in
1977. Among the 300 largest industrial establishments, 258 belonging to the private sector
provided employment to 55.7% of the labor force and had 72.6% of total sales in 1979
(Sonmez, 1980).
The debt crises beginning in mid-1977 led to debt renegotiations in 1978, which
later would ease the debt servicing burden. However, economic growth still required
foreign exchange. Because no more foreign lending was forthcoming, the current account
deficit declined. Moreover, both of the standard IMF stabilization programs adopted before
1980 proved to be unsuccessful. The first one was Demirel's Austerity package of August
and September 1977, and the second one was Ecevit's, which included a devaluation in
March 1978 and other standard measures in April 1978. Among the reasons for the failure
of these two was the fact that they were not complementary and were implemented slowly
and hesitantly. Inflationary expectations rose fast and led to further depreciation of the TL,
which in turn fueled inflation as much as the devaluation. Low industrial capacity
utilization and time lags involved in importing the necessary inputs combined with
continuing strong domestic demand worsened inflation. Despite depreciation of the TL,
there were no effective measures to curb domestic spending. The average rate of inflation
152
Table 5.18
Capital/Labor and Net revenue/Wage ratios in Manufacturing
1965 1969 1975
Public sector
Capital/Labor ratio 5.46 5.10 6.0
Net revenue/Wage 2.93 3.43 1.80
Private sector
Capital/Labor ratio 3.82 - 5.66
Net revenue/Wage 2.05 - 1.49
Source: Ebiri, 1975.
Table 5.19
Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing
1979 1970
Private Public Private Public
Chemicals 60.2 79.2 60 89
Petroleum products 33.3 68.5 90 91
Metals,except iron 40.0 42.5 63 76
Cement 76.0 68.0 90 88
Source: Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, 1980.
153
reached 52.6% in 1978, 63.9% in 1979, and finally 107.2% in 1980 (Table 5.20). From
1979 to 1980 the largest price increases were recorded in industrial raw materials and semi-
finished goods (115.8%) followed by food prices (100.4%).
Given the extremely serious balance of payments crisis, in 1979 a "rescue
operation" was instituted by concerned creditors, which included the international financial
agencies and over 250 private Western banks. In conjunction with yet another IMF
"austerity package", a consortium of seven foreign banks began rescheduling and
reordering Turkey's massive foreign debt, involving some $6 billion (Berberoglu, 1982).
The 1979 IMF conditions for further extension of credit to Turkey included: deceleration of
economic growth, a wage freeze, a 20-30% devaluation of the Turkish Lira, another round
of consumer price increases, and more transfers to the private sector from the state budget
(which of course was already in deficit!). Immediately following the implementation of
these measures their real effects began to be felt countrywide. In the late 1979, the rate of
inflation was 100%, the rate of GNP growth was -0.4%, about 50% of industrial capacity
was lying idle, the unemployment rate was 20%, real wages were declining, and there were
widespread shortages of even the basic commodities, heating fuel, medicines, etc.
(Berberoglu, 1982). Finally, in January 1980 another stabilization package was
introduced. As usual, the 1980 package was aided by not only the September 1980 coup,
but also large capital inflows (e.g. $1 billion from the OECD) that soon followed.
Although the OECD and the IBRD had been proposing various stabilization programs
since 1978, it was finally in 1980 that the new stabilization package introduced a thorough
transformation of the economy from ISI to export-orientation with industry being the
leading sector. The necessity of such a transformation was derived from the crisis of the
ISI, which had been followed since the mid- 1950s; its essence was to render the industrial
sector capable of earning its own foreign exchange requirements in the long run.
Chronic foreign exchange bottlenecks and unusually high inflation signalled the
exhaustion of ISI opportunities in the late 1970s. They also caused a major capital flight
from productive to speculative commercial activities, and thus further aggravated the crises.
The resumption of the accumulation of productive capital clearly required the elimination of
this imbalance. Accordingly, long-term stabilization aimed at restructuring the capital
accumulation process through the elimination of the inefficient capital units. A realistic
interest rate policy is supposed to accomplish this end. But inefficient industries were
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Table 5.20
Annual Inflation rates
Wholesale price index Istanbul Wage Earners'
General Food Industrial Cost of Living Index
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
7.1
16.8
18.7
15.1
19.5
5.2
2.9
5.6
4.3
1.2
8.1
4.8
7.6
3.2
7.2
6.7
15.9
18.0
20.5
29.9
10.1
15.6
24.1
52.6
63.9
4.4
18.4
20.5
7.3
18.8
7.3
6.6
8.7
4.3
0.2
10.1
5.4
6.6
2.0
8.1
3.2
14.2
15.2
-21.5
35.5
17.2
15.0
22.8
45.1
48.9
14.2
14.2
13.0
32.6
22.0
1.5
-3.7
3.8
2.7
4.9
4.1
9.0
5.3
5.9
12.5
18.5
22.1
19.0
21.8
-1.2
16.6
26.4
65.9
87.4
9.7
11.3
8.4
12.8
23.1
6.6
4.2
4.5
10.0
2.0
5.7
4.4
6.1
4.5
4.9
9.6
17.8
14.2
13.0
22.1
22.1
16.9
30.6
69.0
76.3
Source: Tusiad, 1980
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9.7
precisely the ones that were import-substituting. Therefore, liberalization of imports of
final goods that these industries produced, combined with a realistic exchange rate policy,
hurt them the most. Under international competition, and the increasing cost of imported
inputs, ISI became impossible. Instead, industrial production mostly for export purposes
became necessary for survival, as summed up by the prime minister Ozal as "either learn to
export, or die".
Naturally, foreign competition requires lower input prices, which translates into
lower industrial wages and lower agricultural prices and incomes. Domestic consumption
demand for industrial goods, which had made ISI possible, now needed to be curbed.
Parallel to this economic transformation, both the inter-bourgeoisie conflicts and the
conflicts between the different bourgeoisie groups and the working class intensified. In the
face of their deteriorating relative position, the working people responded by staging mass
strikes, demonstrations, and factory occupations. Given the deepening economic and
social crisis, and the intensifying workers' struggle in the late 1970s, a revolutionary
situation developed. Increased repression by the state did not bring about a solution to this
extremely alarming situation. Finally, in September 1980, several top-ranking military
commanders seized power through a coup once again as in two previous occasions, namely
in May 1960 and in March 1971. As populist democracy has outgrown its usefulness with
ISI coming to an end, a repressive and authoritarian regime became necessary to carry on
the transition to export-promotion. This "solution" to the crisis of ISI in Turkey,of course,
was not new; there are many examples from the other parts of the world, such as Latin
America and South East Asia (Collier, et al., 1979).
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STAGES OF ISI: CONCLUSIONS
This section provides a summary of major developments and policy lessons drawn
from the experience of industrialization in Turkey in the post WII period. During each
stage of ISI, national and international pressures for openness, key policies of openness
and the results of their implementation, changes in the internal and external balances of the
economy, and recurring balance of payments crisis are examined. The main conclusions
that follow from the politico-economic developments during the 1950s, the 1960s, and the
1970s are discussed in the context of Turkey's experiments in increased openness. The
results from these experiences help to better evaluate the future prospects for sustained
growth after the transition in 1980 from ISI to export-promotion industrialization (EPI).
In the post-WW II period, Turkey made several attempt at liberalization: during a
transition to a free market economy in the early 1950s, the regional economic agreements in
the 1960s, the opening to Eurodollar market in the 1970s, and another transition to a free
market economy starting in 1980. However, increased openness did not lead to sustained
growth. Instead at each attempt, increased openness meant import liberalization, increased
foreign capital inflow, and further borrowing to be able to expand Turkey's import
capacity. The benefits of the outward orientation were not long-lasting; about every ten
years a serious crisis situation developed. All liberalization experiments relied on external
resources to finance economic development. Increased openness without developing a
stong industrial base could not lead to sustained growth. The share of manufactured goods
in exports did not reach significant levels. The highly import-dependent nature of
production and investment under ISI did not allow this transformation; instead it led to an
increasing external debt. The 1980 transition to EPI was the only solution to the serious
external debt problem.
The 1950s
After being totally closed to the world economy during 1930-1946, the major
international and national developments that followed WW II led to an opening of the
Turkish economy through the adoptation of a free market economy. To take part in the
new international system that was being formed under the leadership of US, Turkey
received both military and economic aid from the US. US aid helped Turkey to increase
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her imports of European manufactures. Domestic pressures for opening were due to two
reasons. During the war, Turkey's military weakness and her lack of capacity to provide
enough wheat for the population had become painfully clear. In addition, Russian
territorial demands led to the need for military aid.
The politically dominant groups, landlords and commercialist, were worried about
the economic future of the country. Within the new international system, they also saw an
opportunity for a change towards democracy. During the war years, speculation due to
inflation and shortages of even the basic commodities had led to a large accumulation of
commercial capital. Openness would create the opportunity to transform this into
productive capital, through joint ventures with foreign capital. The role of Turkey as a
supplier of food and raw materials to Europe provided an opportunity to put large amounts
of idle land into use. However, this necessitated both agricultural mechanization and
improved infrasturcture, especially a new network of highways. Thus, the landlords and
commercialists saw openness as a great opportunity for both political and economic
advancement. Following military aid through the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan and
memberships in IMF, IBRD, GATT, and OEEC determined the way Turkey would open
up to the Western world. Statism would be discouraged, agriculture would be given
priority over industry, and foreign capital would be encouraged.
Key policies of openness
i. As a member of the IMF, a fixed exchange rate policy was adopted following a
devaluation in 1946.
ii. To encourage agricultural production and exports to Europe, Turkey started
importing tractors in 1949 through the Marshall Plan.
iii. Following the 1947 and 1951 foreign capital laws, in 1954 a more liberal law
lifted virtually all limitations on foreign capital. In 1954, the petroleum law and the law for
the encouragement of tourism both provided generous incentives for foreign capital.
Commercial banks would provide the private sector with external long-term credit that was
guaranteed by the Central Bank. The Industrial Development Bank (1950) was also set up
to provide project credit to the private sector at low interest rates.
iv. In 1950 imports were liberalized by 60-65%.
v. In 1953 a law establishing of free trade zones was put into effect.
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vi. To limit statism and to encourage private initiative in industry, many state
factories were put on sale at reasonable prices.
The fundamental element of this program of openness was foreign capital. Direct
investment, long- and short-term commercial credit, and official aid were three ways of
opening to foreign capital.
Results of implementation
i. Some policies were canceled soon after going into effect. Import liberalization,
for example, lasted until mid-1953. The trade deficit increased nearly 10 fold between
1950 and 1952. Consumption goods (luxury) imports reached 25% of total imports.
Foreign exchange reserves that were accumulated during the war melted. In 1954, as the
Korean war ended, the external terms of trade turned against Turkey. Agricultural
production had reached its limits. The rate of inflation also increased. Given the fixed
exchange rate regime and 20% (yearly) inflation during 1955-57, the stocks of export
goods piled up. Following the 1958 devaluation, however, exports did not increase;
because the world price of Turkey's export goods (traditional agricultural commodities) fell
sharply during 1959-61. In contrast, imports increased due to external borrowing
following devaluation. As a result, the trade deficit worsened.
Policy lesson: Given an economic structure where even a large devaluation could not
increase exports, when the world conjuncture changed Turkey could not continue the
implementation of policies of openness and import liberalization.
ii. Specialization in agriculture failed. No IBRD credit was made available until
1966 due to political reasons. Instead, industrialization became more profitable. After
1954, imports declined and the internal terms of trade turned in favor of industry.
Population increase, urbanization, opening of agriculture to domestic market, in addition to
domestic credit expansion and external borrowing, joint ventures with foreign capital,
technology transfer through licence and know-how agreements all made industry attractive
for private investment.
iii. The sale of SEEs to encourage the private sector to create a free market
economy failed. The economic role of the state did not diminish. In contrast, as a result of
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the sale of SEEs, it became clear that the public sector could create positive externalities for
the private sector in the form of sales of SEE commodities at low prices, transfer of trained
labor, and sales credit provision. In addition to investment in infrastructure, public
industrial investment through SEEs also increased. Despite the expansion of commercial
credit, private investment failed to increase. Instead of a free market economy, ad hoc state
intervention in the economy, e.g., daily interference in the market, changing decisions,
fixing profit rates, foreign exchange provision without planning, etc. became
commonplace. This experience prepared the way for economic planning in 1960.
iv. Foreign capital use was the only element of the program that worked. Turkey
succeeded in increasing imports through official aid, import credits, commercial credit, and
foreign capital inflow. In other words, Turkey could open up to international economy
through increased imports and technology due to foreign capital inflow. During 1950-60,
Turkey received 1 billion dollar program credit, 600 million import credit, 210 million
commercial credit, and only 72 million project credit.(GNP was $3.12b in 1950 and
$7.44b in 1960). However, continuous trade deficits were registered after 1947. The
volume of imports were determined by available external credit. Because of the permission
given to commercial banks to import credit, during 1953-58 imports increased greatly. As
the central bank was responsible for paying this debt with foreign exchange, but it could
not control the use of these credits. As a result, imports unrelated to growth took place
through this channel and the short term debt of the Central Bank reached unexpectedly high
levels.
Policy lesson: As a result of the application of guaranteed imports credits without
government control, Turkey finally failed to pay its external (commercial) debt.
v. Direct foreign investment was insignificant. At 77 million dollars, it was less
than 5% of total external credit during 1950-59. But, through joint ventures foreign capital
helped the private sector, at least partially, with technology, capital, and various aspects of
business administration. License and know-how agreements also provided advantages in
technology, use of trademarks, representation of foreign firms, etc.
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Increasing internal and external imbalances
From 1950 to 1953 economy grew 11.5% on average, and inflation was low. But
by 1954 many problems appeared: agricultural production fell leading to a 3% fall in GNP,
the public deficit and savings gap both increased. Exports revenues fell due to declining
production and worsening terms of trade. Inflationary financing of public investment led to
a large budget deficit, while production fell (Table A.1). As a result annual price increases
doubled. At the same time, a large increase took place in annual debt payments
(principal+interest) reaching nearly 27% of export revenues. Import liberalization
increased imports 2 fold, and the trade deficit 9 fold. More external borrowing followed;
the debt burden reached 40% in 1955. The continuous public deficit led to higher inflation
(20%) No new foreign credit was available, so imports fell. Shortages fueled inflation
further. Smuggling increased and a strong underground economy appeared.
Policy lesson: After import liberalization ended, increasing import financing through short-
term credits.resulted in the external debt burden reaching very high proportions.
The 1958 Foreign Exchange Crisis and the Stabilization Program
The increasing debt burden, import liberalization and the temporary increase in
agricultural exports, in addition to the worsening terms of trade (1953=100, 1951=109.
1960=80), led to a balance of payments crisis. Without debt payments no new credit was
forthcoming. Finally, the 1958 Stabilization program followed. There were various
inflation conrols in this program. All price controls were lifted, but central bank and
commercial bank credits were limited. The budget deficit will be eliminated as SEE prices
were increased. However, up to 1961 prices continued to increase and the budget deficit
averaged 3% of GNP. Folowing devaluation, exports did not increase, but due to
increased credit inflow, imports increased. The result was an increased trade deficit.
Credit limits led to a contraction of the economy with an average GNP growth rate of
3.5%. Also many banks went bankrupt during the recession.
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Table A.1
Basic Economic Indicators, 1950-1961, %
GNP Annual Investment/ Savings/ Savings Gap/ Public Deficit/ Debt payments/
growth inflation GNP GNP GNP GNP Exports
rate rate
1950 9.4 9.6 8.3 -1.3 2.1 11.4
1951 12.8 3.0 10.3 8.1 -2.2 -0.9 8.9
1952 12.0 6.8 12.8 9.0 -3.8 -0.7 9.3
1953 11.2 6.3 12.4 9.7 -2.7 -2.0 9.6
1954 -2.9 12.0 14.7 11.3 -3.4 -2.5 27.1
1955 7.9 9.9 14.3 11.9 -2.4 -3.3 40.5
1956 3.2 13.2 13.4 12.5 -0.9 -4.0 30.4
1957 7.8 19.6 13.2 12.4 -0.8 -2.6 28.1
1958 4.5 11.8 14.0 13.0 -1.0 -1.2 19.1
1959 4.0 18.8 15.6 12.6 -3.0 -2.6 23.2
1960 3.4 3.9 15.9 13.4 -2.5 -3.7 29.3
1961 2.0 3.0 15.0 11.8 -3.2 32.9
Source: SPO, Third Five Year Development Plan, 1972.
The 1960s
This is the beginning of the planned ISI period based on five year development
plans supported by OECD credits. Given high import protection, openness was to be
accomplished over a long period through regional agreements. The 1963 EEC and the
1964 RCD agreements were followed by the 1969 Islamic Conference agreement.
Accordingly, the 15-year perspective plan (1963-77) aimed at increasing investment in
manufacturing. By the end this period, Turkey would achieve balance of payments
equilibrium and start exporting labor intensive manufactured goods that are determined
according to her compartative advantage. To this end, it was important to encourage
foreign capital. However, as imports increased faster than traditional exports, by the end
of the 1960s foreign exchange bottlenecks appeared. Industrial growth rate fell to 1.5% by
1970. Although workers' remittances help greatly towards alleviating the current account
deficit, further borrowing became necessary. As a result external debt reached serious
proportions. Finally, the foreign exchange crisis led to the 1970 Stabilization Measures.
Opening through regional agreements was not successful in trade, except with EEC
which had a 47% stable export share over 1950-80. The trade relations with RCD and
Islamic Conference gained importance later in the 1980s. With respect to capital
movements, these regional agreements did not provide much. But as far as the labor
movements are concerned, the EEC was very important starting in the 1960s and up to the
1980s when return migration started. The Middle Eastern countries also gained importance
in the late 1970s.
The 1970s
Following the 1970 devaluation, 1971-73 was a period of economic expansion.
GNP growth picked up, inflation was around 15-20%, and as external terms of trade
improved exports almost doubled. Although imports also doubled, remittances and exports
of manufactured goods quadrupled. In 1973, unexpectedly the current account registered a
surplus and net foreign exchange reserves improved. While the first oil crisis created a
world crisis, Turkey was enjoying a period of fast growth. However, an economic
embargo from the West after the Cyprus invasion added to inflationary pressures.
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Internal and external pressures for opening
Following the oil price increases, the international banking system was flooded
with petro-dollars. These low interest funds were made available to primary exporters like
Turkey, which were the hardest hit by the crisis. These funds were outside the control of
IMF and were neccesary to keep world trade going. Also, the pressure to increase imports
reached a high level in Turkey, especially the imports of oil and petroleum products. The
motor vehicles subsector grew rapidly during 1970-73 and energy consumption also grew
by 12%. Thus, the restriction of oil consumption would create idle capacity in motor
vehicles and energy production would decline. So while the world was decreasing oil
consumption, Turkey, through state price subsidies, actually increased her oil consumption
in 1972-77.
Although the national savings rate was not increasing due to negative real interest
rates and high inflation, low interest rates on both domestic and external credits encouraged
investment. This fostered import demand and GNP also increased rapidly. However,
despite these pressures to increase imports of oil, capital goods, and intermediates, exports
did not improve. Terms of trade turned against Turkey. Increasing protectionism in the
West and the current exchange rate policy discouraged exports. Also, during 1972-77
import payments skyrocketed due to price increases, not to real increase: 80 % of the
increase was due to price increases.
Policy lesson: Turkey's heavy borrowing in the booming Euromarket, during a world
crisis, led to a rapidly increasing debt and ultimately to default.
Exchange rate policies
In 1970 the TL was devalued by 68% for imports and multiple exchange rates were
applied for exports. During 1971-73, the world speculative boom and the 1970
devaluation improved Turkey's external terms of trade. In addition, increasing remittances
led to a current account surplus in 1973. After the 1974 oil crisis and resulting stagflation,
the foreign exchange regime was changed so as to make use of the petro-dollars . But the
large inflow of these funds fueled inflation and also led to further overvaluation of TL.
Although a flexible exchange regime was not in effect, the exchange rate with respect to the
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dollar changed often: up to 1975 TL gained, but later lost. The rapidly increasing external
credits did not allow large nominal exchange rate adjustments; the real effective value of TL
increased 20% (in imports) in 1973-77. In 1970, the import liberalization ratio also
increased, from 27.7% in 1970 to 62% in 1974. Import guarantees declined by 50%,
stamp tax by 60%, but the ratio of import taxes to import payments was still 41%; it
declined to 27% in 1975.
Policy lesson: The overvaluation of TL against the real effective exchange rate for imports
was due to both rather small nominal exchange rate adjustments and declining tariffs. As a
result imports were made easier.
Despite increasing imports, there was no attempt to increase exports; actually
nomimal exchange rate changes discourged them. The real increase in exports was only
10% of the real increase in imports during 1973-77! The foreign expenditures increased
not only due to imports, but to tourism as well. The overvalued exchange rate made
tourism expenditures larger, but tourism revenues did not increase, because Turkey became
expensive for tourists. Workers' remittances were important, but after 1974 they also
declined due to the discouraging effects of the exchange regime and the recession in the
West.
Liberalizing the foreign exchange regime and increasing debt
The external debt of Turkey increased fast due to higher oil and import prices.
Increasing import demand, but lack of efforts to expand exports led to higher debt. To
make external borrowing easier, there were several changes in the foreign exchange regime:
i. CIDLs: High real exchange rate, exchange rate guarantee by the state treasury
encouraged imports through the CTDLs. But, when credit was given in TL terms, CTDLs
led to a large credit expansion, worsening inflation. Within three years (1975-77), this
created a big payments problem.
ii. Certain large banks were given permission to hold foreign exchange accounts, which
were to be used for financing imports. This type of credit became commonly used after
1975 for financing of imports faster and easier. As the payments were made immediately
after the goods were received, it proved to be highly profitable for these banks.
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Growth and increasing internal and external imbalances:
In the middle of a world crisis, Turkey grew fast through external borrowing.
Despite increasing investment, savings stagnated; the internal resource gap increased. In
1977 it reached a record high 7% of GNP from 2.4% in 1974. Credit expansion due to
CTDLs and the increasing government deficit upset the monetary balance. The trade deficit
increased while remittances declined. The savings and foreign exchange gaps increased
(Table A.2). In 1977, economic decline started; shortages appeared. Agricultural
production also stagnated, and manufacturing production declined. Total fixed investment
declined 50%. Public investment continued to grow while private investment grew by -
7%. By 1977 the trade deficit was more than twice the export earnings. Unofficial exports
(smuggling) were more than official exports, and fictitious imports reached 1/3 of official
imports ! Foreign exchange reserves declined due to increase in price of imports and of oil.
Exports stagnated as agricultural production declined; as a result agricultural import also
had to be increased
Policy lesson: Growth financed through the increasing short-term debt lasted only 3-4
years, but the effects of the debt burden continued to be felt during the 1980s.
The 1978 Foreign Exchange Crisis and the Stabilization Program
In 1977 Turkey could not pay CTDL debt payments, which were 60% of the
outstanding debt. Two kinds of short term debt, CTDLs and import credit through
commercial banks were responsible for this situation. In 1978 imports plus debt repayment
was three times larger than export revenues and remittances. During 1975-77, the balance
of payments deficit was financed by 7% IMF credit, 16% FE reserves, and 77% short-term
credit. Compared to 1975, in 1977 the structure of debt suddenly changed: the share of
short term credits was 58% and long term was 42%, and 74% of short term debt was
private commercial debt. These two developments led to insovency in 1977, and finally to
an IMF program in 1978.
Until the 1979 agreement, no fresh credit was forthcoming. Stagflation, shortages,
smuggling also led to political crisis. After devaluation in 1979, exports did not increase,
but imports were limited and the remittances increased. So the current account deficit
declined. However, GNP growth was negative and inflation was 60%. An important
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development was that almost half the private short term debt was transformed into long
term public debt. 1979 was the begining of the second oil crisis. As terms of trade again
turned against Turkey and real interest rates increased, BP crisis deepened. The 1980
program started under these difficult external and internal circumstances (Tables A.3).
Results from the Experiments in Openness
(1) Increased openness gained importance as a result of both internal and external
pressures. All experiments in openness were during times of significant changes in the
world conjecture and the external terms of trade.
In the post-WW II period, the first crisis developed following the Korean War, and
the foreign exchange crisis of 1958 coincided with the 1957-8 crisis in the Western world.
The second crisis again coincided with a short recession in the West in 1970. The first
world oil crisis was during 1973-75. Turkey, however, through drawing on her foreign
exchange reserves and greatly increasing her external borrowing, managed to postpone the
recession until 1977-78, but the third foreign exchange crisis hit in 1978. The 1980
transition coincided with the second oil crisis in 1979-80.
(2) Increased openness through exports did not lead to sustained growth. As a primary
exporter, Turkey was subject to fluctuations in the price of primaries in world market.
Similar to the open economy period during 1923-29, in the 1950s, the 1960s, and
the 1970s (although manufactured exports reached 30% of exports in the early 1970s)
Turkey was basically a primary exporter. Like other primary exporters, except oil
exporting countries, fluctuations in the world price of primary commodities upset both the
internal and external balances of the economy and led to lower growth. Unlike the
countries with higher per capita GNP that are exporters of manufactured goods (e.g.,
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong) increased exports did not lead to higher growth
rates in the primary exporters (e.g., Turkey, Chile, Argentina).
(3) Without a strong industrial base, openness could not lead to increased exports of
manufactured goods. Given the emphasis on contiued ISI, the composition of exports did
not change significantly.
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Table A.2
Basic Economic Indicators, 1973-1979
GNP Annual Investment/ Savings/ Savings Gap/ Exports/ Imports/
growth inflation GNP GNP GNP GNP GNP
rate rate
1973 4.4 20.5 18.1 21.9 1.2 6.1 9.9
1974 8.5 29.9 19.8 17.4 -2.4 5.2 12.8
1975 8.9 10.1 22.9 17.8 -5.1 3.9 13.3
1976 8.5 15.6 23.3 17.6 -5.7 4.7 12.6
1977 4.4 24.1 25.2 18.2 -7.0 3.6 12.2
1978 2.9 52.6 22.7 20.0 -2.7 4.4 8.9
1979 -0.3 69.9 22.0 20.0 -2.0 3.7 8.7
Source: Tusiad, 1981.
Table A.3
Basic Economic Indicators, 1974-1983
Savings Investment// Savings Gap/ Exports/ CA
GNP GNP GNP Imports Deficit
1974-1977 17.4 22.4 -5.0 34.2 -2071.3
1978 19.8 22.5 -2.7 48.8 -1418
1979 19.7 21.7 -2.0 44.6 -1239
1980 20.8 26.0 -5.2 36.8 -3210
1981 20.5 24.0 -3.5 52.6 -2092
1982 18.2 20.3 -2.2 65.0 -1166
1983 17.1 19.3 -2.2 62.0 -2234
Source: Tusiad, 1984.
All experiments in openness included a transition to a free market economy, import
liberalization, and free capital movements to a certain extent. Export expansion, however,
was left in the background. This was because, during a foreign exchange crisis when
export expansion became extremely urgent, lower primary prices made this impossible and
devaluations did not help much to increase exports. The major mistake was to think that
without a strong industrial base, openness through a free market economy could lead to
sustained growth. In Turkey, during the late 1950s and the 1960s ISI continued. In the
1970s ISI persisted due to domestic demand expansion, but manufactured exports did not
happen. Although in the early 1970s manufactured exports increased greatly, after 1974
they started to decline. Only with the transition to export-promotion in 1980 could Turkey
increase her manufactured exports While agricultural exports increased in the 1980s, due
to the declining world prices, export revenues from this source actually fell.
(4) The external debt burden continued to increase, especially due to large amounts of
short-term borrowing.
In all experiments in openness, one of the most important reasons for insolvency
was rapidly increasing short-term debt. When the world conjuncture changed and the
internal and external imbalances increased, the necessary adjustment was provided by short
term borrowing for import financing. This application led to foreign exchange crisis
because increased short term borrowing leads to more borrowing in such circumstances.
Short term credits, on the one hand increase demand for imports through credit expansion,
on the other by overvaluation discourage exports and encourage imports. Once the
economy is conditioned on a certain level of imports, to be able to continue industrial
production, the following year the same net capital inflow becomes necessary. But, the
same net imports require more capital inflow, because of the debt service for the previous
year. Within a few years, a foreign exchange crisis follows increased debt through short
term credit. Therefore, encouragement of import financing by short term credit (for
example, through exchange rate guarantees) does not fit in with rational debt management.
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Into the 1980s
Increased openness
At the end of the 1970s, the share of imports in GNP had reached high levels while
the share of exports in GNP remained low (Table A.4). In 1977 the export ratio was
4.1%, while the import ratio was 12.4%. There were four main reasons for this
development. First, due to high capital inflow (capital inflow/GNP was 7.6% in 1977),
the overvaluation of TL led to an exaggerated GNP value; therefore, a low export/GNP
ratio resulted. Second, fictitious exports (which were due to import restrictions and foreign
exchange controls), were estimated to be close to official exports. The large export
increases in the 1980s stem from the fact that these fictitious exports were added to the
official exports. Third, the high share of workers' remittances in total export revenues
greatly encouraged imports . Finally, the most important reason for higher import share
was easy borrowing in the 1970s. The trade deficit was mostly financed by credit inflow.
That is, Turkey's openness took the form of capital inflow-increased imports. After 1980,
however, net capital inflow to developing countries was restricted. This determined the
new form of openness: further borrowing would depend on an increasing export/import
ratio. Accordingly, Turkey managed to increase this ratio to 14% in 1985-86. (We should
also keep in mind that this time fictitious exports made export statistics look artificially
high)
The quantitative restictions on trade and foreign exchange control of the 1970s were
replaced by price incentives in the 1980s. This defines increased openness of the economy
in the 1980s. Turkey was considered inward-looking in 1963-75, but moderately open
after 1975 with an increased openness after 1980. The most important difference compared
to other middle-income countries (MICs) was the growth rate of exports during the 1980s,
at which Turkey follows the highly successful Korea.
Change in the composition of exports
Although Turkey was a primary exporter up to the late 1970s, the share of
manufactured imports increased significantly in the 1980s (Tables A.5 and A.6). In 1960
97% of total export revenues still came from exports of primaries while manufuctured
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Table A.4
Exports/Imports, %
Import/GDP Exports/GDP Exports/Imports
1965-69 6.4 4.6 71.8
1970-74 9.5 5.1 53.7
1975-79 11.1 4.0 36.0
1980 14.2 5.1 35.9
1981-82 16.2 9.5 58.6
1983-84 20.3 12.3 60.6
1985-86 20.5 14.0 68.3
Source: Tusiad, 1987.
Table A.5
Sectoral Distribution of Exports, %
1961-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-83 1984-86
Agriculture 76.3 63.3 61.5 39.1 23.8
Mining 4.8 5.2 6.1 3.5 3.3
Industry 18.9 31.5 32.4 57.4 72.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Tusiad, 1987.
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goods contributed only 3%. In 1973 at the height of the export boom, the share of
manufactured exports increased to 32%. In 1985 the share of manufactures reached 54%,
which was at the same level as that in the upper middle-income developing countries.
Within manufactured exports, textiles and clothing had a very high share, 32%, in 1985,
which was similar to Korea. However, the share of machinery and transport vehicles was
only 3-5% of total exports
Parallel to the change from the primaries to manufactured exports, there was a
change in the export markets. Up to 1980 Turkey's exports were directed to the
industrialized western countries. In the 1980s, however, the share of industrialized
countries declined, while the share of the oil exporters and other newly developing
countries increased. In 1985 almost half the exports were directed to these countries
(Table A.7). Most labor intensive manufactured goods (textiles, clothing, carpet-kilim) are
exported to the industrialized countries, but relatively more capital intensive goods
(medicine, chemical products, electric and non-electric machinery, transport vehicles) to the
oil exporters and other developing countries in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Turkey's
manufactured imports increased as fast as the upper middle-income countries (e.g., India,
Korea, Brazil, Yugoslavia) and her export market shifted to the other developing countries
in a more significant way than the lower middle-income countries. In these two aspects of
trade, Turkey has reached higher levels than the rest of the middle-income countries.
External debt burden
In the 1970s, while the export/GNP ratio remained low, imports increased due to
external borrowing. As a result, total external debt increased (Tables A.8). Especially
from 1970 to 1985 the debt burden increased fast, and the debt/GNP (35.4%) and debt
service/export ratios (32.1%) reached similar values to those of the five large debtor
countries, namely Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile. The only difference with
them was that Turkey could continue borrowing because of the relatively larger increase in
her exports and the regular debt repayments she could make. In the 1980s, the annual
growth rates of GNP and of manufacturing reached higher levels than the average for the
MICs. In 1985 the share of industry in GNP was 35%, and that of manufacturing was
25%. The share of exports also increased to 19%. But despite a lower investment ratio,
the savings gap was 4%, because savings failed to increase (Tables A.9 and A 10). Major
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Table A.6
Share of Manufactured Exports in Total Exports, %
1979 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987
Traditional Exports
Food, processed 6.7 7.2 11.3 8.1 6.9 9.9
Leather 1.9 1.7 5.6 6.1 4.6 7.-
Textiles, clothing 16.7 14.6 26.3 22.5 24.8 27.0
Iron and steel 1.4 1.2 8.1 12.2 10.8 8.4
26.7 24.7 51.3 48.9 49.1 52.3
Others 1.4 2.8 20.8 26.4 22.5 27.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Tusi-ad, 1988.
Table A.7
Regional Distribution of Exports, %
1950-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-83 1984-1986
EEC 47.9 44.4 45.0 47.2 32.0 39.3
US 18.5 13.4 9.8 6.3 4.4 6.3
Arap and
RCD 33.6 6.8 13.2 15.0 42.8 38.3
Others 35.4 32.0 31.5 20.8 16.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Tusiad, 1987.
Table A.8
External Debt
Total debt Debt/GNP Debt Service Short-term /
(million $) Annual Export GNP Total debt
payment ratio ratio
1982 17619 33.3 2418 26.4 4.6 10 85
1983 18385 36.7 2507 29.5 5.0 12.4 80.1
1984 21258 43.4 2834 27.0 5.8 15.0 75.7
1985 25349 48.2 3966 32.3 7.4 18.8 76.1
1986 31228 54.3 4773 41.5 8.1 22.1 67.4
1987 39100 59.1 5500 42.5 - 23.5 64.4
Source: Tusiad, 1989.
Table A.9
Basic Economic Indicators
Savings/ Investment/ Savings Gap/ Budget Deficit Tax Revenue Internal debt
GNP GNP GNP GNP GNP GNP
1984-87 19.3 21.4 -2.1 3.7 14.5 2.6
annual average
1980-83 19.2 22.4 -3.3 2.2 16.7 1.2
Source: Tusiad, 1980-88.
Table A.10
Economic Indicators, growth rates
GNP Industry Exports Inflation CA deficit Unemployment
1984 5.9 9.3 24.6 50.3 -27.5 39.3
1985 5.1 6.3 11.7 43.2 -28.5 23.5
1986 8.0 9.0 -6.3 29.6 50.0 11.8
1987 6.8 8.8 40.0 48.9 -47.0 7.5
Source: Tusiad, 1989.
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social indicators are also similar to those in the 1970s: inadequate education, large urban
population not engaged in industry, growing marginal sector, and high share of agriculture
in active population continues. The improving economic indicators but declining rate of per
capita income growth and worsening social indicators together define the level of
development Turkey has achieved so far.
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PART B. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH ISI
VI. STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND GROWTH IN MANUFACTURING
Since manufacturing had the dominant share in the industrial sector (about 90%),
we will focus on manufacturing. The first section of this chapter looks at the general
structure of manufacturing. After reviewing manufacturing growth at the sectoral level, the
scale of manufacturing firms, the public and the private manufacturing sectors, and foreign
capital in manufacturing are examined. Also, the structure of production, based on
intersectoral linkages and the distribution of value added, and the final demand components
are both analyzed to determine the "key" sectors in Turkish manufacturing.
The second section of the chapter examines the relationship between structural
change and growth based on static and dynamic 1-0 and decomposition analyses.
Technological change and also changes in the composition of output as a function of
domestic demand, technology, and trade factors (ISI and export expansion) are examined at
the subsectoral level. The section on technological chaNge looks at the requirements of
intermediate inputs, primary inputs (labor, capital), and imported inputs and also at the
distribution of value added. Dynamic I-0 analysis compares the balanceD growth
requirements of consumption, intermediate, and capital goods production. The production
of intermediates and capital goods both fell significantly short of balanced growth
requirements. In addition, a comparison of production levels based on domestic inputs
only, as opposed to total (domestic+imported) inputs, points to the low levels of output. It
sheds light on the extent of import dependency in manufacturing. The production of both
the intermediates and capital goods are highly import dependent. The distribution of
manufacturing value added indicates that as ISI progressed the share of wage payments
increased, although the share of wage payments in manufacturing is much lower than that
of non-wage payments. Using decomposition analysis, changes in output composition are
examined. Domestic demand changes are found to be the most important source of
manufacturing growth.
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The third section deals with the measurement of ISI. The major results from
several alternative methods of measuring ISI, i.e., import/output ratios, sectoral growth
functions and intersectoral approach, are reviewed. The final section, by combining the
findings of the previous sections, explores the relationship between structural change and
industrialization via ISI and export expansion. This includes the role of the public and
private sectors, intersectoral relations, distributions of value added and investment, and
changes in final demand. Finally, Part B ends with a summary of the major characteristics
of Turkish ISI.
1. STRUCTURE OF MANUFACIURING
a. Manufacturing growth
During the planned period - the post-1963 period- manufacturing output grew faster
than during the 1950-62 period. The average manufacturing growth rate was 10.2%
during 1963-76, whereas it was 8.5% during 1950-62. Also, the share of manufacturing
output in GNP increased from 11.4% in 1950 to 14.7% in 1962, whereas between 1963
and 1976 it increased from 14.7% to 22.4% (Table 6.1). In contrast, the share of the
agricultural sector declined substantially -- from 40.8% in 1950 to 34.5% in 1962, and
22.8% in 1976. The service sector always had the highest GNP share -- 43.2% in 1950
and 53% in 1976. In 1980 the relative shares of industry, agriculture and services were
21.8%, 24.1%, and 54%, respectively (Turkiye Ekonomisi, 1983).
In general, when the manufacturing output grew fast, manufacturing prices
increased slowly. In 1950-55 and 1963-1968 price stability prevailed, but in 1956-59 and
1970-76 prices increased relatively faster. During the first five year plan period (1963-67)
a yearly average growth rate of 11.6% was accomplished with only 3.6% inflation, during
the second plan (1968-72) there was 8.9% growth with 9% inflation. During the third plan
(1973-77), 10% growth with 6.2% inflation. Thus, the first plan period was the most
successful in developing of manufacturing. The internal terms of trade also stayed in favor
of manufacturing from 1950 to 1967 (with the exception of 1957), but it turned against it
starting in 1969. This reversal was largely due to changing public sector pricing policies
and agricultural support price policies.
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Table 6.1
Manufacturing Industry
Year a b c d e f
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
10.48
10.49
11.01
12.34
12.74
13.38
13.46
13.90
13.82
13.31
14.94
14.73
15.35
16.01
17.06
17.62
18.60
19.49
20.50
19.71
19.59
20.45
22.09
21.80
21.75
22.35
3.0
10.6
17.5
9.1
12.5
9.7
9.1
8.5
2.7
-0.8
14.0
3.8
14.3
8.9
9.5
15.2
10.3
12.1
11.6
1.0
8.7
11.0
13.0
7.2
8.8
11.0
.3158
.3218
.3251
.3524
.3874
.4273
.4945
.5835
.7322
.7438
.7338
.8298
.8529
.8687
.9035
.9389
.9874
1.000
1.028
1.119
1.329
1.506
1.709
2.262
2.527
2.755
6.8
1.9
1.0
8.4
9.9
10.3
15.7
18.0
25.5
1.6
-1.3
13.1
2.8
1.9
4.0
3.9
5.2
1.3
2.8
8.7
18.7
13.3
13.5
32.4
11.7
9.0
1.143
1.1115
1.040
1.113
1.103
1.101
.955
1.037
1.168
1.120
1.054
1.055
1.031
1.047
1.065
1.013
1.018
1.000
.968
.935
.973
.919
.762
.772
.742
.702
1.197
1.180
1.173
1.176
1.169
1.150
1.176
1.192
1.191
1.164
1.083
1.147
1.110
1.087
1.081
1.064
1.036
1.000
.976
.953
.954
.930
.889
.941
.900
.947
a Share of manufacturing in GNP, in 1968 prices
b Growth rate of manufacturing output, annual
c Manufacturing price deflator
d Growth rate of manufacturing price deflator, annual
e Terms of trade betweeen manufacturing and
agriculture
f Terms trade between manufacturing and all other
sectors
Source: Korum (1977)
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Manufacturing growth at the subsectoral level
Manufacturing subsectors are defined as follows by the SPO:
Consumption goods: food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing;
Intermediate goods: wood products, furniture, paper, printing, publishing, leather, plastic
and rubber, petroleum products, chemicals, non-metallic minerals,
iron and steel;
Investment goods: metal products, machinery, electrical machinery, electronics, transport
equipment (Third five year development plan, 1972).
The relative importance of the manufacturing subsectors varied over time
(Table 6.2). During the planned period there has been an important shift towards the
intermediate and investment goods sectors. In 1973, although investment goods had the
largest increase in their share, the intermediates had the largest share (44.6%) in value
added for the first time. The number of firms in the consumption goods sector increased in
the 1960s compared to the 1950s, but in the 1970s there was a decline. However, in all
other aspects of manufacturing development, i.e., employment, output, value added, and
wage payments, the consumption goods sector continuously declined. In contrast, the
intermediate goods sector increased in all areas, except in the number of firms. The
number of firms declined in the 1960s compared to the 1950s, but in the 1970s increased
again. The investment goods sector showed a consistent increase in all aspects of the
manufacturing development.
The most interesting changes took place with respect to manufacturing output and
value added. Parallel to the stages of ISI, consumer goods declined throughout while
intermediate goods and investment goods continued to increase, although more
significantly in the 1960s than in the 1970s. The share of consumer goods in total output
declined by about 25% from 1950 to the 1960s and less (20%) from the 1960s to the 1970s
due to the export boom of the early 1970s. In sharp contrast, the share of intermediates
increased by 60% from 1950 to the 1960s and 30% from the 1960s to the 1970s. The
share of investment goods also increased 130% and 20%, respectively. With respect to
manufacturing value added, the share of consumption goods declined by 30% from the
1960s to 1973. However, the share of intermediates increased by 97% from 1950 to the
1960s, and by 30% to 1973 and the share of investment goods increased by 55% and 36%,
respectively.
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Table 6.2
Relative shares of manufacturing subsectors (percent)
1950 1963 1967 1973
Number of C 52.7 57.7 52.4 45.2
firms I 37.6 26.3 27.6 29.7
K 9.7 16.0 20.0 25.1
Employment C 65.7 59.8 55.5 46.7
I 20.9 24.0 25.5 29.0
K 13.4 16.2 19.0 24.3
Output C 76.0 59.4. 54.7 42.4
I 18.0 27.3 30.5 36.6
K 6.0 13.3 14.8 21.0
Value C 72.8 51.6 49.0 36.3
added I 18.6 33.1 37.7 44.6
K 8.6 15.3 13.3 19.1
Wage C 57.5 50.5 46.9 39.0
payments I 23.7 30.4 31.3 33.6
C: Consumption goods I: Intermediate goods K: Capital goods
Source: Korum, U. (1975)
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Scale of manufacturing firms
Industrial establishments with more than 10 workers are defined as "large"
manufacturing. Information about the size of manufacturing firms is limited by the
industrial censuses of 1950, 1963, and 1970. The "small" establishments concentrated in
food, textiles, leather, wood products, metal products and transport vehicles. Almost all of
them were privately owned and generally were family-type establishments. Over time
"small" manufacturing seems to have lost importance, except in employment (Table 6.3).
Although the share of small manufacturing in output, value added, and wage payments
declined by more than 50% by 1970 compared to the 1960s, a significant proportion (39%)
of manufacturing employment was still provided by small establishments. Small
manufacturing was important in the 1950s in the production of consumer non-durables and
in the 1960s in the production of parts for consumer durables. But, in the 1970s with the
changing emphasis towards intermediates and investment goods, small manufacturing lost
its importance. For example, its value added share was 60% lower by 1970.
Public and private manufacturing sectors
In the 1950s, the mixed nature of manufacturing was dominated by the public
sector as the encouragement of the private sector continued. Most of the existing
manufacturing firms were small and those in the capital goods sector were newly
established. The output share of the public sector in consumption goods, intermediates and
investment goods was 52.1%, 36.3%, and 73.6%, respectively (Table 6.4). The public
sector provided more than half of manufacturing output and employment in tobacco,
clothing, wood products, paper, petroleum products, iron-steel, metal products,
machinery, and transport vehicles (Korum, 1977). During the first five year plan period
(1963-67) the importance of the public sector in manufacturing increased. While its share
in the intermediate goods sector increased, in the investment goods sector, which was
mostly geared towards the production of durable consumer goods, the private sector
gradually took over. The share of the public sector decreased significantly in metal
products, machinery, transport vehicles, and wood products. During the second five year
plan (1968-72), the overall share of the public sector declined further. It provided more
than half the output only in beverages, tobacco, paper, petroleum products, and iron-steel.
This trend also continued during the third five year plan (1973-77). The changing role of
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Table 6.3
Relative importance of small manufacturing, %
1950 1963 1970
Employment 55.9 52.5 39.0
Output 27.6 24.7 11.8
Value added 26.4 20.0 7.9
Wages & Salaries 21.5 14.1 5.9
Source: Korum, U. (1975)
Table 6.4
Share of public sector in manufacturing* (percent)
Employment Output
1950 1963 1967 1973 1950 1963 1967 1973
Consumer 47.4 41.5 44.7 38.4 52.1 38.7 48.7 33.1
goods
Intermediate 41.8 45.8 43.9 38.5 36.3 60.9 58.2 52.5
goods
Investment 85.9 50.0 37.4 26.3 73.6 34.0 23.7 16.7
goods
Total 51.4 43.9 43.0 35.5 50.5 44.1 47.9 36.8
manufacturing
* large manufacturing (10 or more workers)
Source: Korum, 1977
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the public sector clearly reflects the division of labor between the public and the private
sectors over time: in the 1950s the public sector took the initiative in providing basic
consumption goods on a massive scale, in addition to several capital goods, whereas in the
1960s, it provided necessary inputs into the production of durable consumer goods in the
private sector. In the second half of the 1970s, as the private sector remained uninterested,
it also attempted to start production of capital goods on a large scale.
In general, the public sector, as means of subsidizing the private sector,
concentrated in those areas of manufacturing with large capital requirements, large scale,
high labor intensity, low labor productivity, and relatively high wages. One of the
important differences between the public and the private manufacturing sectors was the
scale of manufacturing establishments. In the public sector the average size establishment
(as measured by the number of laborers employed) was 8 times larger than that in the
private sector. In 1967, 64.9% of the workers in the public sector were employed by fmins
with more than 1000 workers, while only 38.2% of the workers in the private sector fit this
category. Similarly, 1.2% of the workers in the public sector were employed by firms with
less than 100 workers, whereas this ratio was 34.3% in the private sector.
Also, value added per establishment in the public sector was 13 times greater than
that in the private sector. This large discrepancy between the employment and value added
statistics was due to relatively higher wages and indirect taxes in the public sector. These
differences, however, were smaller in the investment goods sector than in intermediate and
consumer goods. Except wood products, non-metallic minerals and machinery, in all the
other subsectors the ratio of the value added to output was higher in the public sector.
Value added per labor in the public sector was higher than the private sector in consumption
and intermediate goods, but lower in investment goods. In consumption goods the value
added per labor in the public sector was 2.24 times greater than in the private sector in
1950; however it dropped to 1.38 in 1973. In intermediate goods, although the value
added per labor in the public sector was lower in 1950, it increased to 2.67 times the value
added per labor in the private sector. In investment goods sector, the public sector
continuously lagged behind the private sector in this respect.
In general, manufacturing wages in the public sector were higher than in the private
sector. In 1973, except furniture, printing, and chemicals, public sector paid higher wages;
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the manufacturing average was about 25% higher than the private sector average.
However, the ratio of wages to value added was higher in the private sector in consumption
and intermediate goods. Only in investment goods was this ratio higher in the public
sector. The distribution of indirect taxes has been a major cause of these differences.
Foreign capital in manufacturing
Foreign capital participated in Turkish manufacturing through joint ventures with
the leading industrialists, commercial banks, and state capital. The average share of foreign
capital in joint ventures was 40%. It concentrated in mining, food and beverages, textiles
and clothing, rubber products, paper, chemicals, and electrical machinery. During ISI,
foreign capital generally preferred production based on imported inputs and highly capital
intensive montage technologies, and was geared towards the domestic market rather than
exports. It also mostly utilized domestic financial resources. In those sectors where
foreign capital was more intensive, the contribution of ISI to growth was also higher.
Where the contributon of exports to growth was relatively high (e.g., food, textiles), the
share of foreign capital was low. Also, foreign capital was more intensive in those sectors
where production was based on imported inputs, e.g., rubber-tire, plastics, electrical
machinery, and electronics. In 1973, the ratio of imported input used by foreign firms to
total intermediate inputs was 53%, much higher than the sectoral average. Furthermore, in
electrical machinery, transport vehicles, and other sectors with lower marginal capital
productivities, the share of foreign capital was relatively higher.
b. Structure of production
The intersectoral flow of goods and services can be examined on the basis of the
input coefficients, leading to a classification of subsectors with respect to the forward and
backward linkages. This classification, together with the total input requirements, helps to
determine the "key" sectors in manufacturing. However, the key sectors indicated by the
intersectoral flow of goods and services may not coincide the key sectors with respect to
other objectives of the development plans, such as the growth rate of the economy,
employment creation, per capita income, etc. In the Turkish case, for example, this was
true with respect to employment. The key sectors with respect to employment generation
did not coincide with the key sectors with respect to intersectoral linkages.
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Intersectoral dependence
Based on the 37-sector 1-0 tables for 1963, 1968, and 1973, the forward and
backward linkages reveal the following intersectoral dependence patterns (Table 6 5).
Forward linkages are the ratio of the sectoral output used as intermediate input by all other
sectors to the sectoral output. Backward linkages refer to the ratio of the total intermediate
demands from all other sectors to the sectoral output. Forest products, mining, petroleum
products, fertilizers, cement, iron and steel, other metals besides iron, energy, banking and
insurance services subsectors had strong forward linkages. Conversely, sugar, food,
textiles, wood products and furniture, rubber and plastic products, fertilizers, cement, iron
and steel, other metals besides iron, metal products, railroad transportation had strong
backward linkages.
Instead of examining only direct linkages, it is possible to better determine the key
sectors based on the total (direct and indirect) forward and backward linkages. The total
forward linkages indicate how responsive a given subsector is to the general demand
increases in the economy. They show the necessary output increase in a given sector when
the final demand for the ouput of all other sectors increases by one unit. Iron-steel,
agriculture, communications, banking and insurance, chemicals, petroleum products,
metals besides iron, land transportation exhibit strong total forward linkages. The total
backward linkages indicate how effective a given subsector will be in stimulating growth in
other subsectors: the necessary output increases in other sectors to meet the direct and
indirect input requirements of a given sector when final demand for the output of that sector
increases by one unit. The food, textiles, wood products and furniture, rubber and
plastics, fertilizers, cement, iron and steel, non-metallic minerals, electrical machinery,
railroad transport and building construction subsectors exhibit strong total backward
linkages (Korum, 1977).
Observing the subsectors with both strong forward and strong backward linkages,
the following can be identified as the "key" sectors in manufacturing: Iron and steel, basic
metals besides iron, chemicals, petroleum products, cement, fertilizers, rubber and plastics,
wood products in the intermediate goods; textiles and food in consumer goods; and also
transportation, banking and building construction. The fact that most key sectors were
intermediate goods producing sectors, and that basic metals and chemicals were especially
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Table 6.5
Backward and Forward Linkages
Sector Direct Total
Bi Bg Bi Bg
Bi and Bg strong:
Basic metals 1,02676 .5365 2.86287 1,90760
Chemicals 0.71209 0,50790 1.73W 1,78836
Forest products 0.66155 0,66062 1,35172 2.11735
Paper 0,60160 0.57128 1.53= 1O
Bg strong, Bi weak:
Motor vehicles O.4to 0,54486 1.2186
Metal products 0,48 0,57714 1.40M 1,97531
Leather 0,25107 0,62407 1,26510 2,08026
Food 0i28 0,70948 1.4705 2.16230
Textiles 0,28211 0,51559 1.46350 1.85757
Bi and Bg weak
Non-metallic 0,78718 0.43488 1,24554 1.67120
Petroleum 0,86312 0,33994 1,8278M 1,43544
Rubber 0,64373 0,48479 1,20053 1,70260
Energy 067055 0.42458 1.50612 1.66216
Mining 0,89251 0,28039 1.80506 1,44133
Bi and Bg weak: O.4N 0,46753 1,44005 1,75627
Machinery -9o ,731.45 1757
Electrical machinery 0,48467 0,41235 1.24353 1.69119
Tobacco 0,06656 0,43632 1,06272 1.69321
Agriculture 0,4745 0.34045 3,72015 1,53123
Services 0,2356 0.3020 4.36260 1.455
Bi: Forward linkages Bg: Backward linkages.
Source: Kepenek, 1977.
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important, indicate that throughout the 1960s the economy was in the intermediate goods
stage of ISI. However, these are mostly durable consumer goods since typically more than
half the output of these subsectors went into consumption.
Labor coefficients and employment creation potential
Sectoral labor coefficients indicate the amount of labor needed to produce one unit
of output, i.e., the ratio of employment to output in each subsector. The multiplication of
the vector of labor coefficients with the inverse matrix gives the direct-and-indirect labor
coefficients. Total labor requirements then can be calculated for a given final demand
vector. For the Turkish economy, the earliest I-0 matrix based only on domestic input
coefficients is for 1967, so results are rather limited (Table 6 6). The highest direct-and-
indirect employment coefficients were in wood-furniture, leather, non-metallic minerals,
metal products, motor vehicles, textiles and clothing. Therefore, these were the key sectors
with respect to employment, i.e., they have relatively high potential to create employment.
However, among them only wood products and textiles were also key sectors with respect
to intersectoral linkages.
In most of these key subsectors the share of small industrial establishments in
sectoral employment was relatively high. They were also dominated by private sector.
Moreover, they had a large share in industrial exports, and therefore, represent the areas of
static comparative advantage of Turkey in international trade. However, during the export
boom of the the early 1970s, while the traditional subsectors (food, tobacco, beverages)
lost employment share, the engineering industries increased theirs. In wood-furniture and
textiles-clothing there were no significant employment increases. In leather and fur there
was only a slight gain in the private sector and similarly in food products in the public
sector. In the private sector, motor vehicles, besides petroleum, in the private sector had
the highest employment increase. Metal products, non-metallic products, and chemicals,
experienced the highest increases of employment in the public sector (Ebiri, 1977).
c. Final demand categories and the structure of production
The relationship between the structure of production and the final demand
categories (consumption, investment, exports, imports) leads to the identification of those
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Table 6.6
Total Labor Coefficients
Sector 1963-1972 average
Paper 0,34500-
Motor vehicles 0,31883
Metal products 0,31299
Basic metals 0.31012
Non-metallic 0.25392
Textiles 0.22915
Chemicals 0.21659
Electrical machinery 0.21227
Energy 0.21207
Machinery 0.17576
Forest products 0,16815
Beverages 0.16792
Plastic 0.16239
Food 0,13375
Leather 0.12141Petroleum 0.10415
Mining 0,45315
Services 0.36735
Agriculture
Final demand:
Consumption 0,20514
Investment 0.31107
Exports 0,16519
Source: Kepenek, 1977.
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sectors that are strategically important in the production of goods in a given final demand
category. These key sectors include not only those sectors that are directly producing these
goods, but also those that are indirectly contributing to their production. Therefore, the key
sectors with respect to the final demand categories indicate the priorities of a development
plan that would emphasize the production of goods in a certain final demand category.
According to an analysis based on the 1973 1-0 table with 37 sectors (Kepenek,
1977), in several consumption goods producing sectors (food, tobacco, textiles, leather),
but, and also in various intermediate and capital goods producing sectors (chemicals, metal
products, electrical machinery, petroleum products) more than 50% of production was
channelled into consumption. This was based on total (direct+indirect) contribution to
consumption. Clearly, this obscures the meaning of division of sectors into consumption
and investment goods. However, basic metals, petroleum products, non-metallic minerals,
and forest products stood out as the key sectors in the production of consumer goods,
because, the indirect contribution of these sectors (as measured by production
requirements) to the production of consumer goods were highly significant. Agriculture
and services were also important in this respect.
In the production of investment goods, in addition to the capital goods producing
sectors (machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment, metal products), basic
metals, petroleum products, chemicals, non-metallic products, energy and plastic-rubber
products also contributed indirectly. In fact, these latter sectors emerged as the key sectors
with respect to investment. Besides these manufacturing subsectors, mining exhibited the
same characteristic.
During ISI, in manufacturing production exports did not play a significant role.
Besides food (12%), beverages & tobacco (16%), and textiles (18%), there was no other
subsector which exported more than 10% of its production. However, basic metals,
chemicals (both were among the key sectors with respect to intersectoral linkages) and
petroleum products were indirectly significant in the production of export goods. In
contrast, most manufacturing subsectors exhibited a heavy dependence on imports. Since
only a small percentage of imports went into consumption (e.g., 5% in 1973), the
importance of capital goods, intermediates and raw materials in total imports for the
manufacturing sector becomes clear. The subsectors with relatively high import-output
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ratios were machinery (80%), chemicals (51%), petroleum products (50%), electrical
machinery (47%), transport equipment (27%), basic metals (25%), metal products (14%),
and mining (70%).
The 1968 1-0 table provides the division of intermediate inputs into two categories:
domestic and imported. An analysis of the intersectoral relations based on these categories
determines more reliable estimates of the import dependency of manufacturing production.
The results indicated a high import dependency (on imported inputs only, investment goods
imports not included) of the intermediate and capital goods sectors. Both forward and
backward linkages were strong in chemicals, transport equipment, electrical machinery,
and machinery, varying between 10 and 20%. Basic metals (11%) and mining (16%)
showed strong forward linkages, while for rubber-plastics (14%) the backward linkage
was strong. Therefore, all these sectors were among the key ones with respect to imported
imports.
However, the key sectors with respect to imported inputs may be in conflict with
the key sectors with respect to intersectoral flows. For example, chemicals, basic metals,
and rubber-plastic products were among the key sectors with respect to intersectoral
linkages. The import dependency of domestic production gives clues about which sectors
should be given priority if ISI is to continue. Import-output ratios (forward linkages)
provide the key statistic in this respect. Accordingly, chemicals, machinery, trasport
equipment, electric machinery, and basic metals need to be emphasized in the third stage of
ISI. Backward linkages indicate the importance of imported inputs in each sector, and
thus, highlight priorities for import restrictions. Chemicals (16%), rubber-plastics (14%),
transport equipment (11%), electrical machinery (10%), machinery (8%), and paper-
printing (9.6%) were the sectors that would be adversely affected by import restrictions.
Identification of inputs as domestic vs. imported also makes it possible to analyze
domestic input-based production possibilities seperately. Key sectors with respect to
domestic production determine the priority sectors in increasing domestic production. For
example, chemicals lose their key characteristic with respect to domestic production.
However, basic metals, forest products, and paper-printing maintain their key
characteristics, and rubber-plastics gain importance. The key sectors with respect to
consumption, investment, and exports had basic metals, petroleum products, and chemicals
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(with the exception of consumer goods) in common, all of which were also highly import-
dependent subsectors. This clearly demonstrates the difficulty of continuing ISI beyond
the consumer goods stages. During 1953-63 imports only grew by 15%, but during 1963-
73 by almost 135%!. The predominant source of this rapid import growth was the
domestic demand increases. In 1953-63, the largest import increases took place in
chemicals, mining, food, transport equipment, rubber and plastics. In 1963-68, as ISI in
basic metals declined, there was a rapid increase in the relative contributions of domestic
demand and technological change to the growth of imports in basic metals, mining, and
chemicals (including fertilizers). Intermediate demand expansion alone accounted for 60%
of import growth in 1953-63 and 1963-1973. During 1953-63, the contribution of ISI to
import growth was -26% (ISI in textiles, wood, petroleum, non-metallic minerals,
machinery), during 1963-68 (ISI in paper, rubber, wood, food, textiles, non-metallic
minerals, machinery, transport equipment) it was almost ten times larger (-227%), but
during 1968-73, it turned positive (6%) (Celasun, 1983). Therefore, the most successful
ISI period was 1963-68, which was also important in restraining the growth of
manufactured imports in the 1970s.
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2. STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The aim of this section is to determine the character of structural change in Turkish
manufacturing during ISI. The first part examines technological change: changes in
intermediate input requirements, capital and labor requirements, imported inputs, and also
the distribution of value added. The second part analyzes the changes in the output
composition as a function of domestic factors (domestic demand and technology) and trade
factors (ISI and export promotion).
Instead of linear programming and regression analysis, the study of structural
change here is mainly based on Input-Output (1-0) methods:
(i). Static I-0: Given technology and the final demand vector, sectoral output
levels, labor and capital requirements can be determined to study the character of
structural change (K, L, Intermediate input intensities, productivity);
(ii). Dynamic 1-0: Sectoral growth rates with endogenous investment can be
used to identify the leading sectors (motor of growth);
(iii). Sources of growth: Sources of growth on the demand side, based on the
consistent accounting identities of the 1-0 relations, can be analyzed using
Decomposition analysis. Decomposition analysis explains growth as a function of
domestic factors (technological change and final demand), and trade factors
(ISI and export expansion).
In this framework, there are two basic methods: constant composition and constant
share methods. These two methods differ in their treatment of ISI as follows (The
measurement of ISI will be dealt with in the next section.):
(i). Constant compositior method: ISI in relation to total GDP, and change in
sectoral import levels,
(ii). Constant share method: ISI in relation to sectoral domestic demand, and
change in sectoral imports shares or domestic supply shares.
In either method, depending on the purpose of the analysis, two alternative
measures can be used : deviation from the propositional growth path (indicating the causes
of structural change) and first differences or increments (explaining growth processes and
policy effects). In both methods intermediate input requirements are calculated through
direct measures (i.e., all intermediate uses of a sector's output under the domestic demand
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contribution to the growth process) and total measures (i.e., direct+indirect; effects of
domestic final demand, export expansion, and ISI; while technical change, i.e., changes in
the I-0 coefficients, is identified as a separate source of growth).
The evolution of the treatment of ISI in the literature can be summarized as follows:
Chenery, 1960: ISI= Share method, change in the sectoral import/output ratios,
deviation from the balanced growth path, direct effects only.
Chenery, Shisido,Watanabe (CSW), 1962: Constant composition method, ISI=
deviation of import growth from the propositional path.
Lewis and Soligo, 1965: Share method, change in sectoral import/output ratios,
first differences, direct effects only.
Morley and Smith, 1970: Change in the share of imports in total supply (domestic
production+imports). The extent of import dependency is indicated through calculation of
domestic production levels necessary to substitute for all imports.
Fane, 1973: Share method, ISI= IS in sector j+indirect contribution of production
increase in sector j.
Syrquin, 1976: Share method, share of imports in total domestic demand.
Balassa, 1976: Change in imports as a function of pro-trade and anti-trade biases in
production and consumption. ISI= deviations of the output and consumption growth rates
form the "neutral path", i.e., growth rate of the national product.
In the 1950s the production of consumer goods flourished. However, during the
1960s and 1970s there were important changes in the technological structure and output
composition of the Turkish manufacturing sector. In the 1960s, textiles and various
intermediate goods and transport equipment subsectors grew relatively fast, but capital
goods sectors lagged. Among the subsectors, food (28%) and textiles (16-20%) had the
largest shares in manufacturing output during 1963-72. The fastest growing subsectors,
however, were chemicals, rubber-plastic products, basic metals, and transport equipment.
In contrast, the shares of metal products and machinery in the total manufacturing output
showed a decline over the 1963-72 period. The remaining sectors maintained their relative
shares. As a result of this structural change, the intermediate goods sector gained
importance. However, since these were durable consumer goods, the 1960s represented
the second stage of ISI in Turkey, i.e., ISI in consumer durables.
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a. Technological change
i. Intermediate input requirements
Intermediate input requirements declined in capital goods, but it increased in some
consumer goods and intermediates and declined in others during 1963-73. According to
total intermediate input requirements in 1963, 1967, 1968, and 1972 that were necessary to
obtain final demand for 1972 (Kepenek, 1977 a la Leontief-Carter), food (3.1%), rubber-
plastic products (3.1%), chemicals (1.5%), leather (1.2%), and non-metallic products
(1.2%) showed a yearly increase in their intermediate input requirements, while tobacco-
alcoholic beverages (9.2%), metal products (3%), machinery (2.4%), paper-publishing
(2.3%), textiles (2.1), and basic metals (1.6%) showed a decline. Declining input
requirements in general indicate a more efficient use of inputs; this was especially important
in the key sectors (basic metals, paper, textiles). However, increasing import requirements
in the already highly import-dependent key subsectors, e.g., chemicals, further aggravated
the foreign exchange problem.
ii. Primary input requirements
Capital intensity
In all manufacturing subsectors, there were important increases in capital stocks
during 1965-75. However, at the beginning of this period, the public sector had much
higher capital stocks per worker (in absolute value). Capital intensity in the public sector
was twice as high as that in the private sector. Higher capital/labor (K/L) ratios in the
public sector also arose because production was generally organized in large units. In
addition to the generous public sector employment policy, which provided excess
employment for political reasons, rapidly increasing infrastructure expenditures severely
burdened the public budget and resulted in relatively low levels of public investment in
manufacturing.
On the whole, increases in capital intensity in the private sector were greater than in
the public sector (Ebiri, 1977). The fastest increases in the K/L ratios took place in
petroleum and coal products, in both the public and private sectors. After metal products,
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petroleum products became the second most capital intensive subsector. Petroleum, metal
products, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and paper were capital intensive, while
tobacco, motor vehicles, and electrical machinery were labor intensive public subsectors.
This structure of the public sector, capital intensive intermediates but labor intensive capital
goods, remained unchanged during 1965-75 (Table 6.7a). In the private sector, motor
vehicles, which was the most capital intensive subsector in 1965, lost its position and was
replaced by metal products in 1975 (Table 6.7b). In petroleum products exactly the
opposite development took place; in 1975 it became more capital intensive than it was in
1965.
Capital Productivity (Capital/Output, K/Q, Capital/Value Added, K/VA)
The two measures of capital productivity, K/Q and K/VA, indicate that metal
products followed by non-metallic minerals, paper, and textiles-wearing apparel were
relatively high fixed capital users (Table 6.8). Tobacco is the most efficient sector in this
respect with a K/VA ratio of 0.25, compared to 6.23 in metal products. In general, the
increases during 1965-75 in the K/Q ratios were greater in the private sector (15.6%) than
in the public sector (12%). The public subsectors with higher increases were capital goods
and paper and chemicals. In the private sector, consumer goods, in addition to petroleum,
transport vehicles, and fur-leather products had higher increases.
Scale
In 1965-75, the size of manufacturing establishments increased. Also there was a
concentration of (fixed) capital stock in the larger establishments. Labor concentration,
however, did not show a similar increase. In the public sector, which already had larger
firms, the concentration of production proceeded faster. In 1975, an average public firm
produced 8 times more than an average private firm and employed 7.7 times more workers.
Average production values were higher in petroleum, metal products, tobacco, paper and
chemicals in the public sector, and tobacco, petroleum, motor vehicles, electrical
machinery, and chemicals in the private sector. With respect to the number of labor
employed, the tobacco subsector rates very high overall, followed by basic metals and
paper in the public sector, and electrical machinery, textiles and wearing apparel in the
private sector.
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Table 6.7a
Subsectoral Ordering
according to Capital/Labor, Capital/Wage, and Depreciation/Wage ratios
Public Sector
1965 1975
K/L K/W D/W K/L K/W D/W
Food 8 5 6 7 7 7
Tobacco 14 14 13 14 13 14
Textiles 11 11 8 12 11 11
Wood 10 10 10 9 9 10
Paper 5 .8 5 5 6 5
Printing 9 9 11 8 8 8
Chemicals 3 4 3 4 5 3
Petroleum 1 1 1 1 2 1
Non-metallic 4 3 4 6 1 6
Metals 2 2 2 3 4 4
Metal prod. 7 7 7 2 3 2
Machinery 6 6 9 13 14 13
Elec. machinery 12 13 14 10 10 9
Motor vehicles 13 12 12 11 12 12
K/L: Capital/Labor, K/W: Capital/Wage, D/W:
Source: Ebiri, 1977.
Depreciation/Wage.
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Table 6.7b
Subsectoral Ordering
according to Capital/Labor, Capital/Wage, and Depreciation/Wage ratios
Private Sector
1965 1975
K/L K/W D/W K/L K/W D/W
Food 13 9 9 10 6 6
Tobacco 15 15 15 16 16 16
Textiles 12 8 3 7 4 4
Wood 10 6 6 9 10 10
Paper 5 4 .1 5 3 5
Printing 7 12 11 11 12 14
Leather 14 14 13 12 9 9
Rubber 3 3 8 6 8 3
Chemicals 4 7 5 4 7 8
Petroleum 16 16 16 2 5 7
Non-metallic 6 5 4 3 2 2
Metals 2 2 2 1 1 1
Metal prod. 8 10 10 15 14 12
Machinery 11 11 12 13 13 13
Elec. machinery 9 13 14 31 15 15
Motor vehicles 1 1 7 11 11
K/L: Capital/Labor, K/W: Capital/Wage, D/W:
Source: Ebiri, 1977.
Depreciation/Wage.
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Table 6.8
Subsectoral Capital/Output ratios
Private sector Public sector
A B A B
Food 237 .222 .104 .328
Tobacco .112 .232 .262 .077
Textiles 5'2 .315 .123 .486
Wood .555 .190 .22? .843
Paper 70 .241 .334 1.369
Printing .57 .135 .253 1.033
Leather .308 .454 - -
Rubber .733 .138 - -
Chemicals .539 .167 .360 2.046
Petroleum -193 .534 .262 .575
Non-metallic 1.202 .156 .151 1.735
Metals .810 .231 .413 1.531
Metal products .41E .097 .789 1.494
Machinery .355 .221 .370 .451
Elec machinery .360 .170 .291 1.096
Motor vehicles .439 .339 .245 .573
Total .469 .156 .119 .663
A: Capital/Output ratio, 1965-75 average, B: Growth rate of
Capital/Output ratio.
Source: Ebiri, 1977.
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Labor Productivity
In the public sector, labor productivity (defined as value added per labor, VA/L)
was higher than in the private sector. It was 1.7 times higher in 1965, but only 1.2 times
in 1975. This was due to decreased public investment, since there was no significant
change in the scale of production and public-private wage differentials. During 1965-75,
the yearly average increase in manufacturing productivity was 8.1%. In the private sector,
it increased more (9.8%) than in the public sector (7.3%). In the public sector,
productivity increased most in tobacco, petroleum, chemicals, and textiles, but declined in
metal products, wood and furniture, and food and beverages. In the private sector, fur,
leather, wood and furniture showed decreased productivity, while tobacco, petroleum
products, textiles, wearing apparel, food and beverages showed the highest increases.
In explaining the increase in labor productivity, the three main factors (capital
intensity, scale, and real wages) gave inconsistent results based on a regression analysis by
Ebiri, 1977. Capital intensity explained productivity increases in total private
manufacturing, but did not seem to explain the changes in productivity at the subsectoral
level. In contrast, changes in the scale of production show positive effects on productivity
only in fur and leather, food and beverages, metal products, textiles-wearing apparel,
tobacco, and rubber products, which were mostly export goods. Real wage increases
seemed to have a positive effect on labor productivity in food and beverages, motor
vehicles, paper, electrical machinery, and metal products. This relationship was stronger in
those subsectors that paid lower average wages.
Labor force in Manufacturing
Between 1965 and 1975, the manufacturing labor force increased by 5.7% per year
on average. This was very low compared to the growth of value added and fixed capital
stock (13.8%). In the public sector, it increased by only 3.2%; in the private sector, it was
three times more. As a result, the share of the public sector in total manufacturing
employment decreased from 44% to 35% (Ebiri, 1977). In general, however, there was
not any significant change in the distribution of the labor force among the subsectors. In
1965, 60% of the manufacturing labor force was in traditional subsectors like food,
tobacco, and textiles; in 1975 it dropped to only 46%. In contrast, the share of the
engineering industries increased; in machinery labor force increased 2.5 times, in electrical
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machinery and basic metals it doubled, and in motor vehicles it increased 1.5 times. Of the
total manufacturing labor force, 18.5% was (directly and indirectly) engaged in the
production of capital goods. This represented 19.5% of the labor force in the public and
18% in the private sector.
The largest increase of employment in the public sector was in chemicals and basic
metals, and in the private sector in petroleum, paper, and motor vehicles. In the public
sector, the share of the basic metals increased the most: from 9% in 1965 to 17.5% in
1975. Similar increases took place in fertilizers, chemicals and cement. Tobacco and
textiles, however, experienced lower shares. In the private sector, food and other
traditional subsectors also lost their shares, while motor vehicles increased its share 7 fold
and petroleum increased its labor share by 24 fold!
White collar labor force
During 1965-75 there was a significant change in the education and skill level of the
manufacturing labor force. The tendency to use labor with high education (university level)
increased over time. Between 1969 and 1975, especially, the yearly average rate of this
increase was 15% (13% in public, 17% in private sectors). In 1965, 42% of the white
collar workers were in the public sector, but this dropped to 32% in 1975. In 1965, 52%
of such workers were in food, textiles and chemicals; in 1975 basic metals also joined these
subsectors. In the public subsectors, basic metals, food and textiles employed 60% of
white-collar workers. In the private sector, no subsector had more than 15% of such
workers, the highest share being in chemicals and textiles. In general, petroleum and
chemicals had the highest share of white collar workers, followed by paper and motor
vehicles. In the public sector, petroleum, electrical machinery, and basic metals and in the
private sector chemicals, petroleum, and machinery had relatively high shares. Although
there was not much change in the distribution of the labor force in the public sector, in the
private sector, basic metals, petroleum, and metal products increased their shares while
printing, rubber, electrical machinery experienced declining shares.
200
Labor force with medium skill levels (skilled labor and technicians)
Until 1969, the total number of medium skilled workers in manufacturing
increased. From 1969 to 1974, however, there was a significant decline, especially in the
public sector (35%). It affected motor vehicles, textiles, tobacco, and metal products and
machinery the most. In the private sector, the decline was not as great; it affected metal
products, non-metallic mineral products, textiles, tobacco, and motor vehicles the most.
However, by 1975 the number of medium skilled workers again rose to its 1968 level.
The significant drop in the number of medium skilled workers can partly be explained by
unusual increases in the highly skilled labor force. Highly skilled workers, as their relative
wages started to decline, gradually replaced medium skilled workers. The other
explanation is labor migration to Europe. Between 1964 and 1974, 1/3 of emigrant
workers were medium skilled. About 70% of the skilled labor force (mostly from
manufacturing) migrated to several industrialized countries. The subsectors that lost the
most were the ones with the lowest average wages. The public sector not only lost more of
its medium skilled labor force than the private sector, but also the out-migration from the
public sector lasted longer. Although public sector wages were in general higher than the
private sector, the wages of medium skilled workers were lower than in the private sector.
iii. Import dependency in the industrial sector
In the post-war period, imports increased while exports fluctuated. On the whole,
the export/import ratio declined throughout the planned period. It dropped to 30% during
the third plan period from 70-80% during the first plan period. Furthermore, the external
terms of trade also continued to turn against Turkey. The increase in the value of imports
has been greater than the increase in the quantity of imports; this tendency also became
more pronounced during the third plan period. The ratio of imports to GNP increased
suddenly in 1947 and stayed high until 1953 (Table 6.9). During 1954-1958 it declined
due to foreign exchange shortages, which necessitated a return to ISI. However, later the
import/GNP ratio started to increase as a new growth period began in 1963, and continued
to increase throughout the planned period. Especially during 1974-1977, it showed a
significant increase as more and more foreign exchange became available due to workers'
remittances and the CTDLs. But during the crisis of the late 1970s, the import/GNP ratio
again started to decline.
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Table 6.9
Shares of Imports, Industry and Investment in GNP
Imports/GNP, % Industry/GNP Investment/GNP
1950 8.3 13.1 14.47
1951 9.7 11.9 13.71
1952 11.6 11.8 15.54
1953 9.6 12.6 15.89
1954 8.4 14.2 15.72
1955 7.3 14.6 15.06
1956 5.1 15.5 13.46
1957 3.8 15:9 13.14
1958 2.6 16.1 12.55
1959 3.0 15.9 12.55
1960 4.7 15.5 13.47
1961 9.2 17.1 13.66
1962 9.7 16.7 13.74
1963 9.3 17.0 13.11
1964 6.1 18.2 12.96
1965 6.8 19.4 12.88
1966 7.1 20.0 14.05
1967 6.1 20.7 14.34
1968 6.2 21.6 15.26
1969 5.4 23.4 15.39
1970 6.5 22.6 16.52
1971 8.5 22.6 14.25
1972 8.9 23.4 15.23
1973 9.4 25.1 16.87
1974 12.2 24.9 17.77
1975 12.9 24.9 20.31
1976 12.3 25.0 21.59
1977 12.0 25.7 22.65
1978 8.8 25.8 (78-79 ave.18.4)
1979 8.1 24.8
1980 13.4 24.3 21.4
Source: Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ekonomisi, 1980.
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The share of industrial imports in total imports (Table 5.7) had been consistent with
the degree of import dependency in industrial production. The high share of manufacturing
(above 50%) led to a high share of the industrial sector in total imports. Similarly, high
import dependency in the petroleum subsector led to also a high import share for mining,
22% in 1977. The compositon of imports did not change much during the first three plan
periods (Table 6.10). Nearly 35-40% of the imports were capital goods imports and 55-
60% were intermediate goods and raw materials. Given the shares of these inputs in
industrial production (intermediates 70%, capital goods 20% and labor 10%), the extent of
import dependency becomes clear. The share of consumption goods imports has always
been the smallest among the three categories. Moreover, parallel to the stages of ISI in
Turkey, the share of consumption goods imports declined contiuously. While their yearly
average share in total imports was 16.7% during the 1950s, it dropped to 6.3% during the
1960s and to 3.8% during the 1970s. In the early 1980s, it was a low 2.2%, but starting
in 1984 this share began to increase; the 1984-1986 average reached 6.2%.
The distribution of imports according to commodity groups and their annual growth
rates, which indicates the priorities of ISI, are given in Table 6.11. The share of crude oil
imports was highest with 25.4% of total imports, while the shares of machinery imports
(18.7%), chemicals (13%), transport vehicles (9%) and iron and steel products (12%) were
also very high. During 1972-1977, the annual growth rate of imports was 30%. Tractor
imports had the highest growth rate with 95%, followed by trucks (74%), agricultural
machinery (63%), and crude oil (57%). Given the fact that the 1970s were the intermediate
and capital goods stage of ISI, the burden of the high degree of import dependency was
tremendous.
Dependence on imports at the subsectoral level
Savas, 1980 provides the ratios of import dependence at the 64 sector level based
on the 1973 1-0 table. Import dependence here is defined as the ratio of imports to
domestic demand. In general, the manufacturing sector exhibits a very high level of import
dependence, the average ratio of imports to final demand being above 60%. Besides public
services, no other subsector was able to meet the full domestic demand. Except
agriculture, fisheries, tobacco, maritime, communications, banking, insurance, personal
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Table 6.10
Composition of imports, %
Capital goods Consumption goods Raw materials
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
46.0
43.0
50.5
52.0
53.0
54.3
58.2
43.5
43.3
45.6
52.1
44.8
45.0
45.8
45.7
42.2
47.5
47.2
48.0
43.8
47.1
43.7
50.1
47.5
33.6
41.4
43.7
38.9
34.6
31.5
20.6
20.6
24.8
22.1
19.8
19.6
14.6
11.1
12.3
12.2
10.2
9.6
9.9
7.2
5.4
4.9
4.3
5.0
4.9
4.8
6.8
5.0
5.0
4.7
4.1
4.0
4.3
3.0
3.1
2.9
1.9
2.2
Source: Akbank, Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ekonomisi, 1980
204
33.4
32.2
27.4
28.2
27.4
31.1
30.7
44.2
44.5
44.2
38.3
45.3
47.8
48.8
49.4
53.5
47.5
47.9
47.2
49.4
47.9
51.3
45.2
48.4
62.4
54.3
53.3
58.0
62.5
66.6
77.2
Table 6.11
Imports accoring to Commodity Groups
(thousand $)
1972 IM 174 1975 9WN 1M7 (%)
1. Machinery
Motors
Agricultural
Textile
Metal
Other machinery
2. Transport vehicles
Tractors
Otomobiles
Trucks
Dampers
Other vehicles
Parts
3. Electrical machinery
394.39 506.480 644.292
53.785 64.977 77.015
14.094 29.984 39.333
44.440 102.054 143.602
27.604 25.688 33.945
252.386 23.M 350.397
111.847 173.639 204.561
7.070 21.032 16.802
10.046 1&415 29.14
444 2.749 5.136
4.197 2.094 10.417
9.145 tis808 23.715
80.755 110.484 125.ss
122.756 14.11 183.615
4. Iron-steel products 147.738 247.462 50.971
5. Crude petroleum 154.915 221.501 76.857
6. Chemicals, organic 77-54 114.571 167.93
7. Chemicals, non-organic 35.778 45.373 65.453
8. Plastics
9. Fertilizers
10. Others
General total
32.445 41.800. 79.978
62.202 100.540 - 101.264
423.094 48.725 1.036.6K
1.562.854 2.066.n1 3.777.55
99s.7 1.000.064 1.OB.7 22.2
117.784 136.681 121.5 17.7
90.270 129.825 164.235 6.4
158.00? 129.239 22.642 134
60.166 09.446 91.784 27.2
50.800 64.70 682A.64 22.0
360.161 570.20 522.63 36.8
82.295 191.737 20.16 O.4
47.M 67.628 31.432 25.6
5.812 27.003 7.154 74.4
20.236 10.467 1.064 25.5
35.117 36424 43.918 36.9
178.673 215.181 22MSa 22.8
27X 302 27.415 295.77 19.2
679.764 546.919 693 M S.2
811.49 1.12.74 1.470.379 56.
21T.774 274.173 279.647 29.2
145.922 112.04 S.779 19.9
90.616 103.567 155.484 3.8
48.35 6.M 214.474 28.1
1.106.45 9ft.927 90.309 8.6
4.736.558 5.128.647 5.796.222 30
Source: DPT, Fouth five year development plan, 1979.
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and professional services, and housing, the rest of the subsectors were more than 25%
import-dependent. More importantly, at the beginning of the intermediate and capital goods
stage of ISI most key sectors were among the highly import dependent: non-electrical
machinery (99.3%), fertilizers (94%), iron-steel (93%), other manufacturing (77%),
transportation vehicles (76%), petroleum (76%), petroleum and coal products (73%).
Dependence of industrial production on imported inputs
During the ISI period, the dependence of industrial production on imports of both
intermediates and capital goods increased. As a measure of industrial dependence on
imported inputs, Table 4.7 provides the ratio of imports of capital goods to fixed capital
investment and the ratio of imports of intermediates to industrial production. The first ratio
averaged 19.7% during 1963-69, but later increased to 23% during 1970-1977; the latter
averaged 20.2% and 30.2%, respectively. Although both of these ratios declined during
the crisis at the end of the 1960s, during the second half of the 1970s (the intermediate and
capital goods stage of ISI) both increased significantly. In short, as ISI proceeded along
the consumer goods stages and moved into the intermediate goods stage, the import
dependency of industrial production also increased.
The import dependency of industrial production can also be evaluated based on the
import coefficients matrix from the 1-0 tables. In the agro-based industrial sector, wood
and furniture, leather and fur products, and non-alcoholic beverages have relatively high
import coefficients. However, as vegetable and animal oils, other foods, alcoholic
beverages, fresh fruits and vegetables have high intersectoral dependence, increased
production in these subsectors would require increased production, and therefore increased
imported inputs, in many other subsectors such as chemicals, petro-chemicals, machinery,
transport equipment, and metal products. In manufacturing, except for clothing and
wearing apparel and cement, all other subsectors have high import coefficients and high
intersectoral dependency. Most intermediate and capital goods producing subsectors,
especially plastic products, rubber and rubber products, other metals, iron-steel, metal
products and electrical machinery also exhibit very high import coefficients.
A comparison of the 1973 and 1977 1-0 tables reveals that the ratio of imports to
output increased in most subsectors including fertilizers, plastic products, petroleum, while
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in paper and agricultural machinery this ratio declined. Also, a comparison of the import
coefficients from the 1968 and 1973 inverse matrix (direct+indirect linkages) indicates an
economy-wide increase in import dependency of about 33% (Kepenek, 1984). Continuing
import dependency of the most important subsectors of the economy during ISI, depending
on balance of payments conditions, led to periodic foreign exchange bottlenecks.
iv. Distribution of value added
The share of wage payments in manufacturing value added (direct labor
requirements) was much lower than that of non-wage payments (profit, indirect taxes,
interest, and depreciation). The share of labor was relatively higher in paper and printing-
publishing, transport equipment, and metal products, which defines these sectors as labor
intensive. The relationship of the capital goods producing sectors to the informal sector
through subcontracting for parts underscores the fact that capital goods producing sectors
were highly labor intensive. Interestingly, the highest wage share (paper and printing) and
the lowest non-wage share (food) in value added were equal at 20%. The share of non-
wage value added was high in petroleum products (65%), electrical machinery, energy,
rubber and plastics, machinery, alcoholic beverages and tobacco manufactures, chemicals,
leather products, clothing (36%).
During 1965-75, the average share of wages in net value added was 25% in the
public sector, and 35% in the private sector (Ebiri, 1977). During 1963-72, the share of
wage payments increased while that of non-wage payments declined. The fact that the
share of non-wage payments in value added showed a decline, except in consumption
goods and transport equipment, indicate that profit rates in manufacturing exhibited a
tendency to decline during the 1960s. The highest increases in wage payments were in
machinery (5.5%), basic metals (3.8%), tobacco-alcoholic beverages (3.8%), and electric
machinery (3%). In plastic-rubber products, leather, and non-metallic minerals, the
increase was about 2%. Forest products (4%), energy (-1.3%), and paper-publishing
(-0.3%), in contrast, showed a decline (Table 6.12).
In the consumption goods sectors, especially in textiles, tobacco-alcoholic
beverages, leather, and also in transport equipment the shares of both wage and non-wage
payments increased, indicating a decline in the share of intermediate inputs. Therefore, in
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Table 6.12
Distribution of Value added in Unit Production
Wage Payments
Paper, printing
Motor vehicles
Metal products
Basic metals
Textiles
Non-metallic
Beverages
Chemicals
Electrical machinery
Energy
Machinery
Rubber
Forest products
Food
Leather
Petroleum
Mining
Services
Agriculture
Non-wage Payments
6 20346
0,16151
0.14595
0 139SM
0,12596
0,11779
0.11471
0,10050
0.09368
006968
0,06376
0,06195
0,04960
0,01207
013L410o5
0.29202
Petroleum products
Electrical machinery
Energy
Rubber
Machinery
Beverages
Chemicals
Leather
Textiles
Basic metals
Motor vehicles
Forest products
Metal products
Paper
Food
Services
Mining
Source: Kepenek, 1977.
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0,6452
0.48M3
0.4780
0.47433
0.466
0.44W7
0.3'129
0.36649
0,36341
0,30115
0,30115
0,28049
0.2730
0,23466
0,1967
0,43204
0,36410
general the direction of technological change was input-saving. However, in the production
of intermediate goods since the shares of wage and non-wage payments both decreased, the
share of intermediate inputs increased, resulting in declining technical efficiency. Moreover,
import intensity also increased in the key intermediate goods sectors.
With respect to relative prices, in those subsectors where non-wage payments
contributed positively to price increases, such as wood products, basic metals, transport
equipment, and services, manufacturing prices increased faster than the general price level.
However, price increases caused by higher wages were in general offset by gains in labor
productivity, except in public services. In addition, changes in the 1-0 coefficients
contributed to higher manufacturing prices. Technological change was an important source
of structural change, but it exerted considerable pressure on the real cost of production in
manufacturing, with especially pronounced effects in machinery and related subsectors.
After 1968 the domestic terms of trade shifted in favor of the agricultural sector. This was
due to less restrictive agricultural price policies. It also reflected the effect of worldwide
increases in prices of primary commodities in 1972-73. This upward trend in real
agricultural prices decelerated in the second half of the 1970s, and was reversed in 1978-80
as industrial prices (energy and chemicals) rose sharply.
Wage payments
Since 1950 changes in the share of wage payments in manufacturing value added
show a cyclical pattern (Figure 6.1). In the private sector, labor's share increased from
1950 to 1952 and then declined continuously until 1957. From 1957 to 1960 it increased
and from 1960 to 1965 (except for 1964) it again declined. But from 1965 to 1972 we
observe an increase; later, there was a drop in 1972 and again an increase until 1975. After
1975 labor 's share continued to decline until the mid 1980s. In the public sector, from
1950 to 1952 labor's share declined. From 1956 to 1960 we observe an increase and from
1964 to 1971 it again declined (Aksoy, 1980). There was a huge increase from 1974 to
1980; however, labor's share in the public sector also continued to decline after 1980.
The cyclical movement of labor's share seems to be similar to cycles in economic
activity in the manufacturing sector. According to the estimated results of the relationship
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Figure 6.1 Labor's Share in Value Added
between the labor's share in value added and capacity utilization (Aksoy, 1980), when
capacity utilization decreases, labor's share goes up. The capacity utilization indices used
in this study measures the deviations in actual output growth from the long-run trend rate of
growth. Hence, periods of low capacity utilization were also periods of decreasing output
growth; therefore, labor's share went up when the output growth rate declined. In Turkish
manufacturing lower rates of output growth were due to lower utilization of the existing
capital stock, which resulted from the lack of imported intermediates and raw materials.
But as output decreases firms cannot reduce employment at the same rate; value added
decreases more than the wage bill, thus increasing the share of labor. This was especially
true in the public sector, as employment provision is an important function of the public
sector. Even when output declines, it was unable to lower the labor force. According to
the results in the Aksoy study, in the public sector the effect of capacity utilization on the
share of labor was 3.75 times higher than in the private sector.
In general, the increasing share of wage payments was not due to higher wage
levels. Social Insurance Organization data from the pre-union period indicate that real
wages followed a downward trend. During 1950-60, the share of insured workers'
(mostly industrial workers') incomes in the gross national product fell by about 10%.
Between 1958 and 1963, real wages of insured workers in the public sector annually
increased by 1% on average. However, between 1963 and 1971 real wages rose by an
average of 4% per annum; the increase was 3% in the private and 7% in the public sector
(Schick and Tonak, 1987). After 1971, the same data indicate pronounced decreases in
real wages, amounting to about 40% between 1970 and 1979.
In 1963-73, wages increased due to the better organized labor movement and the
newly granted rights to strike and to have collective bargaining agreements. The increase in
labor productivity does not seem to have a relationship to wage increases. In those sectors
with a declining labor/output ratio, wages increases were the highest, e.g., machinery. On
the whole, a significant portion of the productivity increases went to the non-wage
payments, not to wage payments. In 1965-75 real wages increased 76% in the public sector
and 74% in the private sector, although value added per worker increased 173% in the
public sector, and 239% in the private sector. The ratio of the increase in real wages to the
increase in productivity was 68% in the public and 57% in the private sector (Ebiri, 1977).
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In the public sector, the annual average real wage increase was 5%; only in tobacco
and motor vehicles did real wages increase more than the average. In the private sector, in
petroleum and textiles it exceeded the yearly average of 5.6%. However, the intersectoral
wage differentials remained about the same. In the public sector, petroleum, basic metals,
paper and chemicals had the highest, food, beverages, and tobacco the lowest wages. In
the private sector, in 1965 the highest wages were paid in chemicals and printing, and the
lowest in food and textiles; in 1975 the highest in petroleum and chemicals, and the lowest
in tobacco and leather (Table 6.13). From 1975 onward wage shares in value added
declined continuously in the private sector. However, in the public sector, it increased until
1979, but later declined much faster than the private sector until 1982, and increased
slightly since. From the late 1970s to 1985, the decline in real wages was 52.1% for all
employees and 28.6% for manufacturing workers. In the face of only modest productivity
increases, declining real wages in the 1980s significantly lowered the labor share in
manufacturing (Boratav, 1988).
Labor in manufacturing is the most organized employee group in the Turkish
economy. However, in the union period, in both the private and the public manufacturing
sectors, labor lost compared to the rest of the economy. Manufacturing wages have lagged
behind the growth of the economy; unionization has not benefitted labor at the expense of
the rest of the economy. Actually, on the contrary, in the union period (post-1963), the
relative position of labor in manufacturing has worsened compared to the nonunion period
(1950-63) (Schick and Tonak, 1987). Unlike labor in the private sector, labor in public
manufacturing seems to have lost in both periods. This difference was due to two new
developments in the union period. The first was the introduction of agricultural price
support policies. As a result, especially after 1968, income distribution has moved in favor
of agriculture (Dervis and Robinson, 1978). Urban wages lagged behind the rest of the
economy, including the agricultural sector. In particular, the relative position of
government employees worsened considerably compared to the other groups in the
economy.
The second development was the martial law that followed the military coup of
1971 and was in effect until 1973. This law was an important element of the antilabor
movement. It effectively banned all union activity and successfully lowered the rate of
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Table 6.13
Real Wages in Manufacturing
(Thousand TL)
Public Sector Private Sector
Real wages Growth rate Real wages Growth rate
1%5 8,967 -0.8 6,829 -1.2
1966 9.760 8.8 7,226 5.8
1967 10,188 4.4 7,816 8.2
1968 10,779 5.8 8,264 5-7
1%9 11,575 7.4 9,390 13.6
1970 12,844 11.0 9,823 4.6
1971 12.916 0.6 11.139 13.4
1972 12,693 -1.7 10,544 -5.3
1973 12,974 2.2 10,988 4.2
1974 14,082 8.5 10,977 -0.1
1975 15,780 12.1 11,880 8.2
Source: Ebiri, 1977.
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growth of both nominal and real wages. Although unions succeeded in increasing wages,
these gains were lost in the martial law period. Actually, real wages declined for the first
time since 1951 and it was not until 1975 that labor started to catch up with its premartial
law level of wage increases. In this period, wage earners in general, and civil servants in
particular suffered an acute drop in their purchasing power. Later in 1980 when another
military government took power, it once again shelved the system of collective bargaining
and imposed mandatory arbitration, leading to very similar results tp those of the 1970s. In
addition to the inadequacy of union attempts to secure wage increases, the unionization
rate, the number of workers covered by the provision of collective bargaining, and the
share of wage income all declined. It seems that the second coup successfully
accomplished the objectives of the anti-labor movement began by the 1971 coup.
Mark-up rates indicates that mark-up rates on variable costs have an inverse
relationship with rates of change of real wages. This was true with the exception of 1978-9
which were years of acute supply bottlenecks leading to erratic jumps in the mark-up rates
for several industries. Also, there was a distinct increase in industrial mark-up rates during
the 1980s compared to earlier periods. The decline in real wages reinforced the direct
adverse effect of mark-up increases on the share of wages in value added; the net result was
a decline in the share of labor in value added (Boratav, 1987). Several recent studies on
income distribution (e.g., Celasun, 1986; Ozmucur, 1987; Ozotun, 1987) also show that
during the 1980s the income distribution has shifted dramatically against labor.
Non-wage payments or Surplus (interest, rent, tax, and profit)
Surplus shares and rates declined in intermediates and capital goods, especially in
petroleum products, electrical machinery, machinery, metal and non-metallic mineral
products, and rubber and plastics. During 1965-75, the share of surplus in value added
was 70% in the public sector, and 60% in the private sector. The difference is due to
relatively higher capital intensity, higher indirect taxes, and lower tax evasion in the public
sector. The rate of surplus (Net surplus/K stock) in the public sector dropped to 56% in
1975 compared to 68% in 1965. In the private sector, it declined from 1965 to 1971, but
increased in 1972 and then declined to 54% in 1975 (Ebiri, 1977).
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In the public sector, the rate of surplus increased until 1968, but declined
afterwards. In 1975 it dropped to 30% from an average of 50-60%. Besides tobacco,
petroleum, and food and beverages, where indirect taxes were high, the rate of surplus was
very low. In the private sector, after 1965, except in 1972, the surplus rate declined
continuously, especially after 1973. Aside from tobacco, printing, paper, and motor
vehicles, it declined in all subsectors. The decline in the surplus rate was due to the wage
increases, low capacity utilization, especially at times of foreign exchange shortages, and
the limited size of the domestic market.
In the public sector, the surplus/wage ratio was 2.93 in 1965, increased to 3.43 in
1974, but dropped to 1.79 in 1975. Tobacco, petroleum, and food and beverages kept it
high during this period. In the private sector, it was 2.04 in 1965, dropped to 1.64 in
1971, later except in 1972, then declined continuously until 1975. Intersectoral capital
intensity differentials seem to explain the differences in surplus/wage ratios: higher capital
per worker leads to higher surplus ratios.
Manufacturing Investment
Public sector investment concentrated in intermediate goods in the 1960s. This
concentration increased in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. In contrast, public sector
investments in the capital goods sector declined significantly during the late 1960s.
However, in the mid to late 1970s there was a big public investment effort in the
engineering industries. In the consumer goods industries public investment was halved
during the late 1960s in comparison to the early 1960s, but during the export boom in the
early 1970s, it again increased. Private sector investment, on the other hand, also declined
in consumer goods during the late 1960s, but it almost doubled starting in 1972. Although
throughout ISI, especially during the second plan period, intermediate goods absorbed
more than half the private investment, after 1972 their importance declined. As the share of
public investment in capital goods declined starting in the late 1960s, the share of the
private sector increased in a complementary way.
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Dynamic 1-0
A dynamic I-0 analysis a la Stone-Almon based on the input and investment
coefficients (without distinguishing domestic from imported inputs) for 1968 helps to
determine investment requirements for balanced growth (Kepenek, 1977). For 1968 (the
initial year) the biggest difference between realized and calculated values was in the
intermediate goods and capital goods sectors; the realized values were (40% and 33%,
respectively) less than requirements. Thus, given the structure of production, output levels
were not high enough for balanced growth, except for the consumption goods sector, For
1972, the analysis showed that realized output levels fell short of balanced growth
requirements, especially in mining, by 150%, in the intermediates, by 30%, and in capital
goods, by 100%. This indicates a fast growth in the intermediates, although they lagged
behind the balanced growth values, whereas in the capital goods declined. In the energy,
agriculture, services, and construction sectors a similar problem existed. Given the crucial
importance of energy and construction as inputs into production in other sectors,
bottlenecks became increasingly serious in these sectors. In the consumption goods
subsectors, in contrast, the realized values were 40% higher than the calculated balanced
growth values. This was because of the heavy concentration of manufacturing production
on consumption goods during the early 1970s, partly due to the export boom.
The effect of investment demand on manufacturing output and employment was
highly significant. In 1968 the production increasing effect of investment (the ratio of
required output increases due to investment to those due to final demand) was 1% in
consumer goods, 34% in intermediates, and 75% in capital goods. The direct-and-indirect
output requirements of investment in manufacturing were about 27% in 1967 (Korum,
1977). Therefore, by the end of the 1960s increased investment in the intermediates and
especially in capital goods would have led to higher growth. However, increasing
investment in consumption goods for export purposes was given priority.
An alternative solution based only on domestic inputs for 1968 sheds light on the
extent of sectoral import dependency (Kepenek, 1977). Especially in the capital goods
producing sectors and in the construction sector, initial invesments look much smaller if
only domestic inputs are used. However, in the construction sector large differences in the
input and investment coefficients only show with respect to its investment demand from the
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machinery and services sector. The important point is the dependence of sectoral
investment on not only the production structure of the same sector but also on the
production structure (input and investment coefficients) of the whole economy. A
comparison of production values based only on domestic inputs exhibits wide sectoral
differences. But, in intermediate and capital goods and also in mining, production based
on domestic inputs lagged far behind the total output. For example, in the capital goods
sector production based only on domestic inputs accounted for 54% of the total in 1968 and
later even less. This indicates the high import dependency of these sectors. On the other
hand, in consumption goods, agriculture and energy, output based only on domestic inputs
was not much different from the total output based on both domestic and imported inputs.
A comparison of the solutions based on total inputs and only domestic inputs,
under the assumption of constant final demands and sectoral growth rates, may indicate that
the decline in the input and investment coefficients would also lead to decreases in
production. A modification of the solution with constant input coefficients and variable
investment coefficients, or vice versa, would be necessary. These results indicated that
agriculture, mining, consumption goods, energy and construction exhibited import
dependency with respect to intermediate inputs, but the intermediate and capital goods
exhibited import dependency with respect to investment goods as inputs; and also that
intermediate and capital goods play a very significant role in economy-wide growth.
When the assumption of constant sectoral growth rates was relaxed, two
conclusions emerged: (i) the amount of production and its growth rate was related to the
growth of other sectors, i.e., intersectoral dependence, and (ii) the growth rate of the
economy depends on the rate of growth in those sectors with strong intersectoral
dependency. This leads to the conclusion that the intermediate and capital goods sectors
were the "motors" of growth for the whole economy. When the assumption of constant
final demand was relaxed, it became clear that if final demand was higher in those sectors
with strong forward and backward linkages, in both inputs and investment, sectoral and
general growth rates would be much higher.
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b. Decomposition analysis
During 1953-73, economy-wide domestic final demand expansion was the most
important source of growth and structural change. Technological change and trade factors
(ISI and export expansion) contributed significantly to structural change rather than
growth. The relative contributions of the trade factors varied depending on the existing
trade regime. ISI had a more significant impact on structural change than did exports in
the 1950s and the 1960s, but this was reversed from the early 1970s onward when trade
liberalization was observed. Also, the relative contribution of import substitution was
affected by variations in the nonproportional growth rates of imports (in relation to total
GDP) under the composition method, i.e., the contribution of ISI to structural change
depended on the availability of imports.
The decomposition measures for the 1953-73 period in gross output and value
added were calculated using the constant share method (first difference and deviation) and
the constant composition method (deviation) (Celasun, 1983). In each case, the total and
the direct measures showed that during 1953-73, the increase in domestic final demand
accounted for 87.3% of the increase in total gross output and 49.4% of the structural
change in production. Technological change (change in I-0 coefficients) played a
significant role in structural change (35.1%) but not in growth (3.2%). The combined
trade effects (of export expansion and of import substitution) were more important in
structural change (15.5%) than in growth (9.5%). Import substitution was more important
in structural change than in growth (6.3% vs. 2.4%). The contribution of export
expansion to both growth and structural change was less pronounced thoroughout the
period. The relative contributions of import substitution were higher than those of export
expansion during 1953-63 and 1963-68, but a sharp reversal occured in 1968-73.
Sources of growth in major sectors
Growth: Domestic final demand expansion was the most important factor in output
growth at the 9-sector level (agriculture, mining, food, textiles, basic, lighth, and heavy
manufacturing, services, and social overhead). In manufacturing, ISI was also an
important source in 1953-63 but its somehow diminished in 1963-73, while the opposite
happened with respect to technological change. Domestic demand expansion played a
predominant role in agricultural growth throughout the 1953-73 period. Towards the end
of this period, the contribution of export expansion (due to intermediate demand increases
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generated by food and textile exports) increased. In the expansion of mining output,
intermediate demand from the other sectors were very important throughout. Especially the
increased share of raw minerals in intermediate inputs required by the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors in 1968-73 had a significant impact. However, after 1973 this
pressure led to a rapid growth of oil and non-oil mineral imports as domestic supply
consistently fell short of meeting domestic demand. In services and social overhead,
domestic demand expansion was the predominant source of output growth while exports
also contributed positively. This was mainly due to changes in transportation and in trade
margins on commodity exports.
In manufacturing, domestic final demand expansion accounted for 81% (1953-63)
and 76% (1963-73) of the growth of gross output. The combined trade factors accounted
for only 11% of the manufacturing growth, whereas technological change contributed 8%
(1953-63) and 13% (1963-73). These results demonstrate the overwhelming role of
internal factors in manufacturing growth. The overall ISI effects were 18% (1953-63) and
14% (1963-73), but turned negative in 1968-73. Export expansion was insignificant in
1953-63, but became important in 1963-68 especially for food processing, and also
explained 20% of the production incease in food and textiles and 11% of the aggregate
growth in manufacturing in 1968-73.
Structural change: In structural change, ISI was the most important factor during 1953-
63, but its contribution declined significantly later. Technological change was also very
significant in the 1950s and became even more significant in the 1960s. In contrast,
domestic final demand was not an important contributor to structural change during the
1950s; however, it became important during 1963-73. Domestic demand expansion and
technological change (or changes in the 1-0 coefficients) were the major sources of
structural change. The changing composition of domestic final demand represented the
combined effects of : (i) non-uniform income elasticities of consumer demand, which
produced a decline in the share of agriculture and food and a corresponding rise in
manufacturing and services, (ii) faster expansion of demand for investment goods, as
opposed to consumption goods, (iii) increasing proportions of machinery and equipment in
total fixed investment, and (iv) a faster rise in public consumption than in private
consumption.
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The changes in the I-0 coefficients did not reflect an effort to replace imported
primary products with domestic manufactured ones. Thus, it did not reduce dependence on
primary imports as in some cases of successful ISI (e.g., Korea, Japan). The observed
technological changes reflect: (i) changes in intra-sectoral product flows of agriculture-
livestock-food, e.g., less animal service, more processed feed, and higher stages of food
processing that require less agricultural input; (ii) the introduction of new techniques and
intermediate inputs into various sectors, e.g., chemicals for agriculture; (iii) the widening
range of use for the basic intermediates like electricity, transport, trade, and services; (iv)
the direction of the input substitution that resulted in reduced demand for the primaries,
e.g., increased use of synthetic fibers in textiles. The compositional changes in domestic
final demand accounted for 47% (1953-63) and 70% (1963-73) of the negative deviations
in agricultural gross output and 56% (1963-73) of the large positive deviations in
manufacturing (excluding food and textiles). These trends were strengthened by the effects
of technological change, which caused negative output deviations in agriculture and
positive deviations in manufacturing. In the growth of services and the social overhead,
the combined deviation effects of domestic final demand and technological change were
also dominant. During 1953-63, ISI was a sizable source of structural change in
manufacturing (59%, excluding food and textiles). This positive effect continued during
1963-68, but was reversed in 1968-73. In 1963-73, only 8.8% of total manufacturing
growth was due to ISI. In contrast, export expansion was negligible in 1953-1963, but
accounted for 16% of manufacturing output deviations in 1963-73 (Celasun, 1983).
Sources of growth in Manufacturing
In manufacturing, domestic demand expansion was the most significant source of
output growth throughout 1953-73. Export expansion was important only during 1968-
73. ISI contributed significantly during 1953-63 but declined during 1963-73, whereas
technological change exhibited the opposite pattern. The contribution of domestic final
demand expansion was relatively high in machinery and textiles, average in the light
intermediates (wood products, paper and products, rubber and plastics), and low in the
basic intermediates (chemicals petroleum and coal products, non-metallic mineral products,
basic metals). In contrast, the effects of technological change were strong in basic
intermediates, moderate in light intermediates and food processing, and negative in textiles
and machinery (Celasun, 1983).
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During 1953-63, export expansion was an insignificant source of output growth in
all manufacturing industries. The contribution of exports to manufacturing growth had
been marginal during 1963-68. However, during 1968-74 the following sectors had
significant (>30%) contributions: soft drinks, tobacco, furniture, leather and fur products,
and other manufacturing products. However, in 1973-74, the contribution of exports
decreased compared to the 1968-73 period, especially in wearing apparel, leather and fur,
other chemical products, and cement. In contrast, it increased in furniture, other basic
metals (copper, etc.), and footware (Ciller, 1981). Due to the intermediate demand effects
of export growth in agriculture, food and textiles, small positive contributions were noted
in the growth of chemicals, petroleum refining, rubber and paper products, and basic
metals. In 1968-73 the positive export growth contributions in non-metallics and metal
products were based on the direct effect of export expansion in these subsectors
themselves. This period of successful export expansion reflects Turkey's comparative
advantage in food, textiles and apparels, non-metallic mineral products, and some selective
items in basic metals and metal products.
ISI was a significant source of manufacturing growth in 1953-63. Its relative
contributions in the early stages of industrialization exceeded 20% in non-metallic products
(cement, glass, etc.), petroleum refining, basic metals and non-electrical machinery. In
textiles and rubber products the contribution of ISI was 8%. The contribution of ISI to
manufacturing growth was significant during 1963-68, especially in intermediate and
capital goods which were mostly consumer durables. However, the importance of ISI
declined significantly after 1968. In consumer goods, ISI had no significance. In capital
goods, except for transportation vehicles and non-metallic minerals, ISI also lost its
significance. In contrast, in intermediate goods ISI continued to be important into the early
1970s. During 1963-73 the contribution of ISI was 12% in the machinery output, 11% in
paper and and transport equipment, and 18% in rubber, but negative in the basic
intermediates as a group. Chemicals, one of the key basic intermediates, always had a
negative ISI contribution (Celasun, 1983).
The most significant result of the sources of manufacturing growth analysis is the
contrasting patterns of ISI and technological change in the basic intermediates and the
machinery group. The substantial early contribution of ISI to output growth in basic
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intermediates declined over time, whereas technological change continued to have a
relatively large role in their expansion, especially in chemicals. In turn, machinery had more
favorable ISI effects, while it experienced negative contributions from technological change
(except transport equipment in 1963-73). The sustained growth effects of technological
change in basic intermediates underscores the continuing process of technical innovations
and/or input substitution. The latter process had important implications for the growth of
intermediate goods imports throughout 1953-73. In 1963-68, the contribution of domestic
demand increase to growth was more than 90% in 8 basic consumption goods and 10
intermediate goods. In 1968-73, its contribution in consumption goods declined slightly; to
less than 90% in other foods, tobacco, and wearing apparel. However, it accounted for
more than 90% in 4 intermediate (plastics, metal products, iron-steel, other chemicals
(excluding drugs and fertilizers)) and 3 capital goods (other motor vehicles, electric
machinery, non-electrical machinery and agricultural machinery) sectors (Ciller, 1981).
These results clearly mark different stages of ISI: mostly consumption goods up to the early
1960s (1963) and, mostly consumer durables (intermediate goods and capital goods) during
the 1960s. While after 1968 ISI made no contribution to growth in consumption and
capital goods, intermediates continued to be important into the early 1970s. A comparison
with the results of a crosscountry study involving 63 countries (Chenery, 1960), reveals
that ISI was not a significant source of manufacturing growth as elsewhere; instead,
domestic demand increases were very important in Turkey (Ciller, 1981).
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3. MEASUREMENT OF ISI
The major approaches used in the measurement of ISI during the planned period were:
a. import/output ratios (a la Lewis and Soligo, 1965),
b. sectoral growth functions (a la Chenery-Shishido-Watanabe,1962; Chenery,
1960 and Lewis and Soligo, 1965), where sectoral growth is a function of
domestic final demand, ISI and export expansion, and
c. intersectoral approaches (a la Morley and Smith, 1970).
a. Import/Output ratios
The import/output ratio is net imports (imports minus exports for any commodity)
divided by total availability (local production plus imports). The changes in the
import/output ratio determine the extent of import substitution. To find the value of import
substitution for each year, the change in the import/output ratio of that year is multiplied by
the total availability of the same year for the commodity in question. The value of import
substitution in industry (consumer goods, intermediates, fuels, machinery and equipment)
during 1952-65 is shown in Table 6.14. Import substitution proceeded in a step-like
fashion; with major jumps in 1954, 1956, and 1964. 1954 was the beginning of the import
controls, and the first ISI crisis happened in the late 1950s. Following the first military
coup, 1960-62 were years of political instability and economic uncertainty. With the
beginning of the planned period in 1963, ISI resumed.
Table 6.14
Import Substitution in Industry
(% of industrial output)
1952 +2.78 1959 +3.59
1953 -.27 1960 -1.47
1954 -3.52 1961 .00
1955 -3.14 1962 -2.54
1956 -5.86 1963 -1.93
1957 -1.27 1964 -4.42
1958 -3.42 1965 -2.68
Source: Aker, 1968.
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At its height, ISI in industry was about 6% in 1956 and 4.5% in 1964. In
manufacturing it reached 10%. Between 1960 and 1965 import substitution was 5-6% of
total imports. Throughout the 1950s, ISI took place primarily in consumption goods
(1953-56 yearly average value of ISI was $16 m) followed by intermediate goods (1954-58
average was $8m), and machinery (1953-58 average value was $5m). Among the
subsectors, petroleum products showed the highest level of ISI, followed by textiles and
non-electrical machinery, rubber, and electrical machinery. However, ISI in the latter
subsectors varies between 25-40% of the ISI in petroleum products. The lowest level of
ISI was observed in ceramics, leather, and glass products (Aker, 1968).
During 1963-68 the share of imports in total supply declined considerably,
indicating a period of successful ISI (Table 6.15). However, in 1968-73 it increased
significantly in several sectors, leading to higher ratios both economy-wide and in
manufacturing (Korum, 1977). This indicates the so called "difficult" phase of ISI, i.e.,
the transition from the consumer goods stage to the intermediate and capital goods stage.
Table 6.15
Import/Output ratios
Economy-wide Manufacturing
1963 0.062 0.174
1968 0.043 0.103
1973 0.071 0.154
The percentage of ISI (the change in the import/output ratio) during 1963-68 was
>100% in coal mining, alcoholic beverages, and leather; >80% in agriculture, wood
products, furniture, petroleum products, railroad transport, and metal products; and >60%
in other food, textiles, wearing apparel, rubber-plastic products, iron-steel, electric
machinery, electronics, and motor vehicles. However, during 1968-73 there was decline
in ISI in most of the other sectors; the highest were in cement (97%), in transportation
(45%), and in personal services (30%).
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Interestingly, the changes in the import/output ratio paralleled the changes in foreign
exchange reserves. 1963 was the beginning of planned ISI and large amounts of foreign
aid inflow that allowed a period of successful ISI. However 1968 was a year of foreign
exchage shortages and of low ISI; 1973 again was a year of foreign exchange abundance
and of increased imports. It seems that foreign trade policies have followed from the
foreign exchange situation; when reserves went up import liberalization was increased,
without its effect on the protection of manufacturing being fully taken into account.
b. Sectoral growth functions
During 1963-68 the contribution of domestic demand to sectoral growth was 91%,
of exports 2%, and of ISI 7%. ISI contributed significantly, especially because of
developments in the intermediates and capital goods subsectors, which basically produce
durable consumption goods (motor vehicles, rubber and plastic products, petroleum
products, machinery). In consumption goods, the contribution of ISI to growth was 5%, in
intermediates 14%, and in capital goods 35% (Celasun, 1983). This clearly indicates that
1963-68 was the period of ISI in consumer durables.
During 1968-73 the economy-wide contribution of ISI to growth became negative
(-2.3%)while the increase in exports contributed 6.4%. The largest contribution came from
domestic demand - inputs 36.8%+final 59% - 95.9%. ISI in manufacturing was relatively
significant only in paper and cement. In the rest of the subsectors its contribution to
growth was negative, especially in capital goods (-9%) and intermediate goods (-5%). In
mining, this contribution was -81%, due to increasing crude petroleum imports. Also as a
result of reliance on petroleum (in 1973 the share petroleum in total energy sources was
50.5% ) imports increased significantly. Because at least 70% of energy is used in
manufacturing, the import dependency of the industrial sector increased even further. In
the 1970s, however, the contribution of exports to manufacturing growth was a significant
10%. It was mostly based on consumption goods (tobacco, food, textiles, wearing
apparel), and some intermediate goods (petroleum products, cement, non-metallic
products, iron-steel), and the metal products. The largest contribution was in textiles and
wearing apparel (28.4%), and food (17.4%). Outside manufacturing, exports from the
transportation sector contributed 14.2%.
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ISI in total production and ISI in input production calculated separately (based on
the share method for 1963-74 ) lead to the following the main results.
i. ISI in input production:
ISI in inputs indicates the extent of dependency of manufacturing production on
imported inputs. In general, a period of successful ISI in inputs was observed during
1963-68, but it declined after 1968, and finally in 1973-74 became negative in the
manufacturing sector on the whole (Ciller, 1981). During 1963-68, the highest percentage
of ISI in inputs was observed in petroleum refining, non-electrical machinery, agricultural
machinery, and other manufacturing products (e.g., microscopes, lenses, cameras, films,
watches, alarm clocks, musical instruments, etc.). In 1968-74 in addition to non-electrical
machinery and agricultural machinery, paper products and chemical fertilizers also
exhibited high levels of ISI in the production of manufacturing inputs.
However, after 1968 ISI in inputs was not significant in the manufacturing sector.
During 1963-74 other food products (except sugar, tea), textiles, clothing, paper products,
cement, non-metallic products, and non-electrical and agricultural machinery showed
continuous ISI in inputs. On the other hand, after 1968 there was a tendency for ISI to
decline in the following sectors: wood and cork products, furniture, publishing, printing,
leather and fur products, rubber, petroleum refining, other petroleum and coal products,
iron-steel, other minerals, electrical machinery, transportation equipment, plastic products,
and other manufacturing products.
ii. ISI in total production (input+output):
ISI in total production, so as to meet both intermediate and final demands, took
place mostly in petroleum refining, motor vehicles, non-electrical machinery and
agricultural machinery in 1963-68. In 1968-74, however, motor vehicles, fertilizers, and
metal products exhibited the highest levels of ISI. In general, ISI in total production was
positive during 1963-68, but in 1968-74 turned significantly negative. These results were
similar to those of ISI in input production.
A comparison of the ISI in input production and in total production reveals that:
(i) ISI in final product and inputs continues: other foods, textiles, paper products, cement,
non-metallic minerals;
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(ii) ISI in inputs but not in final product: wearing apparel, non-electrical machinery,
agricultural machinery;
(iii) ISI in final product but not in inputs: publishing, printing, petroleum refining, motor
vehicles. Only in consumption goods (other foods, textiles) and in certain intermediate
goods (paper, cement, non-metallic minerals) did ISI in the production of both inputs and
the final product continue. Mainly, ISI continued with an increasing tendency in the
production of the final products only. This naturally followed from the consumption goods
orientation of the manufacturing sector, and the preference to base production on imported
inputs instead of developing the supporting intermediate and capital goods industries.
c. Intersectoral Approach
The increases in output as a result of ISI in a certain subsector create intermediate
demands (domestic and imported) from the other subsectors. However, this intersectoral
dependency is not explicitly taken into account by the two previous approaches to the
measurement of ISI, namely, import/output ratios and sectoral growth functions. The
intersectoral approach a la Morley and Smith calculate ISI in a certain subsector plus the
added contribution of this ISI to ISI in the other subsectors. To be able to meet a given
final demand, the difference between the actual ISI and the necessary level of ISI in each
subsector indicates the sufficiency of output growth in each sector. According to the
calculations for 1963, 1968, and 1973, during 1963-1968, there was a great discrepancy in
the intermediates and a smaller one in the capital goods, but this discrepancy grew
significantly in 1968-73 in the intermediates (Korum, 1977). In other words, in the
intermediate and capital goods sectors the extent of ISI was not sufficient to meet final
demand during the second and the beginning of the third stage of ISI (1963-73) in Turkey.
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4. STRUCTURAL CHANGE - GROWTH - ISI
Changes in domestic demand - ISI:
One of the most salient characteristics of development in the post-war period in
Turkey was the shift in domestic demand from the agricultural sector to the industrial
sector, and within the industrial sector from consumption goods to intermediate and capital
goods. In manufacturing, the value of output (in constant prices) increased by 1.6 fold
between 1963 and 1968, by 1.8 fold between 1968 and 1973, and 3 fold between 1963
and 1973. The deviation of the actual growth rates from the proportional (balanced)
sectoral growth rates shows the pattern of change in domestic demand parallel to the stages
of ISI: during 1963-68 the emphasis was on intermediates, and during 1968-73 on capital
goods. However, in general the Turkish manufacturing sector was consumption oriented,
e.g., in 1973 the share of consumption in capital goods was 83.1% in metal products, 56%
in electronics and electrical machinery, 24.8% in metal products, and 37% in motor
vehicles. In the intermediate goods sector, the share of consumption in total demand was
27.7% in wood products and furniture, 42.6% in paper products, 56.2% in leather, and
58.4% in non-metallic mineral products. The non-durable consumer goods stage of ISI
was completed during the 1950s. The 1960s mostly represented the durable consumption
goods stage, and the 1970s mostly the intermediate and capital goods stage in Turkey. The
change in final demand was closely related to the process of ISI; demand increases were
generally observed in those sectors with higher import content, which unfortunately further
increased dependence on imported inputs.
The sectoral distribution of the proportional growth rates indicates that
nonproportional growth concentrated in paper, leather, rubber-plastic, chemicals,
petroleum products subsectors during 1963-68, whereas it shifted to food and textiles
(major exports), steel-iron, metal products, and various other capital goods sectors during
1968-73. In 1963-68, this change in demand was largely met through import-substitution.
In 1968-73, however, given the favorable foreign exchange situation, it was largely met
through increased imports. In the consumption goods sector, where domestic demand had
declined, export promotion policies coupled with favorable international demand
conditions, led to a significant increase in the manufactured exports, especially of textiles
and wearing apparel.
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Mixed economy - ISI
The complementary role of the state sector and the private sector remained
unchanged throughout the stages of ISI. During the first stage of ISI, the output share of
the state sector was 73% in capital goods and infrastructure, 52% in consumer goods, and
36% in intermediates. The most important subsectors were machinery, metal products,
iron, petroleum products, paper, wood products, tobacco, and clothing. During the second
stage of ISI, the public sector concentrated in the production of intermediate goods, while
its share in others declined. During the third stage of ISI, in addition to tobacco, beverages
and other state monopolies, paper, petroleum, iron and steel continued to be important.
The share of the public sector in capital goods decreased to a low 17% by 1973. In the
most dynamic subsectors, like metal products and electronics, public sector involvement
was never serious where the structural advantages of the public sector, e.g., scale
economies, could have been fully utilized. However, in the late 1970s again there was an
important investment effort in the capital goods by the public sector.
The division of labor between the private and public sectors has been such that the
public sector largely provided necessary inputs into the private sector. Interestingly, when
the balance of payments was favorable, the private sector seemed to prefer imported inputs
instead of inputs produced by the public sector. However, during times of foreign
exchange difficulties, the private sector could rely on obtaining the necessary inputs from
the public sector at prices below their cost of production. Given this division of labor, the
public sector concentrated in meeting domestic demand, rather than export demand. The
public sector exported less than its share in total manufacturing production. Besides
tobacco in exports and petroleum products and paper in ISI, other subsectors where the
public sector had a high output share did not play an important role in international trade.
Intersectoral linkages - ISI
In 1963-73, the key sectors (with strong forward and backward linkages) were
mostly in the intermediate goods sector and were also dominated by the public sector.
During 1963-68, ISI in these sectors was successful; however, later in 1968-73 ISI became
negative. Therefore, the ISI policies and the actual key sectors did not coincide after 1968.
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Among the key sectors with respect to employment creation possibilities, only in motor
vehicles and non-metallic minerals did somewhat significant ISI take place, and in textiles
exports reach relatively high levels. In all these subsectors, with the addition of metal
products, there were significant increases in employment. Because demand had shifted
towards the capital goods sectors, with their high employment coefficients, continued ISI
would have been helpful in alleviating unemployment. However, later in the 1970s, the
ISI efforts in this direction did not prove to be successful.
Distribution of value added - Wages - ISI - Exports
In export goods, such as food, textiles, tobacco, forest products, and leather,
nominal wages were lower than the manufacturing average. Conversely, in the most
successful import-substituting sectors, except metal products and rubber, nominal wages
were higher than the manufacturing average. However, in the capital goods sector the
effects of relatively higher public sector wages were not felt to a great extent because of the
higher the employment share of the private sector than of the public sector. In capital
goods sectors and in durable consumption goods, capital/labor ratios were generally lower
than manufacturing averages. The private sector concentrated in those sectors with low
capital/output ratios and lower capital/labor ratios, whereas the public sector ISI shouldered
the relatively more capital intensive sectors. The division of labor within this mixed
economy was perfectly complementary.
With respect to the distribution of value added, the share of wage payments in
manufacturing was higher than the economy average. On the whole, the share of wage
payments was relatively lower in the capital goods sectors; therefore profitability should be
higher. In contrast, in the export sectors the share of wage payments was higher due to
high labor intensity, despite lower wages. The importance of the highly import-
substituting capital goods sectors and the relatively labor intensive export goods sectors in
providing employment opportunities and improving income distribution becomes clear.
However, the relatively high import dependency in the capital goods subsectors effectively
limited this possibility.
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Manufacturing investment - ISI - Exports
The pattern of manufacturing investment seemed to follow the ISI efforts closely,
and the private sector investments were involved in relatively high import substitution. In
1963-67, both private and public investment concentrated in those intermediate and capital
goods sectors (mostly consumer durables) where significant ISI took place. Public
investment was high in chemicals, petroleum products, steel-iron, and non-metallic
minerals. ISI was especially successful in petroleum products, and steel-iron. The private
investment concentrated in textiles, clothing, food, rubber, plastics, petroleum products,
and also in chemicals, non-metallic minerals, steel-iron. In 1968-72, there are important
changes in the pattern of both public and the private investment. The public sector directed
its investment effort towards the intermediates (paper, chemicals, petroleum products, and
steel-iron); shifting away from the capital and consumer goods sectors. However, these
efforts were not enough to meet rapidly increasing demand. As a result, imports of various
intermediates (e.g., steel-iron) also increased significantly. In the private sector,
investments shifted towards the capital goods sector, especially to motor vehicles and
machinery. Within the total investment in capital goods, the share of the private sector
increased to 82% during 1968-72 from 62% in 1963-67.
The relationship between the marginal capital/output ratios, investment and ISI also
followed the requirements of the division of labor between the public and private sectors.
In general, manufacturing investment has (marginal) incremental capital/output ratios that
are lower than the economy average. Within manufacturing, in intermediate goods they are
higher than in the consumption and capital goods sectors. The public sector share is
relatively higher in paper, steel-iron, chemicals, and non-metallic minerals. In addition,
the public pricing policies represented another means of resource transfer to the private
sector, which concentrates in those sectors with lower ICORs. The fundamental character
of the ISI process was such that the subsectors with low ICORs exhibited relatively high
ISI. These subsectors were mostly capital goods where domestic demand was also higher,
however, as the share of foreign capital was also higher, they were more import dependent
than the other manufacturing subsectors. These subsectors were dependent was also on
costly imports of investment goods in addition to raw materials imports necessary for the
production of consumption goods. Thus, the import requirements of the ISI process
progressively increased along its stages.
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Manufacturing growth - Effective protection - ISI - Exports
The major characteristics of the system of protection that prevailed in the 1960s,
and to a considerable extent in the 1970s were as follows:
i. A significant discrimination between the primary sector and manufacturing;
effective protection in these sectors averaged 197% and 314%, respectively. The resulting
relative price distortions were high. Sectoral reallocation of labor, because of the unusually
large differences between productivity levels in the agricultural and the nonagricultural
sectors, has been significant The continuous movement of labor from the low productivity
agriculture to the high productivity nonagricultural sectors had been an important source of
value added growth. The ratio of VA per labor in the nonagricultural sectors to that in
agriculture was 4-5 in 1953-78. The highly overvalued factor returns and incomes in the
nonagricultural sectors have been indicated by the unusually large sectoral productivity
differentials.
ii. The escalation in protection for the subsectors from lower to higher stages of
fabrication, especially in food, basic metals, and metal products. The consequence had
been the emergence of high-cost private firms that produced equivalent products for the
domestic market under different technological agreements, and therefore, with no particular
tendency for either horizontal and/or vertical specialization. This led to difficulties in
producing standard capital goods.
iii. Wide differences between the nominal protection rates and the tariff rates
reflected the presence of large import premia in all industries due to quantitative import
restrictions.
iv. Export promotion schemes did not succeed in removing the bias against
exports, which is measured as the percentage of excess VA in production for the domestic
market over VA in production for exports. In sum, the protectionist system effectively
reinforced the effects of domestic demand expansion as a source of growth in general and
in private-led machinery and related industries in particular.
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Acccording to the effective protection rates, calculated for 1968 a la Balassa,
among the manufacturing subsectors rubber products, cement, printing, publishing, wood
and cork products were the relatively highly protected subsectors, whereas sugar, alcoholic
beverages, footware, metal products, furniture had negative protection (Ciller, 1977).
Unlike the earlier ISI period, during 1968-73 the contribution of ISI to manufacturing
growth had no significant relationship to effective protection. In 12 import-competing
sectors (import/domestic demand >5%) again there was no relationship between effective
protection and the ISI that took place. However, the 1968 effective protection rates seem to
have a negative relationship to ISI in these 12 subsectors during 1973-1974. Therefore,
between the ISI in intermediate goods and effective protection there was no positive
relationship.
However, based on the same data, there was a significant but negative relationship
between export growth and effective protection. In other words, even after the export tax
rebate, effective protection produced an anti-export bias. The negative effects of protection
on exports (after export tax rebates a la Balassa, the measure of anti-export bias used here
is the difference between the value added of a commodity when it is produced domestically
and the value added when it is exported) during 1968-73 have been relatively high in
furniture, metal products, other foods (except tea, sugar), motor vehicles, and rubber and
rubber products. In contrast, petroleum refining, alcoholic beverages, and plastic products
seemed to be positively affected by protection.
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH ISI: SUMMARY
During ISI, the share of manufacturing in GNP nearly doubled; it increased from
11.4% in 1950 to 22.4% in 1976. Manufacturing growth was impressive, with annual
average rates of 8.5% in 1950-1963 and 10.2% in 1963-1976. However, the average
growth rate of manufacturing declined to 2.1% during 1976-1979, while its share in GNP
dropped to 18% in 1979-80.
(1) During 1953-73 the economy-wide contribution of ISI was rather limited
(Table B.1). During 1953-63 and 1968-73, the contribution of ISI to gross output growth
(based on the share method) was lower than that of the other factors, namely domestic
demand, export expansion, and technological change. Whereas its contribution to structural
change (based on the composition method) was higher than that of the exports only. ISI
contributed to both output growth and structural change more significantly in 1963-68
during the consumer durables stage.
Table B.1
Gross Output Growth, percent Structural Change, percent
D ISI E 1-0 D ISI E 1-0
1953-63 92.4 1.9 2.7 3.0 49.8 9.5 4.0 36.6
1963-68 83.6 8.2 4.8 3.4 48.4 11.2 8.9 31.5
1968-73 86.0 -1.3 12.1 3.2 51.2 8.7 8.0 32.1
1973-77 100.4 0.6 -0.1 -
1981-84 64.3 -3.7 39.5 -0.1
D=domestic demand expansion; ISI=Import substitution ; E=Export expansion; I-O=
Change in Input-Output coefficients (Technological change).
Source: Celasun, 1983.
(2) During 1953-63 and 1963-68, the contribution of ISI to manufacturing growth
was greater than that of the exports and the technological change (Table B.2). However,
during 1968-73 it turned negative while the exports and the change in 1-0 coefficients
showed a significant increase in their contribution to manufacturing growth. The highest
contribution of ISI to manufacturing growth (10.5%) was during the second stage of ISI.
With respect to the contribution of ISI to structural change in manufacturing, the most
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important period was 1953-63; it was lower than that of the technological change only. But
in 1963-73, ISI contributed to structural change less than all the other factors did.
Table B.2
Manufacturing growth, percent Structural change, percent
D ISI E 1-0 D ISI E 1-0
1953-63 81.0 9.1 2.3 7.6 1953-63 16.6 38.3 2.2 42.9
1963-68 75.2 10.5 4.4 9.9 1963-73 38.1 9.4 15.9 36.6
1968-73 76.2 -1.5 10.7 14.6
Source: Celasun, 1983.
(3) During 1953-63, in addition to the non-durable consumer goods, ISI mostly
took place in the basic intermediates and machinery (rubber and plastic products, non-
metallic minerals, basic metals, petroleum products and machinery). Later in 1963-73 the
light intermediates, especially paper, gained importance while the basic intermediates
declined, with the exception of chemicals; and metal products and transport vehicles also
picked up while machinery also declined significantly (Table B.3).
Table B.3
ISI in manufacturing subsectors, %
D ISI E 1-0
'53-63 '63-73 '53-63 '63-73 '53-63 '63-73 '53-63 '63-73
Food 88.2 57.9 -3.0 1.6 2.9 21.4 11.9 19.1
Textiles 93.0 87.6 7.8 1.4 4.1 10.7 -4.9 0.3
Light I. 76.9 74.6 3.5 10.9 1.4 3.5 18.2 11.0
Basic I. 56.6 69.5 16.6 -0.9 1.2 5.5 25.6 25.9
Machinery 122.1 91.8 37.3 -60.4 1.0 2.3 -60.4 -3.2
Total 81.0 75.8 9.1 3.3 2.3 8.2 7.6 12.7
Light Intermediates: wood, paper, rubber and plastic products
Basic Intermediates: chemicals, basic metals, petroleum and coal products, non-metallic
mineral products
Machinery: metal products, machinery, transport equipment
Source: Celasun, 1983.
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(4) Domestic industries were protected from foreign competition through high
tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other barriers. Industrial production was carried on
under an oligopolistic industrial structure with a few large and many small firms. It was
based on a division of labor among state, local, and foreign capital, where the main role of
the state was to complement the private sector. Domestic demand shifted from non-durable
consumer goods towards consumer durables, intermediates and capital goods. Parallel to
these shifts, in the 1950s ISI in the public sector was in consumer goods and basic
intermediates, in the 1960s in light intermediates, and in the 1970s first in consumer goods,
and later in capital goods. The public sector concentrated on intermediates and capital
goods that required large capital outlays, advanced technologies, and large scale, while the
private sector (local+foreign) focused on consumer goods where the most significant ISI
took place.
(5) ISI continued with a heavy emphasis on the production of final goods, not of
intermediates and capital goods. On the whole, ISI was relatively high in consumer goods,
but it failed to meet domestic demand in intermediates and capital goods. From the 1960s
to the 1970s the gap between total production and domestic demand increased, especially in
intermediates. This gap was smaller in capital goods, however. During 1963-74 total ISI
(ISI in both input and output) continued only in food, textiles, paper, cement, and non-
metallic minerals. During 1963-68 total ISI took place in petroleum, agricultural machinery
and non-electrical machinery, other manufacturing and during 1968-74 in motor vehicles,
metal products, and fertilizers.
(6) During the 1960s and the early 1970s, most "key" manufacturing subsectors
were in intermediate goods. Most were also import-dependent; which clearly illustrates the
difficulty of continued ISI. In general, production in intermediate and capital goods
required imported capital goods, while that in consumer goods (and also in agriculture,
mining, energy and construction) required imported intermediates. The high share of
imported intermediates in manufacturing indicate the extent of import dependency. The
input shares in VA during 1950-79 were: capital 20%, labor 10%, imported intermediates
70% in the private sector, and in the public sector 30%, 15%, and 55%, respectively.
(7) Labor intensity was higher in the consumer goods and some capital goods
subsectors. Although total manufacturing employment was high in the public sector, it
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increased faster in the private sector during 1965-75. Employment creation possibilities
were relatively high in consumer goods subsectors that had a high export share, where
production mostly took place in small private establishments. Manufacturing employment
also increased in capital goods (durable consumer goods). This, however, was a limited
gain because of the smaller share of these subsectors, in addition to the temporary nature of
expansion due to subcontracting for the production and service-repair of parts.
(8) The most capital intensive subsectors were intermediates in the public sector
(petroleum, metal products, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, paper). Throughout the
1960s and into the 1970s, the capital intensity of fixed investments in manufacturing
continued to increase, especially in chemicals, basic metals, and petroleum refining. The
productivity of capital increased more in consumer and capital goods, which were
dominated by the private sector.
(9) While the share of wage payments in value added (which were lower in
manufacturing than the economy average) had a cyclical pattern, that of non-wage
payments declined, especially in intermediate and capital goods during 1965-75.
Investment changed parallel to the stages of ISI and according to the division of labor
between the public and private sectors. In the 1950s in consumer and capital goods the
public sector took the lead; in the 1960s intermediates gain importance while capital and
consumer goods declined in the public sector, whereas private investment concentrated in
consumption goods. In the 1970s public investment increased in intermediates and capital
goods while the private sector turned to consumer goods during the export boom..
(10) Intermediate input requirements increased along the stages of ISI, especially in
the import-dependent subsectors. The share of intermediates in industrial production and
the share of capital goods in fixed capital investment both increased. The increase in the
share of intermediates was larger: compared to the 1963-69 period, in 1970-77 it increased
to 30.2% from 20.2%. In the same time period, the share of capital goods increased to
23% from 19.7%.
(11) The purpose of ISI was to decrease the external dependence of the economy.
Until the late 1960s, ISI contributed positively to manufacturing growth , but it also created
various structural problems. The high degree of protection led to increased import
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dependency in industrial production; at the same time it discouraged exports of industrial
goods. In addition to protection, overvaluation of the exchange rate made imports more
attractive, leading to higher imports and anti-export bias. The resulting periodic balance of
payments crisis finally halted ISI in 1980.
Sources of Turkish industrialization: An international comparison
Turkey experienced higher relative contributions of domestic demand and
technological change to manufacturing growth than did Japan, Norway, Korea, Taiwan,
Mexico, Colombia, and Israel (Chenery, 1979). The narrow role of export expansion was
similar to that in Mexico and Colombia, which also experienced substantially larger ISI
effects. Compared to the countries that switched to export promotion successfully, such as
Korea, Taiwan and Israel, the inward-looking phase of manufacturing growth was too
prolonged in Turkey. One result was the emergence of a highly protected industrial
structure which heavily relied on imports of intermediate goods. While the effects of ISI
on the process of growth and structural change were only moderate, its role as a trade
adjustment mechanism was substantial. During 1953-63, ISI made the largest contribution
to the growth of manufactured imports (-220%), its contribution was halved in 1963-68 (-
113%), but turned positive (4.7%) in 1968-73. Parallel to the stages of ISI, manufactured
imports also increased. The contribution of ISI to change in the 1-0 coefficients
(technological change) was -27% in 1953-63, but 29% in 1963-68 and 8% in 1968-73.
During 1953-78 a comparison of Turkey's structural characteristics with those
predicted for a country of its size and income level (a la Chenery and Taylor, 1968) reveals
that the actual shares of industrial output, exports and employment in their respective totals
lagged behind cross-country norms, despite a substantial catching-up effort in 1963-78. In
1953 Turkey lagged behind cross-country norms in all intermediate goods while exceeding
the norms in food, textiles, machinery and allied industries. In 1963 the actual shares of
the textiles, basic intermediates, and machinery subsectors were comparable to the norms,
with food processing surpassing the norms and light intermediates (especially in wood, and
paper products) falling markedly below predictions. The period between 1963 and 1973
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experienced a pronounced fall in the share of food processing, a significant rise in the share
of machinery and transport equipment, and gradual improvement in the shares of light and
basic intermediates.
The major characteristics of the transformation of Turkish manufacturing in 1953-
78 can be summarized as follows:
i. In response to the changing composition of domestic demand, as income levels
rose, the structure of manufacturing shifted to the "middle" and the "late" industries.
ii. Despite the rapid decline in the relative share of food processing after 1963, its
actual share has been higher than the predicted share in 1963-78 due to the export
expansion effects on the growth of this subsector. In contrast, in textiles and leather export
expansion have not been sufficient to change their relative position in the manufacturing
sector.
iii. The middle industries (petroleum, non-metallic minerals) showed a significant
catching up effort in 1953-63, but only a moderate expansion after 1963. There were
significant time lags in the introduction and/or expansion of the middle industries such as
rubber, paper, printing. The highly capital intensive nature of fixed investments posed a
resource allocation problem. On the whole, they contributed inadequately to ISI and to
employment creation.
iv. The rapid increases in the actual shares of the late industries (basic metals,
machinery, transport equipment) may be due to domestic price distortions, but they also
indicate very high income elasticities.
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PART C. A THEORY OF ISI
VII. THEORETICAL MODELLING
The first part of this chapter provides a summary of the character of Turkish ISI
during the post-World War II period. It also compares the experience of ISI in Turkey
with that of the Latin American countries and others in order to demonstrate the general
pattern of industrial cycles and the structural change that accompanies ISI. The second part
introduces a model of ISI. This formalization attempts to capture the cyclical pattern and
the highly dependent character of growth during ISI. The major conclution is that without
the development of a broad industrial base, sustained growth and productive investment
cannot be achieved.
1. EXPERIENCE OF ISI
Turkey registered continuous trade deficits from 1950 to 1979. They resulted from
large imports of necessary capital and intermediate goods in the face of insufficient export
earnings. Figure 7.1 shows the ratio of the trade deficit to exports, which clearly
demonstrates the serious crisis of the late 1970s. The intensity of the foreign exchange
crisis varied over the 1950-1979 period, depending on both the availability of foreign
exchange to finance the imported intermediates and import requirements of the
manufacturing sector during a particular stage of ISI. The periods of crises are also the
periods of severe quantity rationing (Krueger, 1974). The quantity of imports, which was
rationed, varied over time. Figure 7.2 shows import availability as measured by the share
of imports in industrial GDP (Aksoy, 1982). This measure of import availability also
reflects the cyclical pattern of industrial growth. Furthermore, parallel to the stages of ISI,
the import requirements of the manufacturing sector changed substantially. When these
requirements could not be met satisfactorily, the result was stagflation, in addition to a
serious balance of payments crisis. Three cycles of this nature occured in Turkey: one in
the 1950s, one in the 1960s, and one in the 1970s. During the first half of each cycle,
foreign exchange was not a major problem (1950-55, 1959-63, 1971-1976), but during the
latter half of each cycle, especially towards the end, foreign exchange crises intensified
(1956-58, 1964-70, 1977-79) (Krueger, 1974). In sharp contrast to its initial logic, the
process of ISI in Turkey proved to be highly "foreign exchange dependent", rather than
"foreign exchange saving".
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Figure 7.1 Ratio of Trade deficit to Exports
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Following the crisis at the end of each stage of ISI, Turkey made an attempt at
stabilization through a standard IMF program. All stabilization attempts (1958, 1970,
1978-79) were geared towards providing new external credit to be able to continue ISI.
However,.without providing any meaningful solution to the underlying structural
problems, when development efforts are heavily dependent on external resources, they will
often be frustrated and lead back to the IMF for new credit. The IMF sees the problem as a
monetary phenomenon, therefore the suggested solution is a contraction of the economy to
reach a short-run equilibrium at a lower income level. The failure of IMF programs is due
to the fact that the economic structure under ISI is not sensitive to policies based on the
price mechanism. Without increasing imports through new credit inflow, industrial
production, and therefore manufactured exports, cannot increase. The result is an inflation-
debt vicious circle.
In the post-WW II period, Turkey entered a process of integration into the world
economy through increased agricultural exports. Especially during the first three years of
the 1950s, this process was successful. It was due to the favorable conjuncture of the
Korean War, the agricultural boom, and increased foreign exchange reserves during the
war years, in addition to considerable amounts of foreign aid. However, this initial
success did not last long. By 1954, as agricultural expansion reached its limits, GDP
growth started to decline. Import liberalization had led to increased foreign exchange
expenditures. As imports almost doubled between 1950 and 1953, but exports did not
keep pace, the trade deficit deteriorated. This first meant rapidly declining foreign
exchange reserves, and later increasing external borrowing. In addition, monetary
expansion coupled with stagnating production led to spiraling inflation. The balance of
payments difficulties continued during 1954-58. The increasing trade deficit was
temporarily financed through short-term credits, but later import restrictions were
introduced. By 1958 there was not enough foreign exchange left even to finance one
week's worth of necessary industrial imports. Following this first crisis, a standard IMF
package, the 1958 Stabilization Measures were accepted. In return, 359 million dollars
worth of fresh credit was provided and 600 million dollars of external debt was
rescheduled. (GNP in 1958 was 6.75 billion dollars.)
The stabilization measures, however, did not produce the expected results.
Inflation continued to increase by 20% between 1958 and 1960. Devalution increased the
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cost of imported goods, and together with the SEE price hikes, led to increased industrial
costs. Similarly, credit expansion and import liberalization fostered imports while exports
did not respond to devaluation. The result was an increasing trade deficit. Also, limiting
the growth of Central Bank and commercial credit affected investment. Parallel to declining
investment, industrial production stagnated. 1958-62 was a period of contraction for the
economy. The lesson from the 1950s was that when industrialization efforts were based
on external credit, instead of necessary structural changes that can create a real base, an
inflation-external debt vicious circle eventually follows. And the solution will naturally be
imposed by the party that holds the key to more credit, the IMF.
After the failure of openness through free market mechanisms, Turkey chose
regional agreements as an alternative. This started with the 1963 agreement to join the EEC
and the establishment of the Organization for Regional Cooperation and Development
(RCD) with Iran and Pakistan in 1964. In 1960, based on OECD consortium credits five-
year development plans were introduced and the first plan announced import-substitution as
the official industrialization policy. This inward-looking industrialization process, based
on high protection and import-dependency, continued throughout the decade. However, as
a result of limited foreign exchange earnings from traditional exports, but exploding
imports, the trade deficit more than doubled in 1969 compared to 1964. Although
workers' remittances helped greatly to ease the deficit, additional foreign exchange
resources were needed. Further external borrowing followed. In 1968 about half the
imports were financed through external borrowing. This signalled the beginning of a
serious debt burden in the late 1960s. Given the second foreign exchange crisis, the need
for fresh credit injection finally led to the Stabilization Measures of 1970. This standard
IMF package also required devaluation. In return, 950 million dollars of new credit
temporarily eased the balance of payments deficit.
Following the devaluation, in the early 1970s both export revenues and workers'
remittances increased greatly, exports by almost 2.5 fold and remittances by 10 fold.
Favorable demand conditions in the world market for primary exports in the early 1970s
had a lot to do with this export expansion. Despite increasing foreign exchange earnings,
however, stabilization measures did not yield the desired results. This was because foreign
exchange expenditures were increasing even faster following the injection of new credit.
Imports increased 3 fold by 1973 compared to 1969. As a result of these developments,
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the trade deficit almost tripled by 1972. The petroleum crisis of 1974 made the situation
much worse. In sum, the result was similar to that of the 1958 Stabilization Program. The
standard IMF measures were implemented to obtain sorely needed credit, and with the
temporary solution it provided, ISI resumed.
With the oil crisis, Turkey once again turned to external borrowing to finance the
deficit. This took the form of short-term borrowing, especially of the CTDLs, in the
European money market that was booming due to petro-dollars. Between 1975 and 1977,
of the rapidly increasing external deficit, 16% was financed through the use of existing
foreign exchange reserves, 7% from IMF credits, and 77% through short-term credits. In
addition, as a result of the 13 mini-devaluations, Turkish Lira was devalued by 68%
between 1970 and 1978. During 1974-76, based on very rapidly increasing CTDLs, there
was a period of high growth. However, in the meantime, the investment-savings balance
of the economy deteriorated and close to 25% of investment was through the use of
external resources. This was an indicator of the increasing seriousness of the external debt
problem. As the real increase in exports was only 10% of that of imports during 1973-77,
the trade deficit reached twice the size of export earnings by 1977. The current account
deficit deteriorated as remittances declined after 1975. Also, inflation due to agricultural
support prices reached 25%. Private investment declined due to the lack of necessary
imports. Foreign exchange reserves fell to such a low level that they could only meet a few
months' import demand. In addition, as an energy bottleneck became serious, industrial
capacity utilization fell and production declined. Starting in 1977 new stabilization
packages were introduced, but until the 1979 IMF agreement, no new credit was made
available. 1.5 billion dollars worth of OECD credit was supposed to follow. However,
without having the chance to utilize this credit, the government had to leave office in 1980.
Despite stabilization attempts starting in 1977, which included the standard IMF
measures, by 1980 neither had the balance of payments deficit improved, nor was
stabilization achieved. The GDP growth rate became negative. Inflation reached 60% in
1979. Despite devaluation, although workers' remittances increased, the trade deficit
showed no improvement as exports actually declined following devaluation. Without fresh
credit, there was no way to resume industrial growth, and therefore to increase exports.
The only way to continue financing industrialization by external borrowing was through the
IMF. Accordingly, the IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment Program followed in 1980.
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The OECD pledged $1.16 billion in aid; a three-year IMF standby credit for $1,650 million
(six times Turkey's quota, the largest such proportion ever granted in standby assistance);
the EEC resolved to extend 336 million in aid over five years. Also the OECD agreed to
reschedule $2.9 billion in debt for the second time (already rescheduled in 1978-79).
The 1980 Structural Adjustment Program aimed at not only stabilizing the
immediate economic crisis, but also changing the inward-oriented industrialization strategy
that Turkey had followed for nearly three decades. The new strategy involved an outward
orientation with market forces playing an increased role in the economy. According to this
program, Turkey was expected to specialize in the production and exports of consumer
goods such as textiles, food products, clothing, ceramics, and leather goods. The
production of these goods mainly utilizes domestic raw materials and relatively cheap labor.
Most industries producing such goods had already been successful in generating exports
during the brief export drive in the early 1970s. Export-oriented production of intermediate
and capital goods, based on subcontracting for parts, was also encouraged. As a result of
the opening of the national economy to international competition, the process of ISI was
largely halted. Most of the highly protected import-substituting industries could not stand
the competition; takeovers and bankruptcies were widespread. Contrary to a domestic
market orientation, the channelling of most resources to industrial production for export
purposes brought about a total reversal of the ISI process.
Turkish growth performance in the 1980s looks impressive compared to other
(capital importing) developing countries. An average annual rate of growth of 4.8% was
achieved during the 1981-1986 period. During the "Turkish miracle" exports grew at an
annual average rate of 21.6%, in volume terms, from 1981 to 1986. In addition to the
successful exchange rate policy, extremely generous export subsidies, highly advantageous
market conditions in the Middle East (mosdy due to the Iran-Iraq war), and successfully
restricted domestic demand all contributed to the the export boom of the early 1980s.
In the post-miracle period, however, Turkey is facing serious economic problems:
inflation remains very high, income distribution continues to worsen as real wages follow a
downward trend, and debt service imposes a heavy burden. Inflation, according to the
official statistics, averaged 36.9% during the 1981-86 period. The rate of export expansion
declined substantially after 1984. Even an export boom of great proportions was not
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enough to create the necessary foreign exchange earnings for adequate debt service. Given
the continued real depreciation of the Lira, the debt/output ratio steadily deteriorated.
Moreover, rescheduled liabilities from the earlier phase of the adjustment were added on,
and the share of short-term debt more than doubled since 1982. In 1984, about fifty cents
of every dollar of export earnings went to service Turkey's external debt; now it is more
than eighty cents. In the light of the previous experiences, the rapidly increasing short term
debt points to yet another debt crisis.
A comparison of ISI experiences: Turkey, Latin American countries, and others.
Following the Great Depression of 1929, many LDCs adopted an import-
substituting development strategy. In the post-WW II period, it was established as the
driving force of industrialization. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s ISI was a general
phenomenon in Latin America, especially in the larger countries (Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina), South and East Asia (India, Pakistan, the Philippines), and the Middle East
(Turkey, Egypt, Syria). In Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela, contrasted with
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, ISI started later in the 1950s as a solution to the balance of
payments deficits (see, for example, Furtado,1978). However, relatively small domestic
markets prevented ISI from being implemented in Hong Kong and Singapore, while
Malaysia continued to follow an export-oriented policy based on processing domestic raw
materials. South Korea and Taiwan also implemented ISI, but mostly in labor intensive
light industries where small scale production continued to be profitable. Israel, Syria, Sri
Lanka and Uruguay also turned to inward-looking industrial production. The early to mid-
1960s also marked the beginning of large scale ISI in several sub-Saharan African
economies (Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia). In the 1980s, ISI continued to dominate the
development plans of the smaller, less industrialized LDCs.
A comparison of the Turkish experience of ISI with the experiences of other
countries helps to shed light on this strategy of industrialization. This is especially true for
the larger Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and, to some
extent, Columbia and Venezuela) which are thought of as sharing common politico-
economic developments (see for example, Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). These countries are
comparable to Turkey in that they have a similar economic structure and process of
integration into the international economy, although Turkey follows them with a time lag.
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The Turkish case is often thought of being unique; however, this comparison points to
quite similar cross-country patterns. The results of this comparison provide us with the
basic characteristics of the countries that experience industrial growth cycles during ISI.
Actually, a global pattern of industrialization experience in LDCs begins to emerge.
In this section, a brief comparison of ISI experiences will be attempted by tracing
the role of ISI in the process of development:
- beginning of ISI: From export-economy stage to ISI,
- crisis of ISI,
- solution to crisis of ISI, namely, export-promotion which produced "miracles" in
certain countries with relatively developed industrial structures,
- post-miracle stage: ISI is largely halted as a result of the "opening up" of the
national economies to international competition.
Beginning of ISI
The process of Turkey's integration into the world economy through "free trade"
began in 1838 with the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention and lasted until the Great
Depression of 1929 (Alpar, 1974). This was the "export economy" stage of development
fostered by a "free trade" economic policy, which required imports of industrial goods and
exports of primary goods, such as cotton, tobacco, and various foodstuffs. In the face of
European competition, native industries began to crumble, and by the late 1800s the
Turkish industrial sector was on the verge of collapse. Within a relatively short period, the
Ottoman Empire was effectively transformed into an agrarian reserve for the expanding
European countries. Increasing imports and sluggish exports, together with the Porte's
financial crisis due to its large territorial losses, led to heavy borrowing from Europe
starting in 1840 (Dogan, 1980). As early as 1877, the Porte had to declare bankruptcy,
and shortly after, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA), a European controlled
organization established to collect payments on these loans, followed in 1881. The OPDA
period lasted until 1914. In sum, the export economy period resulted in an economic
structure that was incapable of sustaining growth given a serious balance of payments crisis
and an increasing external debt.
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Following WW I and its extention in Turkey, the War of National Liberation, the
Turkish republic was formed in 1923. Naturally, the post-war era was a period of
economic and political reconstruction. Throughout the early years of the republic the free
trade policy continued. With the Great Depression, however, both the export and import
flows were cut off. This situation necessitated state intervention in the economy, because
at that time an organized group of industrialists did not exist in Turkey (Boratav, 1974;
Okyar, 1965; Hershlag, 1968). The state had to step in to shoulder the responsibility of
starting domestic production of basic consumer goods, such as textiles, sugar, and flour.
As a result, a rapid industrialization took place throughout the 1930s. It was based on the
utilization of domestic resources. However, with the outbreak of WW II, this initial
momentum of industrialization came to an end.
With the exception of the Statist period (1931-37) Turkey had fallen behind the
Latin American countries in her efforts to industrialize. However in the post-WW II era
Turkey and Latin America began a common capital accumulation process. The most salient
characteristic of this period was the internationalization of productive capital. The national
commercial capital, which had gained considerable strength during the war period by taking
advantage of the highly inflationary and speculative environment, joined by metropolitan
capital slowly transformed itself into industrial capital (Boratav, 1974; Karpat, 1959).
Parallel to the Latin American situation, the "triple alliance" of the state, local industrialists,
and the MNCs came to form the foundation of planned ISI in Turkey. Shortly after the
1960 military coup, it would turn into a "quadruple alliance" as the Turkish Armed Forces
also joined in the process of industrialization.
In Latin America, the export economy stage started around 1850 with the national
independence movements and lasted until the Great Depression. As in Turkey, this export-
oriented growth was realized through continuous external debt ( Cardoso and Faletto,
1979). During WW I, although exports of primary goods from Latin America continued,
imports of manufactures were cut off. As a result, taking full advantage of the emerging
domestic market for manufactures, the small urban bourgeoise successfully transformed
itself into an industrial class (Frank, 1967; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). This made the
domestic production of basic consumer goods possible in Latin America, much earlier than
in Turkey. These developments that had started with WW I and were reinforced during the
Great Depression also continued throughout the WW II years. Moreover, increased
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international demand for Latin America's primary exports helped to build extensive foreign
exchange reserves. Also, a period of successful ISI had strengthened the industrial class.
Thus, the foundations of ISI to come in the post-war era were firmly established (see for
example, Baklanoff, 1971; Diaz-Alejandro, 1970). With the participation of the state in
industrial investment (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979), a period of rapid industrialization was
witnessed, especially in basic consumer goods. This was in sharp contrast to the Turkish
case where the process of industrialization was totally halted due to the war. In Latin
America, the first stage of ISI, the non-durable consumer goods stage, continued roughly
until 1950 ( Diaz-Alejandro, 1970; Furtado, 1965), Hein and Stenzel, 1979).
From the mid-1950s onward, however, ISI took on a different character. The
internationalization of productive capital in the post-WW II era facilitated a shift to the
second stage of ISI, the durable consumer goods stage, which continued throughout the
1960s. In many Latin American countries, the national industrial capital was either joined
by or absorbed by industrial capital from the metropolitan countries (Pompermayer and
Smith, 1973; Dos Santos,1973). As in Turkey, foreign capital had become an inseparable
part of the ISI process in Latin America. There was a large inflow of foreign capital, in the
form of both credit and aid. But more importantly, productive investment provided the best
oppportunity for foreign capital to avoid highly protective tariffs and to capture the
domestic market effectively. Also, as the Latin American export boom came to an end with
the Korean War in 1953, and the price of traditional exports declined considerably, foreign
exchange bottlenecks became binding. This situation forced most national economies to
open up to foreign capital ( Furtado, 1965; Diaz- Alejandro, 1970; Baklanoff, 1971). The
resulting interdependence between national and foreign industrial capital, together with the
state, created the "triple alliances" that formed the foundation of ISI in Latin America
(Evans, 1979; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).
Crises of ISI
In addition to balance of payments crisis as in Turkey, the limited size of the
domestic market also determined the limits of ISI in Latin America. Since demand for
consumer durables came mostly from the high income brackets, the saturation of the
domestic markets did not take long. As in the case of Turkey, the traditional export
structure and increasing dependence on imported inputs together led to cyclical balance of
payments crises. ISI was sustainable only through increased external borrowing (Furtado,
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1965). This fact also made the process of "deepening", i.e., moving to the later stages of
ISI, impossible (Hirschman, 1968). As in Turkey, the crises of ISI in Latin America took
on similar characteristics. As the crucial import needs of the import-substituting industries
became difficult to meet, low capacity utilization resulted. This, in turn, lowered industrial
profitability and investment, leading to lower levels of industrial production. Moreover,
given the highly protected nature of the domestic market, inflation skyrocketed. The
resulting stagflation effectively pushed industrial investment further away from production
and into speculative activities. (Hein and Stenzel, 1979 and Pompermayer and Smith,
1973 provide useful discussions of the crises of ISI in Latin America).
In general, as the consumer goods stage was completed, ISI entered a crisis period,
elements of which were serious balance of payments problems, large public sector deficits,
stagflation, and a worsening income distribution as real wages declined and employment
creation was low. The solution to these crises was typically sought through the standard
stabilization measures in the short run and the "new" industrialization strategies in the
medium to long run. However, there has been considerable inter-country variation in the
timing and the characteristics of this transition. In those countries where the durable
consumer goods stage was completed, e.g., Brazil and Mexico in the 1950s and 1960s,
Brazil in the post-1974 period, and Turkey in the mid-1970s, a "deepening" of ISI (a
transition to intermediate and capital goods stage) was attempted (see Foxley, 1980 and
Marini, 1972 for Latin America and Kepenek, 1982 for Turkey). Also, in some others
increased production of durable consumer goods was sought, e.g., Argentina, Mexico,
Brazil in the 1950s, Brazil in 1964-1971. Strategies for increasing exports of
manufactured goods included processing for exports, exports based on the already existing
import-substituting industries, and exports from the labor intensive assembly and process
industries (Nixson and Kirkpatrick, 1984). Greater emphasis on increasing the exports of
primary goods, in conjunction with other strategies, was witnessed in Chile and Uruguay
in the post-1973 period and in Argentina in the post 1976 period. In the 1960s, most of
the East and South East Asian countries attempted a transition from import substituting
industries to increased manufactured exports. Conversely, some smaller Latin American
countries aimed at industrial development with better distribution of income based on the
production of non-durable and cheap durable consumer goods, e.g., Chile (1966-1970,
1970-1973), and Argentina (1970-1976). In the post-independence era in the sub-Saharan
African countries, ISI in consumer goods achieved relatively high growth rates between
1964 and 1975. However, the crises of ISI began in the late 1970s and the early 1980s,
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leading to export oriented strategies in, for example, Kenya, Ivory Coast and Tanzania
(Nyongo, 1984). Also in India in 1975, in Egypt in 1974 and in Turkey in 1980 similar
shifts took place.
Solution to the crisis of ISI: Export-promotion
ISI does not seem to be a necessary precondition for the development of industrial
exports. Among the more successful exporters, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore had
switched to export-promotion after the"easy" stage of ISI, i.e., the non-durable consumer
goods stage. However, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and Colombia switched after
the second stage was completed, when foreign exchange constraints led to selective forms
of export-promotion mostly in non-traditional industries. Switching to export-promotion
from a more advanced stage of ISI resulted in highly diversified manufactured exports,
e.g., Latin American exporters have a higher percentage of intermediate goods exports than
the Far Eastern and Asian countries. However, most intermediate and capital goods
exports from the LDCs are sold to other LDCs, because they are not highly competitive
with exports from the industrialized countries. In some countries with relatively advanced
industrial structures, export diversification was encouraged as a way of earning enough
foreign exchange to continue ISI and hopefully to move to a later stage (see Pinto, 1978 for
the Brazilian case). The highly successful export drives led to the famous Brazilian
"miracle" (1968- 1974), and also the rather short-lived Argentinian "miracle" (1966-1970).
Interestingly, the Turkish "miracle" happened in the early 1980s. Unlike in Brazil and
Argentina, it came after the failure to move to the capital goods stage and during the
"opening up" of the economy to international competition.
One of the most important characteristics of the Brazilian "miracle" was the crucial
role played by the state sector: increased industrial investment in joint ventures with foreign
capital. A new division of labor within the "triple alliance" was accomplished with private
(national) capital concentrating in the production of consumer goods using smaller scale
and older technologies, while the state and the MNCs turned to more dynamic industries
with export orientation (Foxley, 1980 and Furtado, 1973). Another important factor in the
Brazilian "miracle" was, of course, the expanding world economy in the early 1960s
(Foxley, 1980).
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Post-miracle stage:
Given the limitations of the "miracle" stage, which heavily depended on external
demand conditions, the post-miracle economic programs aimed at a different kind of
structural change in these countries. In general, the "opening" of national economies aimed
at opening the domestic market to international competition, rather than encouraging the
previously import substituting industries to produce for export purposes. This took place
in Argentina with the 1976 economic program, in Chile with the beginning of the Pinochet
regime and in Uruguay from 1974 onwards (see Foxley, 1980 for Chile and Canitrot, 1980
for Argentina). However, a major restructuring of capital at the sectoral level and increased
monopolization resulted. The industries that were affected the most were durable consumer
goods and intermediates. Because they could not withstand foreign competition, the level
of production dropped significanly starting in 1978-79 (Vilas, 1982 and Bacha, 1983).
The process of "opening" up the national economies effectively halted ISI.
Moreover, it also changed the way these countries were integrated into the international
economy. In an environment where both productive investment and imports were
declining, further external borrowing was used to finance the balance of payments deficits.
Especially in countries with more developed economic structures, like Brazil and
Argentina, these crises were reflected as external debt burdens of unusual proportions.
Under these serious circumstances, further stabilization programs, almost independently
from domestic politico-economic conditions, become inescapeable.
In sum, cyclical industrial growth was observed in those countries which had
successfully moved through several stages of ISI, and thoroughly completed the "easy" or
the "horizontal" stage, e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India, and Turkey (see, for
example, Malan and Bonelli, 1977 on Brazil; Cavallo and Mundlak, 1982 on Argentina;
Aspra, 1977 on Mexico; and Berry and Thoumi, 1977 on Colombia). However, despite
the attempts in these countries, there has been only limited progress in establishing the
domestic capital goods industries. Two famous dependentistas, Dos Santos and Cardoso
also pointed to the lack of an established capital goods sector in the peripheral countries as
an important result of the ISI experience. Actually, Cardoso defined "dependency" as
"when the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic
component within the system" due to MNC control of the domestic market, only partial
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importation of technology, and the absence of a well-developed national financial system,
but most importantly, due to the lack of capital goods industries (Cardoso and Faletto,
1979). Industrial growth continued when there were enough foreign exchange to finance
the necessary imported inputs, otherwise it declined.
The politico-economic structures underlying this type of industrialization also
exhibit similar characteristics. The relatively "easy" stage of ISI is characterized by
populist regimes in general, while authoritarian regimes emerge in later stages (see for
example, Collier, et al., 1979). The "triple alliances" of state capital, domestic private
capital and foreign capital represent the crucial underpinnings of ISI. These countries also
share common patterns of integration into the international economic system. They are the
recipients of foreign investment rather than the source of it. They are at the receiving end
of new technologies and product innovation. Furthermore, they have a heavy external debt
burden in common. These countries also have a highly unequal distribution of income.
The high capital intensity and import dependency generally result in low industrial
employment generation, and real wages can successfully be kept low. The resulting
economic structure is such that, as primary sectors decline, services grow faster than
industry. However, due to the lack of vertically and horizontally integrated intermediate
and capital goods industries, production of consumer goods remaines dependent on
imported raw materials and intemediates as well as capital goods and technology. Despite a
certain degree of progress, a strong industrial base fails to develop to the extent that it can
sustain growth and productive investment. Also, the level of manufactured exports
remains low. Since ISI is naturally domestic market oriented, after the opening of the
economy only a limited number of goods are capable of withstanding international
competition.
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2. THE MODEL
The economy in this model follows import-substitution industrialization. It has a
relatively small share in world markets, and exports traditional agricultural products and
imports manufactured goods. Industrial imports into this country are intermediates and
capital goods, which are used as inputs in the domestic production of industrial products.
This country lacks a solid industrial base of intermediate and capital goods that is
horizontally and vertically integrated with the rest of the economy. Therefore, without
imported inputs, and also a high level of import protection, local industrial production is
impossible.
Let us assume that the production of the industrial good, Q, requires three factors
of production: labor (L), capital (K), and imported intermediate inputs (M). Given a high
level of unemployment, due to the limited capacity of the industrial sector to create
employment, that there exists a reservoir of "marginalized" labor. This readily available
skilled labor supply can easily meet the labor requirements of industrial production. There
exists excess capacity of capital. Existing industrial capacity cannot be fully utilized
because of the lack of imported inputs. This key assumption is based on empirical studies
of Turkish ISI, but it is equally valid for many other import-substituting countries (for
example, see USAID, 1965 on Latin America). Another common assumption about the
cause of excess industrial capacity is that it is due to insufficient domestic demand (see, for
example, Dutt, 1982 for the case of India). In the present model, the lack of the necessary
imported inputs becomes the binding constraint on growth. The availability of imported
inputs depends on the foreign exchange situation. When foreign exchange reserves are
high enough to finance necessary inputs, industrial production continues; otherwise it
stagnates. Traditional exports, which critically depend on the world demand, are the main
source of foreign exchange in this economy. Given the assumption that it follows ISI, the
high cost and low quality of its industrial production makes manufactured exports
impossible. Thus, industry is not capable of meeting its own foreign exchange needs.
At any given time, the amount of imported input stocks is the total available supply
for production. The amount of imported inputs actually used is proportional to QM.
Hence, the imported input supply into industrial production at time t is proportional to M(t).
The growth rate of industrial output, Q', is assumed to depend critically on imported input
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supply M. It is also assumed that M >0 is constant. Furthermore, there is a minimum Mo
necessary to sustain industrial production. For M > Mo, the industrial growth rate is
positive, Q' >0; for M < Mo, it is negative, Q'< 0; while for M = Mo, the industrial
growth rate is zero, Q' =0. The best way of capturing this is by making the growth rate a
linear function of M- Mo:
Q'/Q = a (M- Mo) (1)
where Q' = dQ/dt and Q'/Q = growth rate of Q at time t, or.
Q = a (M- Mo)Q, (2)
where a > 0 and Mo > 0 are constants. This can be rewritten as
Q' = (CM - D)Q; C, D > 0. (3)
Next, consider the growth rate of imported inputs. In each small time period dt, a
certain amount of imported inputs are utilized for industrial production. This amount
depends on the supply of M and the amount of Q produced using M, and it is proportional
to dt: f(M, Q) dt. It is assumed that f(M,Q) is proportional to Q, i.e., increased output
production results in increased amounts of imported inputs. It is also assumed that f(M,
Q) is proportional to M, i.e., the more available M is the more of it will be used, given the
excess capacity due to M availability, and thus more Q will be produced. Conversely, as
the level of M falls, compared to the full capacity M level, D, output growth slows.
In this economy, however, there exists a socio-politically "tolerable" level of
output, A. Only when the level of output falls below A, do imported input levels increase.
Especially at the end of each stage of ISI when necessary imports decline to such a low
level that producion requirements can no longer be met, a crisis period begins. The
solution typically follows from a standard stabilization program suggested by the IMF.
Only after agreeing to IMF conditionalities do large amounts of foreign credit flows in.
This makes the much needed imports of necessary inputs possible so that industrial
production can resume. Therefore, this "IMF behavior function" leads to the following
growth rate of necessary imported inputs:
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M'= (A - BQ)M. (4)
Equations (3) and (4) together form a system of simultaneous differential equations,
which are the Volterra - Lotka equations (Hirsch and Smale, 1974):
Q= (CM - D)Q,
A, B, C, D > 0 (5)
M'= (A - BQ)M.
This system has equilibria at (0, 0) and z = (D/C, A/B). Since (0, 0) is a saddle
point, it is unstable, and z is a center. The phase portrait of (5) can be investigated by
drawing the following two lines
M= 0: Q =A/B,
Q = 0 : M =D/C.
These lines divide the region M > 0, Q >0 into four quadrants as indicated in Figure 7.3.
The positive M-axis and the positive Q-axis are each trajectories as indicated in this figure.
Otherwise, each solution curve (M(t), Q(t)) moves counterclockwise around z from
quadrant to quadrant. This follows from the theorem which states that "every trajectory of
the Volterra-Lotka equations (5) is a closed orbit, except the equilibrium z and the
coordinate axes (Hirsch and Smale, 1974). The schematic phase portrait is shown in
Figure 7.4.
In this dynamic system, no matter what the levels of output and imported inputs
are, neither will grow indefinitely. Except for the highly improbable case of z, neither
output nor imported intermediates will remain constant, but they will oscillate.
Interestingly, any external shock to this system will bring about a shift from one integral
curve to another, so that the system will continue its periodic motion. After every
257
Q' =0
M' <0
Q' <0
--------- ---
M'>0
Q' <0
(0,0)
M'<0
Q' >0
Z
-------------------- 
M'=0
III e IV
I M' > 0
Q' >0
D/C
Figure 7.3 Trajectories
258
A/B -----
QI J
(0,0)
Figure 7.4 The Phase Portrait of Equation(5)
259
stabilization program, industrial growth will continue at a different level. The composition
of industrial production changes along the stages of ISI. Moreover, as ISI "deepens", the
import dependency of production increases. Therefore, fluctuations in output also become
larger. When this cyclical behavior becomes impossible to sustain, another more
"appropriate" external shock will put an end to it. For example, when ISI reached its limits
in Turkey in the late 1970s, there was a definite switch from ISI to export-promotion
industrialization. Thus, imported inputs ceased to be necessary for domestic industrial
production. Since the comparative advantage of Turkey lies in the exports of light
consumer goods, production of these commodities could be based on domestic agricultural
inputs instead.
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As an important stage in the economic development of Turkey, the post-WW II ISI
started in the early 1950s and lasted until 1980. The aim of this dissertation was to analyze
the major characteristics of growth and structural change during ISI. Industrial growth
during this period passed through three similar cycles each spanning about a decade. Each
cycle started with high growth and high expectations, but ended with a balance of payments
crisis accompanied with a drastic slowdown in growth. Each crisis led to a standard
stabilization program followed by a military coup. One principal finding was the
coincidence of the cycles in industrial growth with the stages of ISI. This stemmed from
the nature of the structural change that took place during ISI. The process of ISI was
increasingly dependent on external resources, especially on imports of intermediates and
raw materials, in addition to capital goods. As a result, industrial growth became
dependent on import availability; the economy could grow only when there was sufficient
foreign exchange, otherwise it would stagnate. Without continuous expansion of capacity
to produce necessary intermediate and capital goods and creation of new technologies,
effective accumulation and expansion of industrial capital was not possible. In short, as a
result of increasing external dependency, the resulting economic structure was not capable
of achieving self-sustaining growth. The second principal finding was that industrialization
initiated through ISI not only failed to acquire a built-in impetus, but also created an ever
increasing external debt. As ISI progressed, each stage became more import dependent,
and thus, each crisis was progressively deeper. Each stabilization program that followed,
in turn, led to increased external debt, thus exacerbating the balance of payments crisis.
This vicious circle of debt finally made ISI untenable and finally, there was a switch to
Export Promotion Industrialization (EPI) in 1980.
From a historical perspective, it is more than a coincidence that the stage of ISI, just
like the preceding Export Economy stage, created an economic structure that was incapable
of sustaining accumulation and productive investment, and generated a massive external
debt. The structural change that took place during the export economy stage led to
underdevelopment as well as a large external debt. On the problem of Ottoman debt,
Kiray, 1988 concludes:
"The history of the Ottoman Empire illustrates that foreign capital, be it
mercantile, financial, or industrial, whether it is accompanied by direct foreign
control or not, does not simply flow in and out of a country changing only the
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level and composition of economic activity. It is accompanied by strain and
structural change, both internally and with regards to the position the economy
holds within the international division of labor. Macro adjustment may come
through a redistribution of income, reshuffling of the balances of power, and a
restructuring of the capacity for productive investment. Within the economic
structures that emerged as part of the debt process, incorporation into the world
economy through increased export demand not only led to further debt, but also
to a lower rate of growth and to default. At the same time, the Empire exported
its economic surplus in return for imports of luxury and military goods, without
any of the actors having an effective incentive to accumulate and increase
productive capacity meant a sluggish and underdeveloped economy."
Equally interesting, however, is the fact that the Turkish external debt situation worsened
even after the switch to EPI. The economic structure that supported a decade of EPI is still
incapable of sustained industrialization. Also, on the verge of yet another debt crisis, there
are thoughts of going back to ISI in the 1990s.
The ideological component of economic development in Turkey did not change
significantly over time. The overwhelming desire "to catch up with the industrialized
West" has been the leitmotive throughout modern history. Although Statism has always
been among the official principles of the Republic, following the first successful period of
ISI in the 1930s, it was largely abondoned in practice. Especially after 1950, it came to
mean extensive state support for the dominant economic groups in the society; earlier on for
commercial and agricultural capital, and later increasingly for industrial capital. In line with
this basic ideological principle, the structural underpinning of ISI in Turkey was the "triple
alliance" of state capital, private capital, and foreign capital as in Latin America, which later
in the post-1960 period turned into the "quadruple alliance" as the armed forces also joined
in.
A historical review of different stages of ISI helped to uncover the overall character
of this strategy of industrialization. After WW II, during the transition to an open
economy, the early 1950s experienced a period of agricultural exports to Europe. Although
ISI continued in the background, it especially gained importance after the balance of
payments difficulties of the mid- 1950s. With the increasing involvement of foreign capital,
the first stage of ISI, the non-durable goods stage, was completed by the end of the 1950s.
However, a balance of payments crisis that developed in the late 1950s led to the 1958
Stabilization program and the first military coup in 1960. The early 1960s witnessed the
introduction of planned ISI. Under a mainly populist regime, a very successful second
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stage of ISI, the durable goods stage, followed. In the late 1960s, another balance of
payments crisis neccesitated the introduction of the 1970 Stabilization program and the
second military coup followed in 1971. After a short period of export-promotion in the
early 1970s, the rest of the decade was an effort to move to the next stage of ISI, that of
intermediate and capital goods. The state initiated this transition, but it remained
incomplete. Moreover, yet another serious balance of payments crisis developed in the late
1970s, which led to the stabilization programs of 1978-1980. The third military coup
followed in 1980. Finally, ISI had to be abandoned.
After the historical review of the stages of ISI, a detailed analysis of the extent of
ISI and its effect on manufacturing growth and structural change followed. This shed light
on the character of ISI at the subsectoral level. The results indicate that the Turkish
manufacturing sector failed to fulfill the expectation that it would be the "motor of growth".
It produced about 16% of the GNP with food and beverages, textiles and apparel, and
petroleum and coal products having the largest shares in value added. Not only did the
production of intermediates and capital goods fell short of meeting domestic demand, but
also, given rather limited traditional export earnings, industrial exports did not increase
enough to meet the import requirements of industrialization. Exports of manufactured
goods, although increased considerably in the 1970s, only reached 25% of industrial
imports by 1975. The share of capital goods within manufacturing did not increase much
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. On average, only 16.5% of manufacturing served
capital formation directly and/or indirectly through the production of capital goods and of
intermediates that are used in the production of capital goods.
There are several underlying reasons for the failure of the manufacturing sector to
fulfill the high expectations of its development. First, industrial production of consumer
goods was oriented towards the highly protected domestic market, and thus was incapable
of international competition. Second, because ISI started from the consumer goods stage
and developed as the local assembly of imported inputs into final commodities, it remained
highly dependent on these imports. The production technologies that ISI relied on were also
imported, and as such were neither very advanced nor labor intensive enough to provide
employment for the rapidly increasing urban labor force. In addition, as the cost of capital
was kept artificially low, capital intensive technologies were encouraged instead of labor
intensive ones. In sum, the infant industry argument totally failed in the case of Turkey.
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During the 1960s and through the mid-1970s, manufacturing was the fastest growing
sector of the economy. On average manufacturing value added increased by 10.5% annually.
Given this high growth rate, manufacturing must have been capable of providing necessary
resources for its own investment needs. Indeed, public sector investment in manufacturing
was only 15-25% of public surplus value and private sector investment was 35-45% of
private net surplus. Therefore, the manufacturing sector was chanelling a high percentage of
its resources outside. Another form of resource transfer out of manufacturing was through
changes in domestic terms of trade. As the prices of manufacturing inputs (raw materials and
intermediates) increased roughly 17% faster than output prices, domestic terms of trade
turned against manufacturing in 1968. As a result, input price increases were passed on to
consumers only in those subsectors where mass consumption goods (food and beverages)
were produced, either by monopolistic firms (chemicals), and/or firms that can
counterbalance this increase by keeping wages low (non-metallic products).
The rate of fixed capital investment determined the growth of manufacturing during
ISI. The fixed capital stock in the public sector increased by 2.7 times, and in the private
sector by 5.1 times. Of the total investment in manufacturing 42.4% was made by the
private sector, as opposed to 57.6% by the public sector. Despite the tendency of profit
rates to decline, manufacturing investment increased, due to increasing labor productivity
and the incentives created by the overvaluation of the T.L. In general, labor productivity in
manufacturing was higher than in other sectors of the economy. Also, the overvaluation of
the T.L. helped to keep the prices of the necessary imported inputs (intermediates and
capital goods) low and thus, provided a production subsidy to industrialists.
The contribution of the manufacturing sector to overall job creation also remained
low. Between 1965 and 1975, manufacturing fixed capital stock grew by 13.8% annually
compared to only 5.7% growth in manufacturing employment. Only 14% of the job creation
in the economy was provided by the manufacturing sector. Also, there was a marked change
in the composition of the manufacturing labor force. Highly skilled manpower increased
more than four-fold compared to medium and low level manpower. As a result, high level
manpower was downgraded and substituted for the medium and low level workers who
migrated to Europe. Although the relative shares of labor and capital roughly remained
constant, real wages always lagged behind productivity increases; labor lost compared to
other groups in the society. On the whole, income distribution continued to worsen.
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The theoretical model presented in chapter VII captures the cyclical nature of
industrial growth during ISI. The cycles are due to increasing import dependency of the
industrial sector along the successive stages of ISI. At the end of each stage, a balance of
payments crisis results in a shortage of necessary inputs. This in turn leads to lower
capacity utilization, and ultimately to lower ouput growth combined with higher levels of
unemployment and inflation. When the crisis becomes serious enough, an IMF sponsored
stabilization program is imposed. This brings "relief' in the form of international credit,
which makes it possible to continue ISI for a while longer. However, it also aggrevates
balance of payments problem and thus, keeps the vicious circle of debt going.
Relationship to previous work
It is generally agreed that there has been a significant level of industrial development
in the Third World through ISI in the post-WW II era. It was based on the production of
consumer goods, with imported intermediates and capital goods, under the aegis of MNCs.
In addition to the Neoclassical viewpoint, there are two alternative approaches to analyzing
the socio-economic structures that emerged in developing countries: Centre-periphery and
modes of production. In the centre-periphery view, the central issue is whether this kind of
industrialization merely reproduces relations of dependence, although in new forms, between
the centre and the periphery (e.g., Amin, Frank, Sutcliffe, Cardoso and Faletto), or whether
it marks the beginning of a breakdown of the centre-periphery division (e.g. Warren).
Followers of the Dependency School differ from earlier development economists in
their rejection of modernization theory (i.e., the "historically progressive" role of
capitalism) and in their emphasis on the nation state, not in isolation, but set in the context
of the world capitalistic system. They incorporate a strong historical dimension into their
work and use a dialectical rather than an equilibrium mode of analysis. But, they also differ
from the "global law of value" Marxism. This "neo-Marxist" group, based on rather
innovative revisions of both Marxist thought and the contributions of the earlier
development economists who effectively challenged the Neoclassical orthodoxy, question
the relevance of these ideas to the actual historical experience of the developing countries.
Although it emerged from Latin America, later contributions came from different parts of
the periphery, such as Africa and the Carribean.
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- Andre Gunder Frank, perhaps the best known dependentista, based on his work in
Mexico, Brazil and Chile, came to the conclusion that the process of the expansion of
capitalism throughout the world had led to the "development of underdevelopment". By
asserting that this process operates both internationally and internally within countries,
Frank elaborated dependency economics into a worldwide interdependent system. In this
framework he argued for the impossibility of capitalist development at the periphery;
socialist revolution was seen as the only solution (Frank, 1978). Among other
depedentistas, Dos Santos (1973) also came to the conclusion that at least "autonomous"
capitalist development is not possible and that a socialist path is the only escape for
developing countries. He emphasized the integration of national bourgeoisie with foreign
capital as the "dominated dominators" and also pointed to the lack of a capital goods sector
in the peripheral countries as an important result of ISI.
- The conclusion that socialism is the way out was also reached through different
analyses in the Marxist tradition. The Emmanuel-Amin theory of unequal exchange and
unequal development are also based on "trade imperialism". Amin's (1978) periphery
model, where production is geared towards exports of low-wage goods and of some
luxury goods for a small portion of the domestic market under the domination of MNCs,
leaves no room for transition to self-reliance for mass consumption goods and capital
goods. In a similar vein, Marini (1972) explains the case of "subimperialism" in Brazil,
which represents the stage of monopoly and finance capital based on exports of low-wage
manufactured goods. This system is crucially dependent on the superexploitation of labor,
managed by an alliance of the state and the MNCs.
- Within the dependency school, "marginality" analysts question the employment
generation capacity of peripheral capitalism. According to this view, under monopoly
capitalism technological change leads not to a fall in price, but increases in both profits and
wages. The latter causes a stagnation in the demand for labor. Thus, surplus population
ends up not being a "reserve army of the unemployed", but a "marginalized" and
"permanently excluded" labor force. In this analysis peripheral capitalism is readily
rejected as a socially and politically viable system.
. Another influential dependentista, Cardoso, provides a definition of dependency as
"when the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic
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component within the system" due to the absence of an established capital goods sector and
of a developed national financial system, MNC control of the domestic market, and only
partial importation of technology (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). P. Evans (1980) provides
an illuminating example of dependent development in Brazil.
. The Caribbean dependency school progressed parallel to, but independently from
the Latin American school, and is also largely based on Marxist thought. In general this
school saw no possibility of national development unless the plantation economy is
replaced by "people's capitalism". Thomas (1974), for example, points to the separation of
the pattern of domestic resouce use from that of domestic demand. In his view, this
divergence between domestic demand and the needs of the masses leaves no prospect for
"real" development, unless a socialist strategy is adopted.
. Sutcliff (1972) also discounted growth based on ISI. Because ISI-led growth
concentrated on the production of luxury goods with limited demand, it merely reinforced
existing highly unequal income distribution patterns. This thesis is very similar to that of
the dependency school. Moreover, due to the application of capital intensive methods
during ISI, employment growth was not high enough to absorb the unemployed masses.
The absence of a "(national) bourgeoisie and a proletariat" resulted from MNC control of
industrialization.
- Among the most influential Marxist critiques of the dependency school, Warren
(1973) pointed to the "internal contradictions" in the developing countries as important
constraints on their capitalist industrialization. These include agricultural stagnation,
excessive urbanization and in some cases premature transition to socialism prior to the
development of self-sufficiency.
As the dependency school seriously undermined the modernization theories and
redirected the conceptualization of capitalist expansion, later the dependency school itself
came under attack in the debate on the articulation of modes of production. This debate
focused on conceptualizing the logic and the consequences of worldwide capitalist
expansion. On the modes of production side, the Marxist debate parts from the classical
Marxist view that the modes of production are successive stages of socio-economic
development. However, given the experience in the developing countries, some
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economists argue, this does not hold. The "peripheral capitalist" social formations, in their
incomplete transition to capitalism, experience a form of problematic co-existence (or
articulation) of two or more different modes of production simultaneously: one is capitalist,
dominant and dynamic, while the other is pre-capitalist, subordinate and stagnant. Given
this fact, the debate concentrates on two basic questions (Brewer, 1978). One is related to
the importance of relations of production in explaining development: is it central or not?
( e.g., extraction of surplus, and unequal exchange). The other question is related to the
analysis of changes in the relations of production: are these relations relatively durable or
easily altered?
- Arrighi is mostly concerned with the importance of a historical and sociological
perspective in development studies: all theory must be located in time. In his work on
Central Africa, Arrighi (1968, 1970) pointed to the fully proletarianized workers who
benefit from the policies of income concentration, which in turn marginalize the semi-
proletarianized circular migrants. He argues that the intervention of the MNCs is
responsible for this change, which involves a small portion of the proletariat as opposed to
providing income for the masses. This is similar to the Latin American case where the
alliance of the national bourgeoisie with MNCs and the landed oligarchy leads to a situation
of hierarchical "internal colonialism" (Stavenhagen, 1966). In this case, not only the ruling
class and middle classes, but also urban workers gain higher incomes at the expense of the
masses.
Most of the theories reviewed above have elements that apply to the Turkish
experience of ISI: dependence of industrialization on external resources; internal
contradictions, which are crystallized in the form of "quadruple alliance", leading to cyclical
industrial growth, agricultural stagnation, excessive urbanization, uneven development,
and worsening income distribution; separation of domestic resource use from domestic
demand; dual industrial structure; high levels of unemployment due to the limited capacity
of ISI to generate employment. However, a deep theoretical understanding of the uneven
development of capitalism needs to recognize the relationships between general processes
(i.e., the logic and the consequences of capitalism in general) and specific historical forms.
Throughout history different forms of development have emerged, which are specific to a
given social formation at any particular period. Also, each historically determined social
formation develops unique forms of class struggle in a unique capitalist state, and a unique
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set of relationships with the rest of the international system. It would not be possible to
understand these forms as typical or atypical cases; rather they need to be understood as
unique parts of the whole capitalist sytem.
Ironically, the original rationale behind ISI was that development was not possible
for the LDCs within the international system. The LDCs needed to become more self-
sufficient for any meaningful national development to take place. In the post-WW II
period, ISI was thought of as the golden remedy to the problems of the primary producers,
namely, balance of payments problems and high unemployment. ISI would not only lead
to balance of payments independence, but also overcome unemployment by creating new
jobs. The Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) at the United Nations argued
that domestic production of industrial goods, even at a higher cost than comparable
imports, was more advantageous for utilizing "surplus labor" rather than employing them
in production for exports. Thus, ISI would lead to self-sufficient growth (Prebisch, 1949,
50, 62). However, the experience of ISI, especially since WW II, has not resulted in
developing countries becoming more independent. On the contrary, countries like Turkey
became more tightly integrated into the international economy as a result of ISI through
external debt.
ISI is commonly called the "inward-looking" type of development as opposed to the
"outward-looking" export-promotion. In fact, there is not much that is inward-looking
about it. In practice it depends on external resources. ISI is heavily dependent on foreign
capital, technology and expertise, and imported inputs. It is also based on the consumption
patterns and marketing techniques of the industrialized countries that are already mastered
by the MNCs. In addition, given the increasingly unequal income distribution in the
developing countries, further diverging demand and production patterns result from ISI. In
sum, ISI led to a highly uneven development: widening gaps in the national, sectoral, and
regional distribution of income and increasing social, political, and economic inequalities.
The fact that the crises of the ISI are reflected as serious balance of payments crises
itself indicates that the problem stems from the way the developing countries are integrated
into the world economy. Specifically, it is the "import-dependency" and "MNC-control"
aspects of the ISI that create these periodic crises. During the "easy" or "horizontal" stage,
ISI is based on the local production of consumer non-durables and the local assembly of
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imported parts into consumer durables. Later during the "vertical" stage, internalizing all
phases of manufacturing of consumer goods leads to increased import requirements,
especially that of intermediate and capital goods imports. Therefore, the result is overall
increased import-dependency. Moreover, the control of the key sectors of the economy by
the MNCs prevents their usage for national development. The contribution of the MNCs to
local economies, e.g., technology transfer, is very limited. Eventually, due to heavy
external borrowing, ISI becomes impossible to sustain. Industrial growth becomes
conditional on import availability, and when this availability declines, so does industrial
production. Only a fresh injection of external borrowing makes it possible to move to the
next stage. Only in some countries with more developed industrial structures, did the final
crises of the ISI led to a switch to export promotion industrialization. This created several
examplary "miracles", e.g., Argentinian and Turkish. However, developments during the
"post-miracle" stage halting the ISI process to a great extent as these economies were
"opened up" to international competition.
International trade and capital movements are the mechanisms that transmit the
requirements of a given international division of labor, imposing certain kinds of
production and trade specialization patterns on the LDCs. However, this has always been
subordinate to the needs of the DCs. This nature of economic relations between the DCs
and the LDCs has remained unchanged during the Export Economy stage (exports of
primaries and imports of manufactures), ISI stage (domestic production of manufactures),
and Export-Promotion Industrialization stage (exports of manufactures by the NICs) of
development. In the Turkish case, incorporation into the world economy through export
economy, through ISI, and also through EPI, all led to structural changes with different
characteristics, but the end result was relative underdevelopment and external debt. At the
end of each stage, although progress meant a step up the ladder of "modernization", the
emerging industrial structure was not capable of sustained growth and broad based
development that would provide not only an increase in productive capacity and rising per
capita income, but also higher living standards for the whole population.
Theoretical implications
The experience of ISI in Turkey suggests a new theoretical distinction within
stagnation/underconsumption theories. The realization-crisis underconsumption theory
270
revolves around the gap between demand for consumption goods and capacity to produce
them (Lustig, 1980). According to this theory, stagnation occurs either due to over savings
or expansion of capacity to produce consumer goods at a more rapid rate than growth in
demand for those goods. However, in the Turkish case the reason for the gap between
demand for consumption goods and productive capacity is neither over savings rapid
expansion of industrial capacity. In contrast, it is due to excess capacity; in the face of
growing demand for consumption goods, productive capacity partly remains idle because
of the lack of imported inputs (intermediates and raw materials). Therefore, it stems not
from the demand side, but from the supply side. The crisis of ISI result from
"underproduction", not "underconsumption". The excess capacity in consumer goods
exists simply because capitalists are forced to operate with excess capacity arising from a
shortage of imported inputs. The productive capacity in manufacturing cannot keep up
with the increase in demand for consumer goods. As a result, the expected profit rate is not
obtained. Capitalists eventually reduce their demand for investment, as excess capacity
persists, thus aggravating the crisis situation that may result in stagnation unless additional
imported inputs can be made available for industrial production.
Lustig points to the distinction between the "realization-crisis theories", which
describe a sequence of essentially short-run phenomena leading to secular stagnation, and
the "market-insufficiency theories", which depend on the long-run structural features of the
economy. The lack of imported intermediates led to repeated production crises in Turkey in
the short run. This essentially was what happened at the end of each stage of ISI.
Therefore, it can be viewed as a special case of realization crisis theories. However, the
fact that ISI was abandoned after the crisis of the third stage, stems from long-run
structural features of the Turkish economy. The industrial sector was based on imported
inputs and technology, it was oligopolistic in nature, and delicately balanced on a quadruple
alliance of the state, the national industrialists, the armed forces and the MNCs. Besides
dependence on foreign exchange reserves, various socio-political factors played an
important role during the process of industrialization. For example, during the third stage
of ISI, because of the apparent character of the government (left-of-the-center), there was
not enough confidence within the business community for the implementation of the
intermediates and capital goods stage. Capitalists did not consider investment in these
goods, expecting that they would not be able make enough profit. Another reason for the
lack of private investment was that commercial and speculative activities, rather than
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productive ones, had become more profitable due to politico-economic uncertainties and the
rapidly rising inflation rate. As the state attempted to shoulder the burden of
implementation alone, the third stage proved to be unsuccessful, and the economy
stagnated again at the end of the 1970s. Therefore, it is possible to argue that in the
Turkish case both the chronic production crisis as well as the long-term structural
characteristics of the economy were responsible for cyclical industrial growth during ISI
and the eventual termination of it in 1980.
Practical implications
The practical implications of the economic structure that resulted from ISI can be
seen in the post-1980 period of EPI. Following the initial success of export-promotion,
since the mid-1980s Turkey seems to be heading for a serious debt crisis. The external
debt of Turkey more than doubled between 1978 and 1986: from $14.7 billion or 28% of
GDP to $31.2 billion or 53% of GDP. Also, the share of short-term debt exceeded 30% at
the end of 1986; this is already twice as high as the LDC average (Tusiad, 1987). If these
developments continue, Turkey will need to borrow $5-6 billion yearly. Even if no new
borrowing is done, servicing the existing debt would require a yearly external transfer of
resources amounting to 6.5% GNP. Given this heavy debt burden, if there are any delays
in external debt service, the balance of payments problem will be renewed. The existing
short-term debt is well above the yearly foreign exchange payment capacity, and thus can
create a crisis anytime. In addition, the rapidly growing debt will necessitate fresh
borrowing in the future. Therefore, the possibilities of both a short-term debt crisis and
long-term borrowing difficulties need to be considered carefully. These short-term
borrowing needs to be limited and inflation needs to be lowered from its yearly average of
30% (during the last 10 years) so that balance of payments, productive investment, and
savings all can have a chance to recover.
Import liberalization has been an important factor in the increasing external debt.
Contrary to expectations, imports of intermediate goods have contributed the most. The
main reason for this is the failure of ISI in the pre-1980 period. As ISI concentrated on
final consumption goods, it increased import dependence in intermediates and raw
materials. Thus external debt requirements increased well above what they otherwise
would have been. The increase in intermediate inputs above domestic production indicates
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negative ISI (During 1981-84 the contribution of ISI to growth was -3.7%.). However,
limiting import liberalization would increase cost inflation and, by depriving industry of
necessary (quality) intermediate inputs, decrease production and thus exports. On the other
hand, if imports of intermediates and raw materials continue to grow as they have been, the
trade balance will become unmanagable. Revenues from exports and tourism have not
shown the expected increases. In addition, the lack of sufficient foreign capital inflow will
contribute to another debt crisis. While imports of consumption goods up to 1986 did not
reach high enough proportions so as to contribute to debt, they have shown the potential to
present a problem if necessary precautions are not taken soon. Imports of capital goods
proceeded around their trend rate and did not contribute to debt significantly in the 1980s.
However, new investments in infrastructure, to the extent that they require external
credit,will contribute to the external debt burden.
A meaningful solution to the current difficult economic situation is not obvious. If
the growth rate of the economy is lowered, the need for new borrowing would decline.
However, given population increases and the already high unemployment rate, it is not
realistic to go below a 5% annual growth rate. One alternative is to return to ISI,but in a
selective way, i.e., in commodities with high export potential. Regrettably, Turkey has
difficult choices to make in the near future.
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